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PYSEC-2026-3933
Summary
The fix for GHSA-rwxx-mrjm-wc2m ("ReDoS via structured_outputs.regex compiled without timeout") wrapped the regex compile in the xgrammar and outlines backends with compile_regex_with_timeout (and, for outlines, validate_regex_is_buildable). The lm-format-enforcer backend was left unguarded: it compiles the attacker-supplied regex with no timeout and no buildability check. A single request with a catastrophic regex hangs the structured-output compile step and stalls the engine worker (denial of service).
Affected code (HEAD d6d39c1)
vllm/v1/structured_output/backend_lm_format_enforcer.py:
- line 110:
character_level_parser = lmformatenforcer.RegexParser(grammar_spec)— builds aninteregularFSM from the attacker regex synchronously, no timeout. - line 155:
validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcerreturns immediately onif so_params.regex:— no validation.
Sibling backends that WERE patched by GHSA-rwxx:
backend_xgrammar.py:92→compile_regex_with_timeout(...).backend_outlines.py:65→compile_regex_with_timeout(...)(plusvalidate_regex_is_buildable).
lm-format-enforcer uses the same interegular DFA-construction primitive the advisory cites for the outlines backend.
Reproduction (runtime-verified against the sink)
The sink lmformatenforcer.RegexParser(<regex>) was exercised directly (this is exactly what the backend calls):
baseline '[0-9]{3}' -> 0.0002 s
attacker '(a{1,300}){300}' -> DID NOT COMPLETE in 20 s (one core pegged at 100% in interegular FSM construction)
End-to-end: start vllm serve <model> --structured-outputs-config '{"backend":"lm-format-enforcer"}', then POST /v1/completions with {"structured_outputs":{"regex":"(a{1,300}){300}"}, ...}. The request never returns; because grammar compile runs in the engine's structured-output path, concurrent requests stall = worker-level DoS. The identical request against the outlines backend is bounded by compile_regex_with_timeout and returns a clean error.
Impact
Unauthenticated denial of service (vLLM ships with no authentication by default). One request pegs a CPU core and blocks the structured-output engine path.
Reachability precondition: the operator must have selected backend=lm-format-enforcer via --structured-outputs-config (the default is auto → xgrammar). This is the same opt-in tier as the outlines backend that GHSA-rwxx already covered.
Suggested remediation
Route the lm-format-enforcer regex compile (backend_lm_format_enforcer.py:110) through the same compile_regex_with_timeout guard already applied to the xgrammar and outlines backends, and reject un-buildable / oversized patterns in validate_structured_output_request_lm_format_enforcer.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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