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GHSA-r3g7-r4hr-m258
obsidian-tcSummary
create_entity, link_entities, rename_entity, unlink_entities and delete_entity regenerate a memory note's body from SQLite at the computed memory/<type>/<name>.md path. When a note already existed at that path and was not owned by the entity being written (a hand-authored note, or an orphan left by a different entity whose name sanitized to the same path), its entire body was overwritten on the next write naming that (type, name), keeping only its frontmatter. Separately, several of these tools inserted or removed their SQLite row before the fallible filesystem step, so a refused note write could leave a relation gone, a retired status committed, or the wrong entity deleted.
Details
create_entityandlink_entitiesinserted the SQL row or relation before materialization.rename_entityseeded the destination path with a direct atomic write that bypassed the ownership check, and for a status-only rename could commit a retired status with the note write refused.unlink_entitiesremoved the relation row before discovering the source note's rematerialization would be refused.delete_entity's cascade could delete the target and its relations before a neighbour's note was found to be foreign.
The overwrite exists in every released version since materializeEntity shipped (git show v1.0.1:packages/server/src/memory/materialize.ts).
Impact
An authorized caller with memory-write scope (any agent using the M5 memory tools) can, without intending to, destroy the body of a vault note outside the entity it is writing, and can leave the memory graph inconsistent with the notes on disk. Snapshots-before-write (restore_note) mitigate the overwrite only where snapshots are enabled and the note had been written through obsidian-tc before.
Patches
Fixed in 1.31.4 at the shared primitive: materializeEntity refuses to write over a note whose obsidian_tc_id is missing or belongs to another entity; a new assertNoteOwnership pre-check runs before any SQLite mutation in the three lifecycle tools, so a refusal is a no-op; create_entity and link_entities roll back the row they had inserted. Verified by test/m5-memory-ownership.test.ts, which covers all five call sites and the rollback.
Workarounds
None that preserve the tools. Disabling the write:memory scope for callers prevents the write path entirely.
Credit
Found by the maintainer while building obsidian-tc memory import (PR #978); the vulnerability class was independently confirmed by a cross-vendor adversarial review.
References
- PR #978 (fix and test), CHANGELOG
## [1.31.4] ### Security packages/server/src/memory/materialize.ts,packages/server/src/tools/m5/memory-lifecycle-tools.ts
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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