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GHSA-q9pw-vmhh-384g
No affected components available
Summary
The URL checking logic in PraisonAI has a logical flaw that could be bypassed by attackers, leading to SSRF attacks.
Details
The current PraisonAI project uses _validate_url to validate the input URL. The main logic is to perform security checks on the host portion of the URL extracted by urlparse to prevent SSRF attacks.
<img width="1290" height="1145" alt="QQ20260424-151256-24-1" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/d5f16b74-5ad2-444f-8600-b05f78a4b769" />However, there are indeed differences in parsing between urlparse and the library that actually sends the request. Currently, almost all application scenarios in this project involve first using _validate_url for URL validation, and then using _get_session().get to send the request.
<img width="1143" height="740" alt="QQ20260424-151437-24-2" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/b1bf6ec2-d32a-4dac-b814-da819e8d3c83" />In reality, its underlying mechanism is requests.get.
<img width="1042" height="576" alt="QQ20260424-151645-24-3" src="https://github.com/user-attachments/assets/e17352c3-4205-44d6-ab6e-75566480215b" />The core issue: urlparse() and requests disagree on which host a URL like http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1 points to:
urlparse()treats\as a regular character and@as the userinfo-host delimiter, so it extracts hostname as1.1.1.1(public)requeststreats\as a path character, connecting to127.0.0.1(internal)
Below is a test code I wrote following the code.
import sys
from pathlib import Path
from pprint import pprint
sys.path.insert(0, str(Path(r"D:/BaiduNetdiskDownload/PraisonAI-main/PraisonAI-main/src/praisonai-agents")))
from praisonaiagents.tools import spider_tools
# url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1"
url = "http://127.0.0.1:6666"
result = spider_tools.scrape_page(url)
if isinstance(result, dict) and "error" in result:
print("scrape failed:", result["error"])
else:
pprint(result)
When an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666/, the existing detection logic can detect that this is an internal network address and block it.
However, when an attacker uses http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1, the detection logic resolves the host to 1.1.1.1, which is a public IP address, thus passing the verification. But in the actual request process, this URL is forwarded by requests.get to http://127.0.0.1:6666, bypassing the detection and achieving an SSRF attack.
PoC
http://127.0.0.1:6666\@1.1.1.1
Impact
SSRF
The vulnerability can be exploited over the network without needing physical access. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a high impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a high impact on the integrity of the data. There is a high impact on the availability of the system.
Active exploitation in the wild has been confirmed. Immediate patching or mitigation is required.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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