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PYSEC-2026-1948
No affected components available
Summary
An Open Redirect vulnerability exists in Taguette that allows attackers to craft malicious URLs that redirect users to arbitrary external websites after authentication. This can be exploited for phishing attacks where victims believe they are interacting with a trusted Taguette instance but are redirected to a malicious site designed to steal credentials or deliver malware.
Severity: Medium to High
Details
The application accepts a user-controlled next parameter and uses it directly in HTTP redirects without any validation. The vulnerable code is located in two places:
Location 1: Login Handler (taguette/web/views.py, lines 140-144)
def _go_to_next(self):
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_:
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter
This method is called after successful login (line 132) and when an already-logged-in user visits the login page (line 109).
Location 2: Cookies Prompt Handler (taguette/web/views.py, lines 79-85)
def post(self):
self.set_cookie('cookies_accepted', 'yes', dont_check=True)
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_:
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_) # ← No validation of next_ parameter
In both cases, if next_ is provided by the user, it is passed directly to self.redirect() without checking whether it points to the same host or is a relative URL.
PoC
Simply replace [your-taguette-instance] with your Taguette server domain and test these URLs in your browser:
Test 1: Cookies Prompt Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/cookies?next=https://google.com
- Open the URL above in your browser
- Click "Accept cookies" button
- Result: You are redirected to
https://google.com(external site)
Test 2: Login Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/login?next=https://google.com
- Open the URL above in your browser
- Log in with valid credentials
- Result: You are redirected to
https://google.com(external site)
Test 3: Already Logged In Redirect
https://[your-taguette-instance]/login?next=https://google.com
- First, log in to Taguette normally
- Then open the URL above
- Result: You are immediately redirected to
https://google.com
Note: We use
google.comas a safe external site for testing. In a real attack, this would be a phishing site.
Impact
- Who is affected: All users of any Taguette instance running in multi-user mode
- Attack vector: Social engineering / phishing via crafted URLs
- Exploitability: Trivial - requires only crafting a URL with a malicious
nextparameter - Consequences:
- Credential theft through phishing
- Malware distribution
- Session hijacking
- Reputation damage to organizations running Taguette instances
The vulnerability is particularly dangerous because:
- The login page displayed is completely legitimate, building victim trust
- Users have just entered their credentials, making them more likely to enter them again on a fake "session expired" page
- The trusted domain in the URL makes the attack more convincing
Recommended Fix
Validate that the next parameter is either a relative URL or points to the same host before redirecting.
Example Fix
Add a validation function:
from urllib.parse import urlparse
def is_safe_url(url, host):
"""Check if URL is safe for redirect (relative or same host)."""
if not url:
return False
parsed = urlparse(url)
# Reject protocol-relative URLs (//evil.com)
if url.startswith('//'):
return False
# Allow relative URLs (no scheme and no netloc)
if not parsed.scheme and not parsed.netloc:
return True
# Allow same-host URLs
return parsed.netloc == host
Then update the vulnerable methods:
def _go_to_next(self):
next_ = self.get_argument('next', '')
if not next_ or not is_safe_url(next_, self.request.host):
next_ = self.reverse_url('index')
return self.redirect(next_)
Apply the same fix to the CookiesPrompt.post() method.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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