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GHSA-rvfr-cqwq-rc4j

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published Nov 17, 2026·Last modified Nov 17, 2026
Affected Components(1)
npm logo@libp2p/crypto
< 5.1.22
Description

Summary

A remote peer can stall a js-libp2p node's entire event loop for ~4–5 seconds per connection (and transiently allocate ~2 GB) by sending a ~15-byte crafted publicKey inside an Identify message. The malformed key reaches the DER decoder before any peer-id/signature check, so the attack is pre-auth and repeatable indefinitely by reconnecting.

Details

packages/crypto/src/keys/rsa/der.ts readLength() parses DER long-form lengths with no comparison to buf.byteLength, and readInteger() then loops over the attacker-claimed length:

function readInteger (buf, context) {
  const length = readLength(buf, context)   // attacker-controlled, claims up to 2^64
  const end = context.offset + length
  for (let i = context.offset; i < end; i++) // runs far past buf.byteLength
    vals.push(buf[i])                         // pushes `undefined` past the end
}

The blob reaches the parser pre-auth: Identify runs on every connection:open and calls publicKeyFromProtobuf(publicKey) (packages/protocol-identify/src/identify.ts:85) before the connection.remotePeer.equals(id) check at identify.ts:88. The MAX_RSA_JWK_SIZE guard in pkixToRSAPublicKey only bounds the total blob size, not the inner length field, so a 15-byte payload defeats it; the ECDSA path (unmarshalECDSAPublicKey) has no cap at all. The decode runs in a single synchronous tick, so no AbortSignal — including Identify's 5 s timeout — can interrupt it. Verified on js-libp2p commit a04f5e0, where @libp2p/crypto reads 5.1.21.

PoC

Full PoC attached (libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz). Build the js-libp2p monorepo at the affected version (npm install --ignore-scripts && npm run build), extract the package inside the monorepo root (sibling of packages/), then cd libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc && node attack.mjs. Expected:

[*] round 1: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 2: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4-5s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[*] round 3: payload sent=true, victim event-loop stall = 4s, peak RSS ~1980 MB
[!] Vulnerability reproduced: 3/3 connections each stalled the victim's event loop for ~4-5s — one crafted ~15-byte Identify publicKey per connection, pre-auth

The stall is measured from the victim's own 1 s heartbeat clock (frozen while the loop is blocked); the ~2 GB transient RSS peak is read from /proc/<pid>/status. The DER RangeError is swallowed by Identify's .catch(() => {}), so the node survives and every new connection re-stalls it; under a container memory limit the ~2 GB spike OOM-kills the process. A node attack.mjs control run (legitimate Identify) shows 0 s stalls.

Impact

CWE-130/CWE-400. Any node running the default Identify service is affected. A single peer can keep the node unresponsive to all of its peers (every new connection adds another multi-second stall — all timers, heartbeats, and protocol timeouts stop) and, in memory-constrained deployments, force an OOM kill. Suggested fix: in readLength, reject any long-form length whose value exceeds buf.byteLength - context.offset; in readInteger/readObjectIdentifier/readBitString/readOctetString, clamp or assert end/finalOffset against buf.byteLength before looping; add an overall DER-element-length sanity cap at decodeDer entry and a byte-length cap in unmarshalECDSAPublicKey.

libp2p-crypto-der-eventloop-dos-poc.tar.gz

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Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
N/A

Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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