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GHSA-w5r6-mcgq-7pq4
No affected components available
Summary
The authentication endpoint POST /auth/token in yamcs-core lacks any form of rate limiting, account lockout, or failed attempt throttling. As a result, an unauthenticated remote attacker can perform unlimited password guessing attempts against any user account.
This missing rate limiting vulnerability (CWE-307) significantly increases the risk of successful brute-force attacks.
Root Cause
File: yamcs-core/src/main/java/org/yamcs/http/auth/AuthHandler.java
POST /auth/token has no rate limiting, no lockout after failed attempts, and no CAPTCHA. The handler processes unlimited authentication requests without any throttling mechanism:
// AuthHandler.java — handleToken()
// No throttle, no failed attempt counter, no lockout
private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
...
getSecurityStore().login(token).whenComplete((info, err) -> {
// Directly attempts authentication with no rate check
});
}
This is absent by default — the official quickstart and documentation contain no guidance on configuring rate limiting.
Impact
An attacker can make unlimited authentication attempts against any account. This enables efficient brute-force attacks against any account.
Proof of Concept
# 20 attempts — zero rate limiting
for i in $(seq 1 20); do
curl -s -o /dev/null -w "Attempt $i: HTTP %{http_code}\n" \
-X POST "http://TARGET:8090/auth/token" \
-d "grant_type=password&username=operator&password=operator12$i"
done
# All return HTTP 401 — no HTTP 429 ever
Confirmed: 20 attempts in 0.07 seconds, no rate limiting enforced.
Fix
Implement DRF-style throttling on /auth/token:
// Track failed attempts per IP
private static final Cache<String, Integer> FAILED_ATTEMPTS =
CacheBuilder.newBuilder().expireAfterWrite(15, TimeUnit.MINUTES).build();
private static final int MAX_ATTEMPTS = 10;
private void handleToken(HandlerContext ctx) {
String ip = ctx.getRemoteAddress();
int attempts = Optional.ofNullable(FAILED_ATTEMPTS.getIfPresent(ip)).orElse(0);
if (attempts >= MAX_ATTEMPTS) {
throw new TooManyRequestsException("Rate limit exceeded");
}
// ... existing auth logic
// On failure: FAILED_ATTEMPTS.put(ip, attempts + 1)
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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