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GHSA-q9m2-fhv9-3jcf
No affected components available
Summary
validate_path_security uses string-prefix containment (startswith) for boundary checks. This allows paths that are outside the intended project directory but share its prefix string (e.g., /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... vs /tmp/potato_proj_demo) to be accepted.
Details
Affected source location (root cause)
File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py
Snippet (lines 370–373):
real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
real_base = os.path.realpath(base_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_base):
raise ConfigSecurityError(...)
Snippet (lines 384–389):
real_path = os.path.realpath(normalized_path)
check_dir = project_dir if project_dir else base_dir
real_check_dir = os.path.realpath(check_dir)
if not real_path.startswith(real_check_dir):
raise ConfigSecurityError(...)
startswith() is string-based, so /tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/... passes when checked against /tmp/potato_proj_demo.
Confirmed affected call sites
File: potato/server_utils/config_module.py
validate_file_pathstask_dir branch (line 2113)
validated_task_dir = validate_path_security(task_dir, project_dir)
validate_file_pathsdata_files branch (line 2151)
validated_path = validate_path_security(file_path, base_dir, project_dir)
validate_training_configtraining.data_file branch (line 2286)
validated_path = validate_path_security(data_file, base_dir, project_dir)
PoC
from potato.server_utils.config_module import validate_path_security
base = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo'
vuln = '/tmp/potato_proj_demo_evil/file.txt'
try:
print('inside=', validate_path_security('/tmp/potato_proj_demo/file.txt', base, base))
except Exception as e:
print('inside_error=', type(e).__name__, e)
try:
validate_path_security('/tmp/other_demo/file.txt', base, base)
except Exception as e:
print('baseline=', type(e).__name__, e)
print('trigger=', validate_path_security(vuln, base, base))
Impact
- Can allow unauthorized sibling-prefix file access outside intended project boundary.
- Can affect read paths (
data_files,training.data_file,base_css,header_logo) and output/path placement depending on configuration.
The vulnerability requires local access to the device to be exploited. It is easy for an attacker to exploit this vulnerability. An attacker does not need any special privileges or access rights. No user interaction is needed for the attacker to exploit this vulnerability. The impact is confined to the system where the vulnerability exists. There is a low impact on the confidentiality of the information. There is a low impact on the integrity of the data.
Exploitation attempts have been detected. Elevated vigilance and prompt remediation are advised.
Probability that this vulnerability will be exploited in the wild within the next 30 days.
We did not find any exploit available. Neither in GitHub repositories nor in the Exploit-Database.
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