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GHSA-vchh-r53j-8mpw
No affected components available
HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate() validated Methods, FunctionReference, Host, IngressConfig, and CorsConfig, but silently skipped RelativeURL and Prefix. Those two fields were validated at the CLI level only
(pkg/fission-cli/cmd/httptrigger/create.go:83). The post-CRD-modernization webhook for HTTPTrigger was retired in favor of API-server CEL — and CEL had no rules on those fields either — so an HTTPTrigger created via kubectl apply or
a direct Kubernetes REST API call bypassed every URL-level check.
A tenant with HTTPTrigger create permission could therefore create triggers whose RelativeURL or Prefix:
- was empty (with both fields unset, the trigger has no URL),
- did not start with
/, - was exactly
/(claiming the entire router root), - contained
..traversal segments (e.g./api/../admin), - collided with router-owned routes:
/router-healthz,/readyz,/_version,/auth/login, - collided with the router-internal function prefix
/fission-function/<ns>/<name>.
Affected
- Project:
github.com/fission/fission - Versions: all versions through v1.24.0
- Audited commit:
647c141 - Component:
pkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go:HTTPTriggerSpec.Validate(and the missing CEL onHTTPTriggerSpec) - Configuration: default
Fix section (paste into the Fix / Patches field)
Fixed in v1.25.0 by:
- PR #3464 (commit
0deed6bf) — enforce the path-safety invariants at both admission layers so the API server's CEL evaluation and the Go-sideHTTPTriggerSpec.Validate()agree:- Three
+kubebuilder:validation:XValidationrules onHTTPTriggerSpec(the API server's CEL admission gate, regenerated intocrds/v1/fission.io_httptriggers.yaml):- at least one of
relativeurlorprefixmust be non-empty; relativeurl, when set, must start with/, must not be/, must contain no..segment, must not be in the reserved exact-path set, and must not start with/fission-function/;prefix, when set, the same rules guarded byhas(self.prefix).
- at least one of
validateTriggerPathhelper inpkg/apis/core/v1/validation.go, invoked fromHTTPTriggerSpec.Validate(), mirrors the CEL rules so the CLI's early rejection and the router reconciler's status-Condition path match what the API server admits.
- Three
Regression coverage: a new TestHTTPTriggerSpecValidate_Path table in pkg/apis/core/v1/validation_validators_test.go exercises every PoC case from the advisory plus literal ..-prefixed-segment positives that must remain allowed.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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