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GHSA-qqmp-wf37-98f9
Impact
Multiple @opentelemetry/instrumentation-* packages recorded the database connection username as the db.user
span attribute on every instrumented database operation. This attribute was emitted unconditionally — it was
not gated by enhancedDatabaseReporting or any other opt-in flag, and it was the default behaviour for
all users of the affected packages until the patched releases shipped on 2026-07-23.
The attribute is forwarded to every configured observability backend (Jaeger, Zipkin, Datadog, OTLP collectors, etc.). Depending on the database account naming convention in use, the exported value may reveal:
- Internal service account names that disclose architecture topology.
- Role-encoded usernames (e.g.
admin_readwrite,app_readonly_prod) useful for privilege inference. - Database account naming patterns useful for credential enumeration.
Affected packages (all are vulnerable from the first published version through the version listed below):
| Package | Vulnerable range | Patched version |
|---------|-----------------|-----------------|
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-cassandra-driver | < 0.66.0 | 0.66.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-knex | < 0.65.0 | 0.65.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mongoose | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-mysql2 | < 0.67.0 | 0.67.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-oracledb | < 0.46.0 | 0.46.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-pg | < 0.73.0 | 0.73.0 |
| @opentelemetry/instrumentation-tedious | < 0.40.0 | 0.40.0 |
Patches
Fixed in the coordinated release on 2026-07-23 via feat!: only emit stable http, network and database attributes (#3585).
Upgrade to the patched version listed in the table above for each instrumentation package in use.
Workarounds
No configuration-level workaround exists in the affected versions: the db.user attribute cannot be
suppressed without patching. As a partial mitigation, a custom SpanProcessor can be used to strip db.user from spans before they leave the process:
// Example: drop db.user in a custom SpanProcessor
class StripDbUserProcessor implements SpanProcessor {
onStart(span: Span) {
span.setAttribute('db.user', null);
}
onEnd() {}
shutdown() { return Promise.resolve(); }
forceFlush() { return Promise.resolve(); }
}
Users who control the downstream collector can also filter the attribute at the collector pipeline level.
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The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The vulnerability can affect other systems as well, not just the initial system. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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