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PYSEC-2026-1223
No affected components available
This vulnerability allows for Cross-Site WebSocket Hijacking (CSWSH) of a deployed Bokeh server instance.
Scope
This vulnerability is only relevant to deployed Bokeh server instances. There is no impact on static HTML output, standalone embedded plots, or Jupyter notebook usage.
This vulnerability does not prevent any requirements for up-front authentication on Bokeh servers that have authentication hooks in place, and cannot be used to make Bokeh servers deployed on private, internal networks accessible outside those networks.
Impact
If a Bokeh server is configured with an allowlist (e.g., dashboard.corp), an attacker can register a domain like dashboard.corp.attacker.com (or use a subdomain if applicable) and lure a victim to visit it. The malicious site can then initiate a WebSocket connection to the vulnerable Bokeh server. Since the Origin header (e.g., http://dashboard.corp.attacker.com/) matches the allowlist according to the flawed logic, the connection is accepted.
Once connected, the attacker can interact with the Bokeh server on behalf of the victim, potentially accessing sensitive data, or modifying visualizations.
Patches
Patched in versions 3.8.2 and later.
Workarounds
None
Technical description
The match_host function in src/bokeh/server/util.py contains a flaw in how it compares hostnames against the allowlist patterns. The function uses Python's zip() function to iterate over the parts of the hostname and the pattern simultaneously. However, zip() stops iteration when the shortest iterable is exhausted.
Because the code only checks if the pattern is longer than the host (lines 232-233), but fails to check if the host is longer than the pattern, a host that starts with the pattern (but has additional segments) will successfully match.
For example, if the allowlist is configured to ['[example.com](http://example.com/)'], the function will incorrectly validate [example.com.bad.com](http://example.com.evil.com/) as a match:
hostparts:['example', 'com', 'bad', 'com']patternparts:['example', 'com']zipcomparesexample==example(OK) andcom==com(OK).- Iteration stops, and the function returns
True.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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