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GHSA-xcx6-vp38-8hr5
No affected components available
Summary
The object.to_json builtin function in Scriban performs recursive JSON serialization via an internal WriteValue() static local function that has no depth limit, no circular reference detection, and no stack overflow guard. A Scriban template containing a self-referencing object passed to object.to_json triggers unbounded recursion, causing a StackOverflowException that terminates the hosting .NET process. This is a fatal, unrecoverable crash — StackOverflowException cannot be caught by user code in .NET.
Details
The vulnerable code is the WriteValue() static local function at src/Scriban/Functions/ObjectFunctions.cs:494:
static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value)
{
var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object);
if (value is null || value is string || value is bool ||
type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable)
{
JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type);
}
else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) {
writer.WriteStartArray();
foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
WriteValue(context, writer, x); // recursive, no depth check
}
writer.WriteEndArray();
}
else {
writer.WriteStartObject();
var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value);
foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue))
{
writer.WritePropertyName(member);
WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue); // recursive, no depth check
}
}
writer.WriteEndObject();
}
}
This function has none of the safety mechanisms present in other recursive paths:
ObjectToString()atTemplateContext.Helpers.cs:98checksObjectRecursionLimit(default 20)EnterRecursive()atTemplateContext.cs:957callsRuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack()CheckAbort()atTemplateContext.cs:464also callsEnsureSufficientExecutionStack()
The WriteValue() function bypasses all of these because it is a static local function that only takes the TemplateContext for member access — it never calls EnterRecursive(), never checks ObjectRecursionLimit, and never calls EnsureSufficientExecutionStack().
Execution flow:
- Template creates a ScriptObject:
{{ x = {} }} - Sets a self-reference:
x.self = x— stores a reference inScriptObject.Storedictionary - Pipes to
object.to_json:x | object.to_json→ callsToJson()at line 477 ToJson()callsWriteValue(context, writer, value)at line 488WriteValueenters theelsebranch (line 515), gets members via accessor, finds "self"TryGetValuereturnsxitself,WriteValuerecurses with the same object — infinite loopStackOverflowExceptionis thrown — fatal, cannot be caught, process terminates
PoC
{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}
In a hosting application:
using Scriban;
// This will crash the entire process with StackOverflowException
var template = Template.Parse("{{ x = {}; x.self = x; x | object.to_json }}");
var result = template.Render(); // FATAL: process terminates here
Even without circular references, deeply nested objects can exhaust the stack since no depth limit is enforced:
{{ a = {}
b = {inner: a}
c = {inner: b}
d = {inner: c}
# ... continue nesting ...
result = deepest | object.to_json }}
Impact
- Process crash DoS: Any application embedding Scriban for user-provided templates (CMS platforms, email template engines, report generators, static site generators) can be crashed by a single malicious template. The crash is unrecoverable —
StackOverflowExceptionterminates the .NET process. - No try/catch protection possible: Unlike most exceptions,
StackOverflowExceptioncannot be caught by application code. The hosting application cannot wraptemplate.Render()in a try/catch to survive this. - No authentication required:
object.to_jsonis a default builtin function (registered inBuiltinFunctions.cs), available in all Scriban templates unless explicitly removed. - Trivial to exploit: The PoC is a single line of template code.
Recommended Fix
Add a depth counter parameter to WriteValue() and check it against ObjectRecursionLimit, consistent with how ObjectToString is protected. Also add EnsureSufficientExecutionStack() as a safety net:
static void WriteValue(TemplateContext context, Utf8JsonWriter writer, object value, int depth = 0)
{
if (context.ObjectRecursionLimit != 0 && depth > context.ObjectRecursionLimit)
{
throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan,
$"Exceeding object recursion limit `{context.ObjectRecursionLimit}` in object.to_json");
}
try
{
RuntimeHelpers.EnsureSufficientExecutionStack();
}
catch (InsufficientExecutionStackException)
{
throw new ScriptRuntimeException(context.CurrentSpan,
"Exceeding recursive depth limit in object.to_json, near to stack overflow");
}
var type = value?.GetType() ?? typeof(object);
if (value is null || value is string || value is bool ||
type.IsPrimitiveOrDecimal() || value is IFormattable)
{
JsonSerializer.Serialize(writer, value, type);
}
else if (value is IList || type.IsArray) {
writer.WriteStartArray();
foreach (var x in context.ToList(context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
WriteValue(context, writer, x, depth + 1);
}
writer.WriteEndArray();
}
else {
writer.WriteStartObject();
var accessor = context.GetMemberAccessor(value);
foreach (var member in accessor.GetMembers(context, context.CurrentSpan, value))
{
if (accessor.TryGetValue(context, context.CurrentSpan, value, member, out var memberValue))
{
writer.WritePropertyName(member);
WriteValue(context, writer, memberValue, depth + 1);
}
}
writer.WriteEndObject();
}
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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