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GHSA-xwgp-w3pj-q5h3

HighCVSS 8.8 / 10
Published Nov 10, 2026·Last modified Nov 10, 2026
Affected Components(3)
npm logo@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf
3.13.0-beta.0 – 3.13.10
npm logo@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf
3.14.0-beta.0 – 3.14.0-beta.36
npm logo@ohif/extension-dicom-pdf
3.5.0-beta.0 – 3.12.18
Description

Summary

An XSS (Cross-Site Scripting) vulnerability occurs when an attacker is able to inject their own JavaScript code into a web page's source, which is subsequently processed by the victim's browser. A common cause of this vulnerability is the failure to validate user-supplied data before displaying it within the vulnerable application without proper filtering. To exploit the vulnerability, an attacker must input HTML code into a vulnerable parameter containing structures that trigger the execution of JavaScript. The DOM XSS variant occurs when user-supplied data is processed by a client-side script; if this data is not handled correctly by the script itself, it becomes possible to inject additional JavaScript commands.

Attacker model: Any actor who can get a DICOM object in front of a victim — email a .dcm for local viewing, upload to a shared PACS, or operate/compromise a DICOMweb source. Preconditions: Victim opens a study whose SOP Class is Encapsulated PDF (1.2.840.10008.5.1.4.1.1.104.1) and OHIF's dicom-pdf extension renders it (default in the standard modes).

Taint path

Source — two attacker-controlled tags on the encapsulated-document instance:

  • MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument (0042,0012)
  • EncapsulatedDocument (0042,0011) — the raw document bytes

extensions/dicom-pdf/src/getSopClassHandlerModule.js:15,20 reads the MIME tag with no validation and passes it as defaultType:

const { SeriesDescription = 'PDF', MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument } = instance;
...
const renderedUrlParams = {
  instance,
  tag: 'EncapsulatedDocument',
  defaultType: MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument || 'application/pdf',  // attacker-controlled
  singlepart: 'pdf',
};
const renderedUrl = dataSource.retrieve.directURL(renderedUrlParams);

Sink — defaultType becomes the Blob type in all three retrieval paths:

Local file (no server required): extensions/default/src/DicomLocalDataSource/index.js:120-131

directURL: params => {
  const { instance, tag, defaultType } = params;
  const value = instance[tag];
  if (value instanceof Array && value[0] instanceof ArrayBuffer) {
    return URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([value[0]], { type: defaultType }));  // attacker MIME
  }
},

DICOMweb InlineBinary: extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:40-44 → platform/core/src/utils/b64toBlob.js:18

if (value.InlineBinary) {
  const blob = utils.b64toBlob(value.InlineBinary, defaultType);   // -> new Blob(..., { type: defaultType })
  value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(blob);
  return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
}

DICOMweb bulk data: extensions/default/src/utils/getDirectURL.ts:52-55

return value.retrieveBulkData(options).then(arr => {
  value.DirectRetrieveURL = URL.createObjectURL(new Blob([arr], { type: defaultType }));
  return value.DirectRetrieveURL;
});

Render — extensions/dicom-pdf/src/viewports/OHIFCornerstonePdfViewport.tsx:86-92

<object
  data={url}                 {/* blob: URL whose stored MIME = attacker's MIMETypeOfEncapsulatedDocument */}
  type="application/pdf"     {/* only a hint; overridden by the blob's own Content-Type */}
  className={style}
>

Why it fires. A blob: URL stores the MIME type passed at new Blob(..., { type }) construction. When such a URL is navigated/embedded, the browser uses the blob's stored Content-Type to choose a handler; the <object type="application/pdf"> attribute is a pre-load hint, not an override. A blob created with type: 'text/html' therefore renders as an HTML document, and because blob: URLs inherit the creating page's origin, any <script> in it executes in the OHIF origin — with access to localStorage/sessionStorage, auth tokens, and same-origin requests to the PACS.

Impact

Users using the applications. If the application is behind authentication then session can be stolen. If on the same DNS name some other applications are hosted, they are also impacted.

Patches

Fixed in @ohif/extension-dicom-pdf 3.12.18, 3.13.10 and 3.14.0-beta.36 (fix: https://github.com/OHIF/Viewers/pull/6228). If you build OHIF from source, the fix first landed in tags 3.12.15, 3.13.7 and 3.14.0-beta.19. Versions 3.5 to 3.11 will not receive a fix. Upgrade to a patched 3.12, 3.13 or 3.14 version.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
8.8

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
8.1

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.42%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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