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GHSA-vq4v-j7r6-jq4m
pnpmpnpmSummary
When resolving a package, pnpm uses the resolved manifest name as a raw path segment for the isolated-linker import target. A tarball dependency whose package.json name is a scoped path traversal (@x/../../…/<abs path>) is therefore extracted outside node_modules, to an attacker-chosen absolute path, and can overwrite existing files there. Attacker controls the destination, filenames, and contents → arbitrary file write → code execution (e.g. ~/.zshrc, .git/hooks/pre-commit, another package's code). Occurs during pnpm install even with --ignore-scripts (no lifecycle scripts run), defeating that safety.
Same class as the just-patched GHSA-hwx4 (transitive-dependency alias traversal) and GHSA-v23m (stage download manifest name/version traversal), in a sink their fixes did not cover: the isolated-linker import target keyed by the resolved name.
Root cause
- The isolated-linker import target is built with a raw
path.join(modules, <resolved name>)ininstalling/deps-resolver/src/resolvePeers.ts:706,installing/deps-resolver/src/index.ts:614, anddeps/graph-builder/src/lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233— without thesafeJoinModulesDirguard used on the symlink/hoisted/bin paths (installing/deps-restorer/src/lockfileToHoistedDepGraph.ts:222). The store location isnode_modules/.pnpm/<id>/node_modules/<name>, so a traversal<name>escapes. - The only resolve-time name gate (
resolving/npm-resolver/src/pickPackage.ts:753) rejects only unscoped names containing/, so a scoped@x/../..passes.
Steps to reproduce
Self-contained PoC (real pnpm@11.9.0; loopback tarball server; escape target is a throwaway temp dir):
npm i pnpm@11.9.0
# host a tarball whose package.json name = "@x/"+"../".repeat(25)+"<abs>/OUTSIDE"; victim depends on the http URL
pnpm install --ignore-scripts
Confirmed output (repro/poc.mjs, exit 0):
escape dir is outside the project : true
new file implanted outside node_modules : true
pre-existing file OVERWRITTEN : true
*** CONFIRMED: a tarball dependency wrote & overwrote files OUTSIDE the project during `pnpm install --ignore-scripts` ***
Remediation
Route the isolated-linker import-target joins (resolvePeers.ts:706, deps-resolver/index.ts:614, lockfileToDepGraph.ts:233) through safeJoinModulesDir (as the hoisted linker already does), and/or enforce validate-npm-package-name on the resolved manifest name (close the scoped-name gap at pickPackage.ts:753) so the import target rejects a traversal name and re-asserts containment before any write.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. The attacker needs the user to perform some action, like clicking a link. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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