RHSA-2026:48703

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0699, Vim's Python omni-completion (runtime/autoload/python3complete.vim and the legacy pythoncomplete.vim) executes reconstructed function and class definitions from the current buffer with exec() as part of populating the completion dictionary. When reconstructing that source, each scope's docstring is inserted verbatim between triple quotes with no escaping, so a hostile buffer can break out of the triple-quoted literal and execute attacker-controlled Python during omni-completion. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0699.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0698, the single-byte branch of spell_soundfold_sofo() in src/spell.c translates a word through a spell file's SOFO (sound-folding) byte map into a caller-owned result buffer. Its copy loop advances the output index ri with no upper bound and terminates only on the input NUL, writing one byte per input byte into the MAXWLEN-element stack buffer the caller provides. A word longer than MAXWLEN, passed to soundfold() (or reached via sound-based spell suggestion) while a SOFO-based spell language is active, therefore writes past the end of that buffer. This is a stack out-of-bounds write that corrupts the call frame and crashes the editor. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0698.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0735, the C omni-completion script in runtime/autoload/ccomplete.vim interpolates the typeref: or typename: extension field of a tags entry, without escaping, into a :vimgrep pattern that is run through :execute. Because :vimgrep honors the bar as a command separator, a crafted tag field can close the search pattern and append an arbitrary Ex command; opening a hostile .c file whose project tags file contains such an entry and invoking C omni-completion runs that command as the editing user. This issue is fixed in version 9.2.0735.

Vim is an open source, command line text editor. Prior to 9.2.0653, the tree_count_words() function in src/spellfile.c fills in the word-count fields of a spell-file word trie by walking it iteratively with a depth counter. The counter is bounded only by the trie structure itself; it is never checked against the size of the fixed MAXWLEN-element stack arrays it indexes (arridx[], curi[], wordcount[]). A crafted .spl/.sug file pair, loaded when the user invokes spell suggestion, can drive the descent arbitrarily deep, so the function writes past the end of those arrays. This is a stack out-of-bounds write that corrupts the call frame and crashes the editor. This vulnerability is fixed in 9.2.0653.