Know every vulnerabilitybefore it knows you.
DevGuard continuously monitors your dependencies and alerts you when CVEs like this one affect your stack — with real-time threat intelligence built for developers.
GHSA-r7j4-crjv-h467
Impact
0.31.0 fixed GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, where text from a Compose file became GitHub Actions workflow commands in compose-lint's output. The fix escapes the command openers in everything compose-lint prints, and the 0.31.0 changelog says the report "escapes both openers (also covering Azure Pipelines)". Five paths were left open:
- Unicode whitespace before a line-leading
::. The runner strips all Unicode whitespace from the start of a line before it looks for a command. compose-lint only accounted for spaces and tabs, so a no-break space or another Unicode space ahead of::is not escaped. It can come from a Compose value, or from a file name: the text report's file heading and per-file summary, and thefixsummary on stderr, start with the path as given, so a directory named with a leading no-break space followed by::puts a command at the start of a line. This reaches those lines, the text report's fix guidance, thefixdry-run diff, and continuation lines of stderr diagnostics. - JSON and SARIF printed to stdout.
--format jsonand--format sarifoutput never passed through the sanitizer, so##[inside a service name or other value reaches the log intact when the output isn't redirected to a file. - Command-line errors. When a repository path reaches compose-lint's arguments without a
--before it, the argument parser prints it raw in its error message. That includes a carriage return, which the runner treats as a line break, so a command can also start a new line there. - Azure Pipelines.
##vso[logging commands were not escaped on any path, despite the changelog's Azure claim. - An error message in the GitHub Action (0.30.0 and 0.31.0). When
sarif-file:names a file in a subdirectory that can't be created, the Action prints the directory's resolved path in an error message, outside the window in which it turns command processing off. A pull request can commit a symlink on that path to a directory whose name contains a newline followed by a command. The documented setup,sarif-file: results.sarifat the repository root, is not affected.
A pull request can therefore create annotations, fold or hide parts of the job log, or issue other commands the runner accepts, when CI runs compose-lint over it, before anyone reviews it. The pass/fail result is not changed.
Affected setups are those that print compose-lint's output to a CI log without the GitHub Action: the compose-lint package run directly in a workflow, the pre-commit hook run in CI, and the Docker image. The pre-commit hook is affected in its default configuration: it passes each changed file's path to compose-lint, and a path whose directory name starts with Unicode whitespace and :: reaches the report's file heading. The JSON/SARIF and command-line paths also need output left on stdout, or args: without the documented trailing --, which is why they alone would score lower. The GitHub Action turns command processing off around each compose-lint run, so of these paths only its own error message affects it, and only when sarif-file: points into a subdirectory. That setup is outside the documented one, which is why that path alone would also score lower.
Found during an internal pre-1.0 security review.
Docker image. composelint/compose-lint tag 0.31.0, the matching minor tag, and latest are affected.
Releases before 0.31.0 are covered by GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6, except the Action's error message, which also affects Action 0.30.0.
Patches
Fixed in 0.32.0. The line-start escaping covers every character the runner strips before ::, so it holds for quoted values and file names alike. JSON and SARIF on stdout escape ##[ inside strings as \u005b, which decodes to the same data. argparse's own messages go through the same sanitizer. ##vso[ is escaped everywhere. In the Action, the SARIF-directory error names the sarif-file: input as written.
Workarounds
- Upgrade to 0.32.0 or later.
- On GitHub Actions, use the
tmatens/compose-lintAction, or bracket the compose-lint step with::stop-commands::<random token>and::<token>::, as the Action does. - In the Action, keep
sarif-fileat the workspace root, for examplesarif-file: results.sarif. - Write
--format jsonand--format sarifoutput to a file rather than the log. - End the pre-commit hook's
args:with--. This closes the command-line path only; it does not stop a file name at the start of a report line, so in CI also bracket the pre-commit step with::stop-commands::as above. - On Azure Pipelines, don't print compose-lint's output from runs over untrusted pull requests to the job log.
Reproduction
On compose-lint 0.31.0 on a GitHub-hosted runner (runner 2.337.0), each of the following creates an annotation:
- a Compose file with
image: "nginx\n\u00a0::notice::X", linted with the text report; - a directory named
\u00a0::notice::X(a no-break space, then::notice::X) holding acompose.yml, linted withcompose-lint -- '<that directory>/compose.yml', or by the pre-commit hook in its default configuration; - a service named
a##[warning]X, linted with--format jsonor--format sarifto stdout; compose-lint '--##[warning]X/compose.yml'with no--;- the Action with
sarif-file: out/reports/results.sarif, whereoutis a committed symlink to a directory namedd\n::warning::Xthat contains a regular filereports.
The same inputs with a plain space in place of the no-break space, or with -- before the path, or with sarif-file at the repository root, create none. The same inputs on compose-lint 0.30.0 create annotations even with a plain space, which is GHSA-6f4g-xm8v-pgv6. The composelint/compose-lint:0.31.0 image produces byte-identical output to the package.
Upload your own SBOM in CycloneDX 1.6 or higher (JSON) directly here to check your vulnerabilities.
Drag and drop some file here, or click to select
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
Browse More
Continuously monitor your dependencies and get alerted when vulnerabilities like this one affect your stack.
Checkout DevGuard