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GHSA-xjhv-v822-pf94

MediumCVSS 6.9 / 10
Published Feb 24, 2026·Last modified Feb 28, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

The affected versions of Wasmtime can panic if the host embedder drops the future returned by wasmtime::component::[Typed]Func::call_async before it resolves.

Details

Starting with Wasmtime 39.0.0, the component-model-async feature became the default, which brought with it a new implementation of [Typed]Func::call_async which made it capable of calling async-typed guest export functions. However, that implementation had a bug leading to a panic under certain circumstances:

  1. The host embedding calls [Typed]Func::call_async on a function exported by a component, polling the returned Future once.
  2. The component function yields control to the async runtime (e.g. Tokio), e.g. due to a call to host function registered using LinkerInstance::func_wrap_async which yields, or due an epoch interruption.
  3. The host embedding drops the Future after polling it once. This leaves the component instance in a non-reenterable state since the call never had a chance to complete.
  4. The host embedding calls [Typed]Func::call_async again, polling the returned Future. Since the component instance cannot be entered at this point, the call traps, but not before allocating a task and thread for the call.
  5. The host embedding ignores the trap and drops the Future. This panics due to the runtime attempting to dispose of the task created above, which panics since the thread has not yet exited.

Impact

When a host embedder using the affected versions of Wasmtime calls wasmtime::component::[Typed]Func::call_async on a guest export and then drops the returned future without waiting for it to resolve, and then does so again with the same component instance, Wasmtime will panic. Embeddings that have the component-model-async compile-time feature disabled are unaffected.

Patches

Wasmtime 40.0.4 and 41.0.4 have been patched to fix this issue. Versions 42.0.0 and later are not affected.

Workarounds

If an embedding is not actually using any component-model-async features then disabling the component-model-async Cargo feature can work around this issue. This issue can also be worked around by either ensuring every call_async future is awaited until it completes or refraining from using the Store again after dropping a not-yet-resolved call_async future.

Resources

This was first reported in https://bytecodealliance.zulipchat.com/#narrow/channel/206238-general/topic/Panic.20in.20Wasmtime.2041.2E0.2E3.20.28runtime.2Fconcurrent.2Fcomponent.29

Risk Scores
Base Score
6.9

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges.

Threat Intelligence
3.6

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
0.36%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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Medium severity
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