Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
PYSEC-2026-2408
No affected components available
Summary
The discover_pipeline_files() function in src/ciguard/discovery.py (introduced in v0.8.0 and used by the MCP scan_repo tool shipped in v0.8.1) walks a directory tree following symlinks, with cycle protection via tracking visited resolved paths. An attacker who can plant a symlink in a directory the user (or AI agent) scans can cause discovery to walk into the symlink target and return paths to pipeline-shaped files outside the requested root.
Threat scenario
MCP confused-deputy. A user runs Claude Desktop / Claude Code / Cursor with the ciguard MCP server registered. The agent is fed an adversarial prompt to scan a directory containing planted symlinks (e.g. via a malicious clone or extracted tarball). ciguard.scan_repo walks the symlinks, returning paths and (via subsequent scan calls) file content from ~/.aws/, ~/.config/, /etc/some-pipeline-config/, etc. Pipeline files often contain hardcoded secrets, internal hostnames, deploy keys.
Patch
- New
follow_symlinks: bool = Falseparameter ondiscover_pipeline_files. Default refuses to descend into symlinked directories OR symlinked files. - Belt-and-braces: results are filtered to those whose
.resolve()lies underroot.resolve(), applied even when callers opt in tofollow_symlinks=True. - 3 regression tests in
tests/test_discovery.py::TestSymlinkSafety.
Discovery
Found during ciguard's first self-conducted penetration test cycle (PTES + OWASP TG v4.2 + CREST framing), 2026-04-26.
CVSS Scoring
- CVSS v3.1:
CVSS:3.1/AV:L/AC:L/PR:L/UI:R/S:C/C:L/I:N/A:N— 4.4 (Medium) - CVSS v4.0:
CVSS:4.0/AV:L/AC:L/AT:N/PR:L/UI:P/VC:L/VI:N/VA:N/SC:L/SI:N/SA:N— first.org calc 5.7 (Medium); GitHub's calc returns 2.4 (Low). Vector is correct — calculator profiles differ.
Reproduction
from pathlib import Path
from ciguard.discovery import discover_pipeline_files
# In a victim dir, plant: trojan -> /etc
# (or any other accessible dir containing pipeline-shaped files)
for f in discover_pipeline_files(Path('/tmp/victim')):
print(f) # pre-fix: includes paths under /etc; post-fix: only /tmp/victim/
References
- Fix released in v0.8.2
- CI regression gate added in v0.8.3
- https://www.cve.org/CVERecord?id=CVE-2026-44220
See also: GHSA-w828-4qhx-vxx3 — same conceptual pattern (path-validation flaw in an AI-agent tool) in Claude SDK for Python, CWE-59 + CWE-367
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists.
No exploitation activity has been observed at this time. Continue routine monitoring.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard