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GHSA-vgrf-pr28-vf98
No affected components available
Summary
The deleteProcess() action accepts a POST parameter tables[] containing arbitrary table names. These are passed directly to $forge->dropTable() without validating that the tables belong to the theme being deleted.
The deleteConfirm view correctly populates tables[] from the theme's own migration files, but the server-side deleteProcess does not verify the received values against those files. An authenticated admin can craft a POST request with arbitrary table names and drop any table in the database.
This is a real bug even within the admin trust model: the action should be scoped to the theme's own tables. The permission grants delete this theme's data", not "drop any table".
Details
Location
modules/Theme/Controllers/Theme.php :: deleteProcess() ~line 147
Vulnerable Code
public function deleteProcess(string $slug)
{
$themeName = $slug;
$activeTheme = setting('App.siteTheme');
if ($activeTheme === $themeName) {
return redirect()->route('templateSettings')...;
}
$tablesToDrop = $this->request->getPost('tables'); // ← user-supplied, unvalidated
if (!empty($tablesToDrop) && is_array($tablesToDrop)) {
$forge = \Config\Database::forge();
$db = \Config\Database::connect();
foreach ($tablesToDrop as $table) {
if ($db->tableExists($table)) {
$forge->dropTable($table, true); // ← no whitelist check
}
}
}
PoC
- Authenticate to the backend (any user with theme.delete permission)
- POST to
/backend/themes/delete-process/<any_non_active_theme_slug> - Include
tables[]=<any_table>in POST body - The named tables are dropped without validation
Impact
- Dropped
ci4ms_blog(confirmed in test) - Dropped
ci4ms_users+ci4ms_auth_identitiessimultaneously — disables all authentication (confirmed) - Any table in the database can be targeted
Additional note
Quick note on the design intent for deleteProcess — I noticed delete_confirm.php scopes the checkboxes to the theme's own migration files, and the CHANGELOG confirms the selective deletion was intentional (admins can choose which tables to keep). The server-side deleteProcess already has all the information it needs to validate the input — deleteConfirm derives the valid table set from the migration files, deleteProcess just needs to do the same before acting on the POST. Happy to clarify if useful.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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