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GHSA-x3q2-h9hx-4r4j
Summary
When the LaTeX backend is configured to render TikZ pictures with the Tectonic engine (LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic")), the TikZ body and the document preamble from the input file are compiled by Tectonic without any restriction on TeX's file primitives. A crafted .tex file can read files the process can read and write files at paths the process can write. If the caller also sets tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=True, the document can run shell commands through \write18.
Details
docling/backend/latex/engines/tectonic.py writes the picture source into a temporary document and runs the tectonic binary on it. _resolve_local_dependency only decides which files are staged into the temporary directory. It does not limit what TeX opens at compile time, so:
\input{/abs/path},\verbatiminput{...}and\openinread arbitrary files, and their content can be typeset into the rendered picture that ends up in the conversion output. For an in-memoryDocumentStream, staging is skipped entirely.\immediate\openout/\writecreate or overwrite files outside the temporary directory. Neither needs shell escape. Tectonic's--untrustedflag does not block them either.
Separately, the TectonicEngine constructor defaults to allow_shell_escape=True. The LaTeX backend always passes tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape explicitly (default False), so this default only affects code that instantiates TectonicEngine directly.
Affected configurations
- Affected: callers that set
tikz_engine="tectonic", have atectonicbinary available (onPATHor in the docling cache), and convert untrusted LaTeX. - Not affected: the default configuration (
tikz_engine=None). docling does not installtectonicautomatically, and the CLI exposes no option to enable it.
Impact
Disclosure of local files readable by the process, and creation or overwrite of files writable by the process. Writing to startup or configuration files can lead to code execution. With shell escape enabled, commands run directly.
Proof of concept
\documentclass{article}
\usepackage{tikz}
\begin{document}
\begin{tikzpicture}
\immediate\openout15=/tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt
\immediate\write15{written by the input document}
\immediate\closeout15
\node {x};
\end{tikzpicture}
\end{document}
Converting this file with LatexBackendOptions(tikz_engine="tectonic") creates /tmp/docling-tectonic-poc.txt.
Patches
Mitigated in docling 2.132.0 by #4419:
TectonicEnginenow defaults toallow_shell_escape=False, and without shell escape Tectonic runs with--untrustedand--only-cached.- Before compiling, docling checks the generated document and every staged file. It skips rendering, and keeps the diagram as TikZ code, when the source uses the
\openin,\openout,\XeTeXpicfileor\XeTeXpdffileprimitives, or names an absolute, home, drive-letter or parent-directory path in\input,\include,\includegraphics,\InputIfFileExistsor\graphicspath.
This check is best-effort. It reads the source text, and TeX can open files in ways a text check cannot see, for example through package commands or names built by macros. As documented in the pipeline options reference, untrusted LaTeX rendered with tikz_engine="tectonic" should still be processed in an isolated environment.
Workarounds
Upgrade to 2.132.0. For older versions:
- Do not enable
tikz_engine="tectonic"for untrusted input, or run the conversion in an OS-level sandbox (container, no host mounts, read-only filesystem, no network). - Never set
tikz_engine_allow_shell_escape=Truefor untrusted input.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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