Open-Source Security Intelligence

Know every vulnerability
before it knows you.

DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.

Search

RUSTSEC-2026-0429

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Oct 22, 2026·Last modified Nov 2, 2026
Affected Components(1)
crates.io logozip
0.0.0-0 – 9.0.0
Description

ZipArchive::extract() sizes the symlink-target buffer from the uncompressed size declared in the central directory record, before reading a single byte of entry data:

let mut target = Vec::with_capacity(file.size() as usize);

Both inputs are attacker-controlled. ZipFile::size() returns uncompressed_size verbatim from the central directory, widened to a full u64 by a ZIP64 extended-information extra field, and is never cross-checked against the compressed size, the remaining archive length, or any platform-appropriate bound for a symlink target. ZipFile::is_symlink() is decided entirely by the S_IFLNK bit of the external-attributes field.

Vec::with_capacity() is infallible: when the reservation is refused it calls handle_alloc_error() and aborts the process. This is not a Rust panic. It is not caught by catch_unwind(), is unaffected by panic = "unwind", and is not contained by running the call on a worker thread.

A 112-byte archive is sufficient. One Stored entry flagged S_IFLNK with a ZIP64 field declaring uncompressed_size = 2^62 and a zero-byte payload makes extract() fail with:

memory allocation of 4611686018427387904 bytes failed
Aborted (core dumped)          # exit 134

The declared value only needs to exceed the host's address space, not its RAM: Vec::with_capacity() maps address space without touching pages, so resident memory stays flat and the abort happens on the refused reservation itself. Under a ulimit -v cap or a memory-constrained container the threshold drops far enough that a plain 32-bit uncompressed_size with no ZIP64 field suffices.

Applications that extract archives from untrusted input are affected on Unix and Windows targets with default features and no special configuration: upload handling, mail-attachment processing, package and artefact ingestion, backup restore and container-image layer extraction. No confidentiality or integrity property is affected: there is no memory unsafety, no out-of-bounds access, no disclosure and no data corruption.

The fix landed in zip-rs/zip2#984 and shipped in 9.0.0.

For further details see: https://github.com/zip-rs/zip2/security/advisories/GHSA-q7v9-x93c-xqv3

Upload your SBOM

Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.

Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.46%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

Browse More

Scan your project

Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.

Checkout DevGuard