Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
RUSTSEC-2026-0335
mykeymykey implements MIKEY (RFC 3830) for SRTP key exchange. Pre-shared key mode
transmitted the TEK Generation Key (TGK) in the clear.
MikeyMessage::new_psk_init built its KEMAC payload with EncAlg::Null and
placed the TGK in enc_data verbatim. Anyone able to read a PSK-Init message
therefore recovers the TGK — and so the SRTP master key — without knowing the
pre-shared key.
The transmitted value was never even used by the receiver: complete_psk
re-derived the TGK from the pre-shared key and ignored enc_data entirely. The
field was write-only; it provided nothing and disclosed everything.
A second consequence: the message authentication key was derived from the TGK rather than from the pre-shared key, so an attacker who read the TGK off the wire could also forge a valid message MAC. Integrity was lost along with confidentiality. That aspect is tracked separately as GHSA-xq78-wvcv-hqvj.
Exploitability
A MIKEY message is normally distributed as an SDP a=key-mgmt:mikey attribute,
which in AES67 and SMPTE ST 2110 deployments is typically announced over SAP
multicast. A passive listener on the media network recovers the session key with
no active attack and no credentials.
RFC 3830 §4.2.3 permits NULL encryption only where "the underlying protocols can guarantee security", and warns to use it with caution. An SDP file or a SAP announcement is not such a channel.
The fix
Pre-shared key mode now follows RFC 3830 §3.1 as key transport: the initiator generates a random TGK, frames it as a Key data sub-payload (§6.13), and encrypts it with AES-CM (§4.2.3) under an encryption key and 112-bit salt derived from the pre-shared key (§4.1.4). The message MAC is keyed from the pre-shared key and verified before anything is decrypted.
This changes the wire format, so both ends of an exchange must be upgraded together. The incompatibility is silent: an old peer and a new peer complete the exchange without error and then derive different SRTP keys.
Workarounds
Use ephemeral Diffie-Hellman mode instead of pre-shared key mode, or carry the PSK-Init only over a channel that is already confidential and authenticated end to end.
Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.
Drag and drop some file here, or click to select
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard