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GHSA-wmgg-3p4h-48x7
No affected components available
Summary
A stronger framing of the same root cause as GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7: the Environment.spec.runtime.podSpec / spec.builder.podSpec passthrough lacked validation, and MergePodSpec propagated dangerous fields into the generated pods.
Details
Three independent flaws compounded:
- Validate gap.
pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go::Environment.Validatechecked only container naming conventions, neverhostPID/hostIPC/hostNetwork/hostPath/privileged. - UPDATE bypass. The
pkg/webhook/environment.gokubebuilder marker registeredverbs=createonly. A tenant couldkubectl applya clean Environment and thenkubectl patchin the dangerous fields — the webhook was never called. - Merge propagation.
pkg/executor/util/merge.go::MergePodSpecunconditionally forwardedHostPID,HostIPC,HostNetwork,Volumes(including hostPath),SecurityContext, andServiceAccountNameinto the Deployments generated by poolmgr / newdeploy / buildermgr.
A kubectl apply plus a follow-up kubectl patch caused poolmgr to schedule a privileged pod with a host-root mount within roughly 20 seconds. From that pod the cluster CA private key was readable, allowing the attacker to sign
arbitrary kubelet certificates and achieve full cluster takeover.
Impact
environments.fission.io create/update RBAC is escalated to node escape and, via the readable cluster CA key, full cluster takeover.
Fix
Fixed in #3391 (with the companion buildermgr SA-token fix in #3390) and released in v1.24.0. Each enumerated flaw is addressed:
- Validate —
ValidatePodSpecSafetyis called fromEnvironment.Validatefor bothRuntime.PodSpecandBuilder.PodSpec. - UPDATE bypass — the webhook marker is extended to
verbs=create;update; chart and envtest manifests are aligned. - Merge propagation — host namespaces,
ServiceAccountName, and hostPath volumes are stripped at the merge layer; per-containerprivileged/allowPrivilegeEscalationand dangerous capabilities are sanitized.
See GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 for the detailed fix — both advisories close to the same commit.
Duplicate handling
This advisory and GHSA-gx55-f84r-v3r7 were reported separately but close to the same code fix. Both are published to acknowledge each reporter's contribution and to keep the public CVE record clear about the multi-layer nature of the issue.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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