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GHSA-xvp7-8vm8-xfxx
No affected components available
Summary
The GoCardless components in Actualbudget in are logging responses to STDOUT in a parsed format using console.logand console.debug (Which in this version of node is an alias for console.log). This is exposing sensitive information in log files including, but not limited to:
- Gocardless bearer tokens.
- Account IBAN and Bank Account numbers.
- PII of the account holder.
- Transaction details (Payee bank information, Recipient account numbers, Transaction IDs)...
Details
Whenever GoCardless responds to a request, the payload is printed to the debug log: https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/blob/36c40d90d2fe09eb1f25a6e2f77f6dd40638b267/packages/sync-server/src/app-gocardless/banks/integration-bank.js#L25-L27
This in turn logs the following information to Docker (all values removed here. These fields are possibly dependent on what is returned by each institution so may differ):
{
"account": {
"resourceId": "",
"iban": "",
"bban": "",
"currency": "",
"name": "<full legal name in the bank>",
"product": "",
"status": "",
"bic": "",
"usage": "",
"id": "",
"created": "",
"last_accessed": "",
"institution_id": "",
"owner_name": "",
"institution": {
"id": "",
"name": "",
"bic": "",
"transaction_total_days": "",
"countries": [
""
],
"logo": "",
"max_access_valid_for_days": "",
"supported_features": [
"",
"",
""
],
"identification_codes": []
}
}
}
https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/blob/36c40d90d2fe09eb1f25a6e2f77f6dd40638b267/packages/sync-server/src/app-gocardless/banks/integration-bank.js#L83-L85
This is the first of the 10 transactions:
{
"top10Transactions": [{
"transactionId": "",
"entryReference": "",
"bookingDate": "",
"valueDate": "",
"transactionAmount": {
"amount": "",
"currency": ""
},
"creditorName": "",
"creditorAccount": {
"bban": ""
},
"debtorName": "",
"debtorAccount": {
"bban": ""
},
"remittanceInformationUnstructured": "",
"remittanceInformationStructuredArray": [
{"reference": "", "referenceType": ""}
],
"additionalInformation": "",
"proprietaryBankTransactionCode": "",
"debtorAgent": "",
"internalTransactionId": "",
"payeeName": "",
"date": ""
}]
}
Additionally, in the error handling for GoCardless, there is a catch all for unclassified errors that prints the entire stack trace to the console.
https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/blob/36c40d90d2fe09eb1f25a6e2f77f6dd40638b267/packages/sync-server/src/app-gocardless/app-gocardless.js#L263-L264
Our bank was offline today for maintenance which threw a 503 error from Gocardless. The entire response payload was dumped to console, which includes the Bearer tokens for accessing GoCardless:
Something went wrong ServiceError: Institution service unavailable
at handleGoCardlessError (file:///app/src/app-gocardless/services/gocardless-service.js:59:13)
at Object.getTransactions (file:///app/src/app-gocardless/services/gocardless-service.js:530:7)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:95:5)
at async Object.getNormalizedTransactions (file:///app/src/app-gocardless/services/gocardless-service.js:267:26)
at async file:///app/src/app-gocardless/app-gocardless.js:186:13 {
details: h [AxiosError]: Request failed with status code 503
at te (file:///app/node_modules/nordigen-node/dist/index.esm.js:13:914)
at IncomingMessage.<anonymous> (file:///app/node_modules/nordigen-node/dist/index.esm.js:17:16315)
at IncomingMessage.emit (node:events:529:35)
at endReadableNT (node:internal/streams/readable:1400:12)
at process.processTicksAndRejections (node:internal/process/task_queues:82:21) {
code: 'ERR_BAD_RESPONSE',
config: {
transitional: {
silentJSONParsing: true,
forcedJSONParsing: true,
clarifyTimeoutError: false
},
adapter: [ 'xhr', 'http' ],
transformRequest: [ [Function (anonymous)] ],
transformResponse: [ [Function (anonymous)] ],
timeout: 0,
xsrfCookieName: 'XSRF-TOKEN',
xsrfHeaderName: 'X-XSRF-TOKEN',
maxContentLength: -1,
maxBodyLength: -1,
env: {
FormData: [Function: _] {
LINE_BREAK: '\r\n',
DEFAULT_CONTENT_TYPE: 'application/octet-stream'
},
Blob: [class Blob]
},
validateStatus: [Function: validateStatus],
headers: T [AxiosHeaders] {
Accept: 'application/json',
'Content-Type': 'application/json',
'User-Agent': 'Nordigen-Node-v2',
'Authorization': 'Bearer eyJ0eXAi... (the full token is in the response)',
'Accept-Encoding': 'gzip, compress, deflate, br'
},
method: 'get',
url: URL {
href: 'https://bankaccountdata.gocardless.com/api/v2/accounts/<Account id Was Here>?date_from=2024-12-22',
origin: 'https://bankaccountdata.gocardless.com',
protocol: 'https:',
username: '',
password: '',
host: 'bankaccountdata.gocardless.com',
hostname: 'bankaccountdata.gocardless.com',
port: '',
pathname: '/api/v2/accounts/<Account id Was Here>/transactions',
search: '?date_from=2024-12-22',
searchParams: URLSearchParams { 'date_from' => '2024-12-22' },
hash: ''
},
data: undefined
},
And quite a few pages more.
PoC
- Setup an Actualbudget server inside of Docker. In this instance I was using the Docker Compose script posted in the repository: https://github.com/actualbudget/actual/blob/master/packages/sync-server/docker-compose.yml
- Link a gocardless account to Actualbudget and sync a bank account
- Observe in the container using
docker logs actual-actual_server-1 -fthat sensitive details are logged to the console and ingested by docker.
Impact
Information disclosure. The services are available both on-premises and in environments that are not under the control of the end user, such as third-party providers who offer this application as a managed solution.
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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