### Impact

The documentation of `remark-html` has mentioned that it was safe by default. In practise the default was never safe and had to be opted into. This means arbitrary HTML can be passed through leading to potential XSS attacks.

### Patches

The problem has been patched in 13.0.2 and 14.0.1: `remark-html` is now safe by default, and the implementation matches the documentation.

### Workarounds

On older affected versions, pass `sanitize: true`, like so:

```diff
-  .use(remarkHtml)
+  .use(remarkHtml, {sanitize: true})
```

### References

n/a

### For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in [`remark-html`](https://github.com/remarkjs/remark-html)
* Email us at [security@unifiedjs.com](mailto:security@unifiedjs.com)


### Impact

A vulnerability in `TimelockController` allowed an actor with the executor role to take immediate control of the timelock, by resetting the delay to 0 and escalating privileges, thus gaining unrestricted access to assets held in the contract. Instances with the executor role set to "open" allow anyone to use the executor role, thus leaving the timelock at risk of being taken over by an attacker.

### Patches

A fix is included in the following releases of `@openzeppelin/contracts` and `@openzeppelin/contracts-upgradeable`:
- 4.3.1
- 3.4.2
- 3.4.2-solc-0.7

Deployed instances of `TimelockController` should be replaced with a fixed version by migrating all assets, ownership, and roles.

### Workarounds

Revoke the executor role from accounts not strictly under the team's control. We recommend revoking all executors that are not also proposers. When applying this mitigation, ensure there is at least one proposer and executor remaining.

### References

[Post-mortem](https://forum.openzeppelin.com/t/timelockcontroller-vulnerability-postmortem/14958).

### Credits

The issue was identified by an anonymous white hat hacker through [Immunefi](https://immunefi.com/).

### For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, or need assistance executing the mitigation, email us at security@openzeppelin.com.


Friendica 2021.01 allows SSRF via parse_url?binurl= for DNS lookups or HTTP requests to arbitrary domain names.

OneFuzz is an open source self-hosted Fuzzing-As-A-Service platform. Starting with OneFuzz 2.12.0 or greater, an incomplete authorization check allows an authenticated user from any Azure Active Directory tenant to make authorized API calls to a vulnerable OneFuzz instance. To be vulnerable, a OneFuzz deployment must be both version 2.12.0 or greater and deployed with the non-default --multi_tenant_domain option. This can result in read/write access to private data such as software vulnerability and crash information, security testing tools and proprietary code and symbols. Via authorized API calls, this also enables tampering with existing data and unauthorized code execution on Azure compute resources. This issue is resolved starting in release 2.31.0, via the addition of application-level check of the bearer token's `issuer` against an administrator-configured allowlist. As a workaround users can restrict access to the tenant of a deployed OneFuzz instance < 2.31.0 by redeploying in the default configuration, which omits the `--multi_tenant_domain` option.

### Impact
A Template Injection was identified in cron-utils enabling attackers to inject arbitrary Java EL expressions, leading to unauthenticated Remote Code Execution (RCE) vulnerability. Versions up to 9.1.2 are susceptible to this vulnerability. Please note, that only projects using the @Cron annotation to validate untrusted Cron expressions are affected.

### Patches
The issue was patched and a new version was released. Please upgrade to version 9.1.6.

### Workarounds
There are no known workarounds up to this moment.

### References
A description of the issue is provided in [issue 461](https://github.com/jmrozanec/cron-utils/issues/461)

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:

Open an issue in the [cron-utils Github repository](https://github.com/jmrozanec/cron-utils)

### Impact
This affects uses who are using nginx ngx_http_auth_request_module with Authelia, it allows a malicious individual who crafts a malformed HTTP request to bypass the authentication mechanism. It additionally could theoretically affect other proxy servers, but all of the ones we officially support except nginx do not allow malformed URI paths.

### Patches
The problem is rectified entirely in v4.29.3. As this patch is relatively straightforward we can back port this to any version upon request. Alternatively we are supplying a git patch to 4.25.1 which should be relatively straightforward to apply to any version, the git patches for specific versions can be found below.

<details><summary>Patch for 4.25.1:</summary><p>

```patch
From ca22f3d2c44ca7bef043ffbeeb06d6659c1d550f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: James Elliott <james-d-elliott@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 19 May 2021 12:10:13 +1000
Subject: [PATCH] fix(handlers): verify returns 200 on malformed request

This is a git patch for commit at tag v4.25.1 to address a potential method to bypass authentication in proxies that forward malformed information to Authelia in the forward auth process. Instead of returning a 200 this ensures that Authelia returns a 401 when this occurs.
---
 internal/handlers/handler_verify.go | 4 +++-
 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go b/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go
index 65c064ce..4dd9702d 100644
--- a/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go
+++ b/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go
@@ -396,7 +396,9 @@ func VerifyGet(cfg schema.AuthenticationBackendConfiguration) middlewares.Reques
 		targetURL, err := getOriginalURL(ctx)
 
 		if err != nil {
-			ctx.Error(fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse target URL: %s", err), operationFailedMessage)
+			ctx.Logger.Error(fmt.Errorf("Unable to parse target URL: %s", err))
+			ctx.ReplyUnauthorized()
+
 			return
 		}
 
-- 
2.31.1
```

</p></details>

### Workarounds
The most relevant workaround is upgrading. **If you need assistance with an upgrade please contact us on [Matrix](https://riot.im/app/#/room/#authelia:matrix.org) or [Discord](https://discord.authelia.com).** Please just let us know you're needing help upgrading to above 4.29.2. 

You can add an block which fails requests that contains a malformed URI in the internal location block. We have crafted one that should work in most instances, it basically checks no chars that are required to be URL-encoded for either the path or the query are in the URI. Basically this regex checks that the characters between the square braces are the only characters in the $request_uri header, if they exist, it returns a HTTP 401 status code. The characters in the regex match are tested to not cause a parsing error that would result in a failure, however they are not exhaustive since query strings seem to not always conform to the RFC.

<details><summary>authelia.conf:</summary><p>

```nginx
location /authelia {
    internal;
    # **IMPORTANT**
    # This block rejects requests with a 401 which contain characters that are unable to be parsed.
    # It is necessary for security prior to v4.29.3 due to the fact we returned an invalid code in the event of a parser error.
    # You may comment this section if you're using Authelia v4.29.3 or above. We strongly recommend upgrading.
    # RFC3986: http://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc3986
    # Commentary on RFC regarding Query Strings: https://www.456bereastreet.com/archive/201008/what_characters_are_allowed_unencoded_in_query_strings/
    if ($request_uri ~ [^a-zA-Z0-9_+-=\!@$%&*?~.:#'\;\[\]]) {
        return 401;
    }

    # Include the remainder of the block here. 
}
````

</p></details>

### Discovery

This issue was discovered by:

Siemens Energy
Cybersecurity Red Team

- Silas Francisco
- Ricardo Pesqueira


### Identifying active exploitation of the vulnerability

The following regex should match log entries that are an indication of the vulnerability being exploited:
```regex
level=error msg="Unable to parse target URL: Unable to parse URL (extracted from X-Original-URL header)?.*?: parse.*?net/url:.*github\.com/authelia/authelia/internal/handlers/handler_verify\.go
```

Example log entry ***with*** X-Original-URL configured:
```log
time="2021-05-21T16:31:15+10:00" level=error msg="Unable to parse target URL: Unable to parse URL extracted from X-Original-URL header: parse \"https://example.com/": net/url: invalid control character in URL" method=GET path=/api/verify remote_ip=192.168.1.10 stack="github.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/authelia_context.go:65 (*AutheliaCtx).Error\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go:431     VerifyGet.func1\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/authelia_context.go:50 AutheliaMiddleware.func1.1\ngithub.com/fasthttp/router@v1.3.12/router.go:414                         (*Router).Handler\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/log_request.go:14      LogRequestMiddleware.func1\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/server.go:2219                       (*Server).serveConn\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/workerpool.go:223                    (*workerPool).workerFunc\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/workerpool.go:195                    (*workerPool).getCh.func1\nruntime/asm_amd64.s:1371                                                 goexit"
```

Example log entry ***without*** X-Original-URL configured:
```log
time="2021-05-21T16:30:17+10:00" level=error msg="Unable to parse target URL: Unable to parse URL https://example.com/: parse \"https://example.com/": net/url: invalid control character in URL" method=GET path=/api/verify remote_ip=192.168.1.10 stack="github.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/authelia_context.go:65 (*AutheliaCtx).Error\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/handlers/handler_verify.go:431     VerifyGet.func1\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/authelia_context.go:50 AutheliaMiddleware.func1.1\ngithub.com/fasthttp/router@v1.3.12/router.go:414                         (*Router).Handler\ngithub.com/authelia/authelia/internal/middlewares/log_request.go:14      LogRequestMiddleware.func1\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/server.go:2219                       (*Server).serveConn\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/workerpool.go:223                    (*workerPool).workerFunc\ngithub.com/valyala/fasthttp@v1.24.0/workerpool.go:195                    (*workerPool).getCh.func1\nruntime/asm_amd64.s:1371                                                 goexit"
```

### For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open a [Discussion](https://github.com/authelia/authelia/discussions)
* Email us at [security@authelia.com](mailto:security@authelia.com)

### Edit / Adjustment

This CVE has been edited adjusting the score to more accurately reflect the guidance in the [official CVSS 3.1 guide](https://www.first.org/cvss/specification-document). Due to misunderstandings about the CVSS indicators this was incorrectly assigned but this has been corrected. Under close evaluation the score we originally assigned to this CVE is inappropriate in two clearly identifiable criteria:

- Complexity (Low -> High): This attack requires the administrator be using NGINX's auth_request module. This means the attack cannot be exploited at will but rather requires a pre-condition separate to the vulnerable system outside of the attackers control (a vulnerable version of NGINX - at the time of this writing NGINX's security team has *refused* to fix the clear bug on their end but that's effectively irrelevant since we operate with more than just a NGINX proxy and no other proxy has this vulnerability), and requires the attacker have gathered knowledge about the system for this likely to be exploited.
 - Availability (High -> None): This attack does not alter availability directly.

ssh2 is client and server modules written in pure JavaScript for node.js. In ssh2 before version 1.4.0 there is a command injection vulnerability. The issue only exists on Windows. This issue may lead to remote code execution if a client of the library calls the vulnerable method with untrusted input. This is fixed in version 1.4.0.

Apache Log4j2 2.0-beta9 through 2.15.0 (excluding security releases 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1) JNDI features used in configuration, log messages, and parameters do not protect against attacker controlled LDAP and other JNDI related endpoints. An attacker who can control log messages or log message parameters can execute arbitrary code loaded from LDAP servers when message lookup substitution is enabled. From log4j 2.15.0, this behavior has been disabled by default. From version 2.16.0 (along with 2.12.2, 2.12.3, and 2.3.1), this functionality has been completely removed. Note that this vulnerability is specific to log4j-core and does not affect log4net, log4cxx, or other Apache Logging Services projects.

## Impact

Starting with OneFuzz 2.12.0 or greater, an incomplete authorization check allows an authenticated user from any Azure Active Directory tenant to make authorized API calls to a vulnerable OneFuzz instance.

To be vulnerable, a OneFuzz deployment must be:
* Version 2.12.0 or greater
* Deployed with the non-default [`--multi_tenant_domain`](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz/blob/2.30.0/src/deployment/deploy.py#L1021) option

This can result in read/write access to private data such as:
* Software vulnerability and crash information
* Security testing tools
* Proprietary code and symbols

Via authorized API calls, this also enables tampering with existing data and unauthorized code execution on Azure compute resources.

## Patches

This issue is resolved starting in release 2.31.0, via the addition of application-level check of the bearer token's `issuer` against an administrator-configured allowlist.

## Workarounds

Users can restrict access to the tenant of a deployed OneFuzz instance < 2.31.0 by redeploying in the default configuration, which omits the `--multi_tenant_domain` option.

## References

You can find an overview of the Microsoft Identity Platform [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/v2-overview).  This vulnerability applies to the multi-tenant application pattern, as described [here](https://docs.microsoft.com/en-us/azure/active-directory/develop/howto-convert-app-to-be-multi-tenant).

## For more information
If you have any questions or comments about this advisory:
* Open an issue in [OneFuzz](https://github.com/microsoft/onefuzz)
* Email us at [fuzzing@microsoft.com](mailto:fuzzing@microsoft.com)

fastify-reply-from is an npm package which is a fastify plugin to forward the current http request to another server. In fastify-reply-from before version 4.0.2, by crafting a specific URL, it is possible to escape the prefix of the proxied backend service. If the base url of the proxied server is "/pub/", a user expect that accessing "/priv" on the target service would not be possible. In affected versions, it is possible. This is fixed in version 4.0.2.

CVE ID↕	Published↕	CVSS↑
GHSA-9q5w-79cv-947m	Sep 7, 2021	Critical 10
GHSA-fg47-3c2x-m2wr	Aug 30, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2021-27329	Feb 18, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2021-37705	Aug 13, 2021	Critical 10
GHSA-p9m8-27x8-rg87	Nov 15, 2021	Critical 10
GHSA-68wm-pfjf-wqp6	Dec 20, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2020-26301	Sep 20, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2021-44228	Dec 10, 2021	Critical 10
GHSA-q5vh-6whw-x745	Aug 13, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2021-21321	Mar 2, 2021	Critical 10

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

2021 CVE Vulnerabilities — DevGuard Vulnerability Database

Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.

2021 CVE Vulnerabilities — DevGuard Vulnerability Database

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.