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GHSA-wjxp-xrpv-xpff
No affected components available
Summary
The Tekton Pipelines git resolver in API mode sends the system-configured Git API token to a user-controlled serverURL when the user omits the token parameter. A tenant with TaskRun or PipelineRun create permission can exfiltrate the shared API token (GitHub PAT, GitLab token, etc.) by pointing serverURL to an attacker-controlled endpoint.
Details
The git resolver's ResolveAPIGit() function in pkg/resolution/resolver/git/resolver.go constructs an SCM client using the user-supplied serverURL and a token obtained via getAPIToken().
When the user provides serverURL but omits the token parameter:
-
getSCMTypeAndServerURL()readsserverURLdirectly from user params (params[ServerURLParam]) with no validation against the system-configured URL. -
secretRefis set tonilbecause the user did not provide a token parameter. -
getAPIToken(ctx, nil, APISecretNameKey)is called. It detectsapiSecret == nil, creates a newsecretCacheKey, and populates it from the system-configured secret (conf.APISecretName/conf.APISecretNamespace/SYSTEM_NAMESPACE). -
clientFunc(scmType, serverURL, string(apiToken))creates an SCM client pointed at the attacker-controlled URL with the system token. The SCM factory sets the token as anAuthorizationheader on the HTTP client. -
All subsequent API calls (
Contents.Find,Git.FindCommit) carry the system token to the attacker URL.
Impact
The system Git API token (GitHub PAT, GitLab token, etc.) is exfiltrated to an attacker-controlled endpoint. This token typically has read access to private repositories containing source code, secrets, and CI/CD configurations.
This follows the same threat model as GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c (published March 2026): a namespace-scoped tenant with permission to create TaskRuns exploits the git resolver to exfiltrate credentials. The prior advisory involved reading the resolver pod's ServiceAccount token via path traversal. This finding involves redirecting the system Git API token via serverURL.
Patches
Fixed in:
- v1.0.2 (release-v1.0.x branch)
- v1.3.4 (release-v1.3.x branch)
- v1.6.2 (release-v1.6.x branch)
- v1.9.3 (release-v1.9.x branch)
- v1.11.1 (release-v1.11.x branch)
The fix validates that when serverURL is user-provided and differs from the system-configured server URL, the user must also provide their own token parameter. Using the system token with a non-system server URL is rejected.
Workarounds
- Do not configure a system-level API token in the git resolver ConfigMap. Instead, require all users to provide their own tokens via the
tokenparameter. - Restrict TaskRun creation — limit which users or ServiceAccounts can create TaskRuns and PipelineRuns that use the git resolver.
- Network egress policies — apply
NetworkPolicyto thetekton-pipelines-resolversnamespace to restrict outbound traffic to known-good Git servers only.
Affected Versions
All releases from v1.0.0 through v1.10.0, including all patch releases. The API mode of the git resolver has been present since the resolver was introduced.
Releases prior to v1.0.0 are not affected because the git resolver either did not exist or did not have API mode.
Acknowledgments
This vulnerability was reported by Koda Reef (@kodareef5), who provided a detailed analysis and proof-of-concept. Thank you!
References
- Prior advisory: GHSA-j5q5-j9gm-2w5c
- Related: #9608 (deprecate
api-token-secret-namespace) - Related: #9609 (SubjectAccessReview for resolver secrets)
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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