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GHSA-vqff-r82h-9crc
Summary
The MCP Apps UI resource (an interactive DataStore table rendered in the host's webview/iframe) communicates with its parent via postMessage. Its inbound message listener performs no event.origin validation, and its outbound messages are sent with target origin '*'. Any window/frame able to reach the document can inject data into the table and interfere with the MCP UI handshake, and the UI's own JSON-RPC messages are broadcast without an origin restriction.
Affected code
src/resources/datastore-table-ui.ts (inline HTML):
window.addEventListener('message', function (event) {
var msg = event.data; // no check of event.origin
if (!msg || typeof msg !== 'object') return;
if (msg.id !== undefined && _pending[msg.id]) { ... resolve/reject pending MCP request ... }
...
if (data && (data.fields || data.records)) initTable(data); // renders attacker-supplied data
});
// outbound:
window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc: '2.0', id: id, method: method, params: params || {} }, '*');
mcpNot: window.parent.postMessage({ jsonrpc:'2.0', method:method, params:params||{} }, '*');
There is no allowlist of accepted origins for inbound messages and no fixed target origin for outbound messages.
Impact
- Content spoofing. A frame that can
postMessageto the UI can supply arbitraryfields/records, causing the table to render fabricated rows and links (e.g. a phishing__link_url) that appear to come from the queried portal. (Values are HTML-escaped, so this is display spoofing, not script injection — no XSS.) - Handshake/UX interference. Because inbound messages matching a pending
idresolve/reject the UI's MCP requests, an attacker frame can spoof responses to theui/initializehandshake or otherwise disrupt the panel. - Outbound leakage. Posting to
'*'means the UI's JSON-RPC messages are delivered to whatever the parent origin is; if the resource is ever embedded by a context other than the trusted host, those messages leak to it.
Exploitability depends on the host embedding model (in a correct MCP Apps host the parent is the trusted host, which limits who can message the frame), so this is a hardening / defense-in-depth issue rather than a directly remotely-triggerable one — hence Low.
Proof of concept
-
poc/verify-no-origin-check.mjs— static confirmation that the listener has no origin check and outbound uses'*':[x] validates event.origin : NO [x] outgoing postMessage targetOrigin : '*' (any) RESULT: VULNERABLE -
poc/parent-spoof-poc.html— a page that embeds the UI and injects fabricated rows cross-origin with no handshake; the UI renders them.
Remediation
- Validate
event.originagainst the expected host origin on every inbound message; drop messages from other origins. - Send outbound
postMessagewith an explicit target origin (the host origin established at initialize time) instead of'*'. - Optionally, bind to a nonce/channel established during
ui/initializeso only the negotiated host can drive the panel.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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