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PYSEC-2026-1783
No affected components available
Summary
Picklescan uses the numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length function (a NumPy F2PY helper) to execute arbitrary Python code during unpickling.
Details
Picklescan fails to detect a malicious pickle that uses the gadget numpy.f2py.crackfortran._eval_length in __reduce__, allowing arbitrary command execution when the pickle is loaded. A crafted object returns this function plus attacker‑controlled arguments; the scan reports the file as safe, but pickle.load() triggers execution.
PoC
class PoC:
def __reduce__(self):
from numpy.f2py.crackfortran import _eval_length
return _eval_length, ("__import__('os').system('whoami')", None)
Impact
- Arbitrary code execution on the victim machine once they load the “scanned as safe” pickle / model file.
- Affects any workflow relying on Picklescan to vet untrusted pickle / PyTorch artifacts.
- Enables supply‑chain poisoning of shared model files.
Credits
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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