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GHSA-w72w-9qmj-c9qm
Summary
The telemetry subsystem embeds a hardcoded auth token ("secret") in the public source and transmits raw CLI arguments—including --secret, --jwt_secret, and --http_rpc_secret values—to a third-party telemetry endpoint.
Details
In telemetry/config.go line 12, var authToken = "secret" is committed in the public repository and used to authenticate to https://telemetry.anycable.io. In telemetry/telemetry.go, clusterFingerprint() (line 320) calls both anycableFileConfig(c.ConfigFilePath) (line 333), which reads the full TOML config file contents, and anycableCLIArgs() (line 402), which reads os.Args[1:] verbatim—including any --secret=..., --jwt_secret=..., --http_rpc_secret=... arguments. Both raw values are passed to generateDigest() (line 373), meaning the actual secret strings flow through the code path and are included in telemetry data sent to the third-party server. Since the hardcoded authToken = "secret" is public, any attacker who can perform DNS hijacking or is positioned on the network path can intercept and read the telemetry payload containing operator credentials.
PoC
- Read
telemetry/config.goin the public repo to findauthToken = "secret". - Set up a DNS spoof for
telemetry.anycable.iopointing to an attacker-controlled server. - Start anycable-go with
--secret=my-production-secret. - The server sends a POST to the attacker's endpoint with the telemetry JSON payload. The
clusterFingerprintfield contains data derived from rawos.Argsincluding--secret=my-production-secret.
Impact
In MITM/DNS-hijack scenarios, production secrets (JWT secrets, broadcast keys, RPC auth) are exposed to third parties. The hardcoded authToken = "secret" provides no protection since it is known to anyone reading the open-source code.
Fix
- Remove the hardcoded
authTokenfrom source; generate or require operator configuration at build time or deployment time. 2. RemoveanycableCLIArgs()from the fingerprint computation, or sanitize it to exclude values of secret-bearing flags before hashing. 3. Add a documented opt-out mechanism for telemetry.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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