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RUSTSEC-2026-0211
No affected components available
AES-GCM decryption used an implementation for checking the provided
authentication tag against the recomputed authentication tag that was
intended to be constant-time, but resulted in non-constant-time code
generation in certain circumstances.
Note that libcrux-aesgcm does not give guarantees on constant-time
code generation and possible mitigations must be considered
on a best-effort basis.
Impact
Users of libcrux-aesgcm that expose a decryption oracle to an
attacker, which allows repeatedly querying for the same ciphertext
were at risk from timing side-channel attacks, depending on their
compilation environment. In the worst case, this could lead to
recovery of the recomputed authentication tag by the attacker, which
enables ciphertext forgery.
Mitigation
Starting from version 0.0.9 (published as libcrux-aes@v0.0.9),
AES-GCM decryption uses a different, best-effort constant-time
implementation of the tag check, which has been checked to reliably
lead to constant time code generation, at the moment.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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